

Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

| NO. | DATE | CONFIDENTIAL | DESCRIPTION |
|-----|-----------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | Feb 53 | | Training Bulletin #1, DCI at 8th Orientation Course |
| 2 | Mar 53 | | Recommendation to D/TR that Remarks of Wm. H. Jackson at 9th Orientation Course not be made the subject of a Training Bulletin |
| 3 | Mar 53 | | Training Bulletin #2, Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense schools and colleges |
| 4 | Mar 53 | | Training Bulletin #3, Remarks of Vice President at the 9th Orientation Course |
| 5 | Mar 53 | | Training Bulletin #4, DCI (Smith) at 9th Orientation |
| 6 | Mar 53 | | Training Bulletin #5, Dulles at 9th Orientation Course |
| 7 | Jun 53 | | Training Bulletin #6, Cabell (DDCI) at 10th Orientation Course |
| 8 | Jun 53 | | Memo for the Record re Distribution and costs of Training Bulletins |
| 9 | Jul 53 | | Training Bulletin #7, Dulles (DCI) at 10th Orientation |
| 10 | Sep 53 | | Memo for Special Assistant, DCI re Training Bulletins from S/PP |
| 11 | 8 Sep 53 | | Memo for Special Assistant, DCI re Training Bulletins from S/PP Original returned to us with Drafts of Speeches, same as 10. |
| 12 | Sep 53 | | Drafts of Gen. Charles P. Cabell's address at 11th Agency Orientation Course (Two) |
| 13 | Sep 53 | | Drafts of Allen W. Dulles' address at 11th Agency Orientation Course (Two) |
| 14 | 8 Oct 53 | | Memos to cover Training Bulletins Number 8, Allen W. Dulles' Address, and Number 9, Charles P. Cabell's address. Handwritten notes to DTR from S/PP and to S/PP from DTR re Forwarding it in present format as Bulletin or send to Reg. - Controll Staff for regulatory issuance. |
| 15 | 23 Nov 53 | | Drafts of Allen W. Dulles' address at 12th Agency Orientation Course (Two) |
| 16 | 23 Nov 53 | | Drafts of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick's address at 12th Agency Orientation Course (Two) |
| 17 | 23 Nov 53 | | Drafts of General Charles P. Cabell's address at 12th Agency Orientation Course (Two) |
| 18 | 23 Nov 53 | | Covering Memos for Training Bulletins 10, 11, and 12 re Remarks of Allen W. Dulles, General Charles P. Cabell, and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick numbered respectively. |

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| 21 | 23 Nov '53 | Training Bulletin #10, Remarks of Allen W. Dulles |
| 22 | 23 Nov '53 | Training Bulletin #11, Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell |
| 23 | 23 Nov '53 | Training Bulletin #12, Remarks of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick |

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TRAINING FOR SPECIFIED DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

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A. General Statement

- (1) The Director of Training develops, directs, and conducts various training courses designed to impart knowledge, develop skills in methods and techniques, and increase understanding of the principles of intelligence, ^{and executive action} as these are directly related to specified duty assignments within the Agency. These courses are identified as Intelligence Training Courses.
- (2) Intelligence Training Courses are presented to prepare new professional personnel for specified duty assignments, to increase the proficiency of on-duty professional personnel in their current duty assignments, or to prepare on-duty professional personnel to undertake different or more responsible duty assignments within the Agency. Intelligence Training Courses are to be distinguished from the Basic Intelligence Course (BIC) covered by CIA Regulation ☐ and from those courses and programs in specialized fields subsidiary to the field of intelligence, such as courses in language and area, languages, and courses in various functional fields.
- Intelligence Training Courses are developed as the result of the identification and ^{establishment} ~~determination~~ of training requirements, standards, and objectives which are mutually arrived at by the various Office Heads and the Director of Training.
- This regulation prescribes the policies, responsibilities, and procedures governing the intelligence training of professional personnel for specified duty assignments in the Agency.

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PROPOSED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REGULATION

Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

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3 February 1953

TRAINING FOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

A. General Statement

- (1) The Director of Training directs and conducts various training courses in the ^{primary} methods and techniques of intelligence processes and operations which are designed to prepare new professional personnel for projected duty assignments, to increase the proficiency of on-duty professional personnel in their present duty assignments, or to prepare on-duty professional personnel to undertake ~~other or~~ different duty assignments in the Agency.
- (2) These courses in intelligence methods and techniques are to be distinguished from the Basic Intelligence Course which is designed to give new professional personnel an adequate basic intelligence background (see CIA Regulation), and from intermediate and advanced training courses for on-duty professional personnel in language and area, and in specialized functional fields.
- (3) Courses in intelligence methods and techniques are intended to supplement and not to supersede on-the-job training conducted by the various Offices of the Agency.
- (4) This regulation ^{prescribes} concerns the policies, responsibilities, and ^{intelligence} procedures governing the training of professional personnel for specific duty assignments in the Agency.

B. Policy

- (1) ~~New~~ professional personnel shall receive training in the course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques prescribed by the appropriate Office Head, in order to prepare them for their projected duty

assignments in the Agency

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- (2) On-duty professional personnel shall receive training in the course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques prescribed by the appropriate Office Head, in order to increase their proficiency in their present duty assignments or to prepare them to undertake other or different duty assignments in the Agency.
- (3) Satisfactory completion of the Basic Intelligence Course shall normally be prerequisite to the entry of new professional personnel in courses in intelligence methods and techniques. The prescribed course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques shall normally be completed before new professional personnel report to duty assignments in the Agency.
- (4) New professional personnel exempted from the Basic Intelligence Course and on-duty professional personnel may be entered in the various courses in intelligence methods and techniques, in accordance with the procedure set forth in D of this regulation.

C. Responsibilities

- (1) The Director of Training shall:

- (a) Identify, in cooperation with the various Office Heads, requirements for ^{training} ~~courses~~ in intelligence methods and techniques to be prerequisite to various duty assignments, ~~and to be prerequisite to various duty assignments~~.
- (b) Develop, direct, and conduct training courses in the methods and techniques of intelligence processes and operations ~~to be met~~.
- (c) ^{such training requirements} Transmit to Office Heads, from time to time, summaries of the courses in intelligence methods and techniques currently offered by the Office of Training.
- (d) Establish and maintain performance standards to be met by ^{enrolled} all personnel in courses in intelligence methods and techniques.

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- (e) Provide for training reports appraising the performance of all personnel ^{enrolled} in courses in intelligence methods and techniques, and transmit reports to the Office Head concerned and to the Assistant Director (Personnel) for their information and action.
- (2) Each Office Head shall:
- (b) Prescribe course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques, as he deems necessary and appropriate, to be taken by new and on-duty professional personnel of his Office and notify the Registrar of the Office of Training, in accordance with the procedures set forth in D of this regulation.
- (3) The Registrar of the Office of Training shall carry out the applicable provisions in D of this regulation.

D. Procedure

- (1) Training Liaison Officers of the various Offices will transmit to the Registrar of the Office of Training appropriate Training Request Forms for all new professional personnel, for whom course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques have been prescribed by the Office Head concerned, as soon as possible after the EOD date of such personnel.
- (2) New professional personnel shall be enrolled by the Registrar in the prescribed course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques. Courses will be taken in the order prescribed; where scheduling does not permit direct processing from the Basic Intelligence Course or from one course to another, such personnel will be assigned to temporary duty in the sponsoring Office pending the beginning of the appropriate course.

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- (3) Enrollment of new professional personnel exempted from the Basic Intelligence Course and on-duty professional personnel in course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques, when requested by the appropriate Office Head, will be similarly accomplished within the limitations of available training facilities.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 12

23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

1. The Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Kirkpatrick's remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FILED NO. _____ DOC. NO. 4 NO CHANGE
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REMARKS OF

MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

AT THE

TWELFTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

6 NOVEMBER 1953

* * * * *

I should like to talk only briefly about the Office of the Inspector General, and then I will devote most of my time to talking about a subject which is very close to my heart, a career in the Central Intelligence Agency, a subject with which I am sure all of you are concerned.

As to the Office of the Inspector General. Let us be quite frank about it and say that in a good organization or in a small, compact organization the necessity for an Inspector General does not exist, and I hope that some day, perhaps through some of my efforts, we can achieve that result in this Agency. This Agency has gone through a period of rapid growth--a growth which, by the way, was not so much of our doing as of other governmental agencies which wanted us to do many things in many parts of the world, some far beyond our capabilities--and it became very large in a very short time. As many of you may realize, we are now going through a period of stability, in which we are regrouping, reorganizing, stabilizing, getting our organization set down and developing ourselves professionally to the degree where we will probably rank, in short order, with the best intelligence services in the world. However, we did grow too fast and some of the problems that come to the Office of the Inspector General are the result of too rapid growth.

What the IG's office does in CIA is very briefly two things: First, it is my objective, with a very small staff, to perform at least once a year an inspection of every single component of the Agency. Inasmuch as this is the first year in which inspection has been performed, we will be much more thorough than in later years. In these inspections it will be our objective to see that the component which we are inspecting is operating within the jurisdiction of appropriate directives, is doing the job competently, is well organized, has its personnel well in hand, has good personnel management, handles its money properly and, in other words, is a sound part of the organization.

I report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence and, therefore, the Inspector General's reports go to the Director. However, it is my policy in reporting on a component to give the head of that component, generally

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the Deputy concerned, a chance to read the report before it goes to the Director, so that if he has any strong dissenting opinion as to the facts produced or the recommendations made, the Director will have the opportunity to review his comments simultaneously with my comments.

The second part of the IG's office is perhaps of more importance to you individually. We are open always to any individual in the organization who has any problems on which he cannot gain redress through the appropriate channels. I would like to stress that there are appropriate channels open to you, whether you have a personal problem or whether you have an official problem. But if you cannot solve your problem, if you become overly frustrated in trying to get it done through official channels, if you seem to run into a stone wall and feel that there is a problem there which should be taken up, the doors of the Inspector General's office are open at all times; and it is understood by all of the supervisors in this Agency that there will be no unfavorable reflection on anyone coming to the IG. I am there to listen, and in case I cannot see you personally, I have two able assistants who will be glad to see you, and we will be glad to do what we can to assist you. In certain instances we may be able to, but remember that bureaucracy in government is a great and complex organization, and we are not always able to cut the red tape or the organizational roadblocks which may be in your way.

Now, let us talk about career service. The very first question which I would like to answer is: "Why should the Agency have a career service which in any way differs from the rest of the Federal Government; why should it differ from Civil Service; are we a privileged group over and above any others?" The answer as far as "privileged group" is concerned is, of course, "no"; but the answer as far as the Agency is concerned is a very strong "yes." And it is "yes" because we have perhaps the gravest responsibility of any group of individuals in the Federal Government. It is not the Army or the Navy or the Air Force with all due respect to the men in those services who are the first line of defense; it is the intelligence service. And the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will come into combat only if the intelligence service fails. If our information is not sufficiently good, if our coverage of the world is not sufficiently accurate, if we fail to get advance indications of hostilities or of actions inimical to this country, then the military services will have to come in and pick up where we dropped the ball. Consequently, the first reason why there should be a career service is that we have a grave and important responsibility to our nation; the second, that we have authority and responsibilities given to us by the Congress, by mandate to the Director of Central Intelligence, over and beyond any other government agency in the United States, and over and beyond any authority or responsibility ever given to any other government agency in the history of this country. Obviously, the Director, himself, cannot fulfill these obligations and responsibilities personally and must delegate them to practically each and every individual in the Agency. With these responsibilities and obligations it is vital that we have the highest-calibre people in this Agency that it is possible to have.

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The third reason we should have a career service is that intelligence is a profession, a profession which is not easily acquired. We as a nation have always been, perhaps, as far behind as any power has been in the intelligence profession; only in recent years with the creation of the first Central Intelligence Group, and then with the creation of this Agency by Federal statute, have we started to catch up to the other great powers. We have a great distance to go to catch up. We have made amazing strides in the years since World War II but we have a large and sinister enemy in the Soviet Union and, perhaps, the most capable enemy that this country has ever faced in the field of intelligence and intelligence operations--sinister, ruthless, amoral, and with nearly all of the assets and abilities that we can put into the same field. Consequently, the intelligence officer who is brought into this Agency needs training, needs experience, and needs a broadening which only time and strenuous effort can give.

And, finally, the fourth and last reason for a career service is that it is extremely important that we encourage everybody entering this Agency to plan to make it a lifetime career and profession for security reasons and for reasons of cost.

As IG, switching rapidly to the other hat, I would like to say to you to remember always that the dollar you are spending as an employee of CIA is your own as a taxpayer and that it should be used with discretion whether you are writing a cable, typing up a memorandum, or engaging in an operation.

And it is very important from a security point of view that we have as small a turnover in personnel as we possibly can. Regardless of what the job of the individual is in an intelligence organization, he obviously acquires a certain amount of information as to its work, its assets, its capabilities, its competence, its knowledge; and the more people that enter this Agency and leave it after a short time, the more information about the work of this Agency there is outside of the Agency. I say that without impugning the motives of the individuals who are forced to leave the organization for personal reasons or for professional reasons, because we recognize that they are loyal and able American citizens or they would not have been here in the first place. Yet, regardless of how discreet an individual is, or how careful he or she may be after leaving the Agency, the security barrier is gone--we no longer have the daily knowledge of security by seeing guards on the doors, by having to lock papers at night. And, consequently, little by little the information about the work of the Agency starts to get out.

I am sure that all of you have heard about career service, and I am also sure that many of you are skeptical about what this Agency is doing about career service. So let me give you a very quick historical outline and tell you what is going on today.

The Career Service Program, as such, started under General Smith in 1951. He organized a CIA Career Service Board to study the problem and come up with recommendations as to what should be done. That Board was composed of

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Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors. They set up eight task forces on which individuals, through the level of Division Chief, were represented to study all of the problems that were necessary in order to establish a career service. Some of those problems were rotation of jobs, transfer between different components of the Agency, liberalized retirement benefits, medical benefits for dependents, tenure of office, job security, and so on down the line; all of the important factors that you are interested in as a career employee.

These task forces met on a weekly basis over a period of about a year, and they came up with voluminous studies covering each and every factor which affects your career. When the final report was submitted to General Smith, he established a CIA Career Service Board which was composed of the Deputy Directors, the Director of Training, the Assistant Director for Communications, and two representatives from each of the Deputies' areas on the Assistant Director level. That Board exists basically as constituted to this day.

Then each of the components of the Agency, each of the offices, established its own Career Service Board, and I might just say that some of them have worked exceedingly well. I would like to pay high tribute to the Career Service Board of the Office of Communications. It is one of the best organized and best operating in the Agency. Others have worked less well. The motivation on the part of some for establishing a career service and working toward this end has not been as great as others.

I would like to add parenthetically that I think the system as we have it today is a little cumbersome. It involves the work of too many high-level officials over too great a time. I think that in the very near future we will come up with a plan for streamlining and simplifying it, and for getting to what I think is the real basis for career service. This is the planning for each of your careers over a period from ten to fifteen years and talking over with you the plan for your career, insuring that it is in accordance with your desires and your aptitudes, and then launching you forward on that career so that you will know that today you are going to hold such and such a job; then, perhaps, you will transfer to another office to broaden your basis of knowledge and experience, and then you will return to your own offices; then, perhaps, you will have a period of six months of training with the Office of Training, and so on down the line over a period of years, in order that you can project your career ahead. I also envisage a board which will screen not only applicants coming into the Agency but also individuals when they pass through their probationary period in career service and perhaps later at a date when specialists and executive-type individuals will be put in the proper patterns for their future. I feel very strongly that each and every-one of us has different characteristics, different capabilities and different types of aptitude that should be developed for the best interests of the Agency.

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I would like to tell you of some of the things that are going on currently. In addition to the regular meetings of all of the Career Service Boards, we have under the very able leadership of of the Office of Training,

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a Women's Panel which has been meeting for some three months and is studying the problems affecting women's careers in this Agency and seeing what should be done to ensure that women can make just as much of a career and go just as far forward as men can in CIA.

We have a Junior Officers' Panel which is studying the problems peculiar to junior officers--grade levels of say five up to nine--to see what should be done to ensure that they can make a better career in the Agency than exists today.

We have a Legislative Task Force studying all of the problems of career service to see what we should go to the Congress to ask for in order that our career service can be the equal of any in the Federal Government, offer the same benefits and, incidentally, the same obligations. I think all of you should recognize that you cannot be on a one-way street as far as a career is concerned. If you are to have retirement benefits, if the Agency is to look after you in sickness and health, you must also recognize that the Agency expects from you an obligation to serve, to stay with the Agency over a career, and to give it the best possible out of your professional abilities.

Then we have a Writing Task Force which is important from your point of view, because I have so many comments like this: "I don't really know what career service is." We have a group preparing a booklet which I hope will be issued to you by the end of this year telling you exactly what career service means to you, what your benefits are, and all of the details as to training, retirement, and so forth.

That is, in essence, a very quick thumbnail sketch of a very large amount of work that is being done. We are trying to make sure that it reflects, not the official views of the Division Chiefs or the Assistant Directors, but the official views of every individual working for the Agency.

If you have problems on career service which are not adequately covered today, I urge you to submit them, preferably in writing, to your Career Service Board, and it will surely forward them up to the CIA Board if there are questions which it cannot answer.

In conclusion, there is just one word which I would like to say. The objective of the CIA Career Service Program is extremely simple. It is to make the Central Intelligence Agency not only the best place to work in the Federal Government but also to make it the Agency that attracts the most qualified and the best individuals for this type of work throughout our entire country.

* * * * *

Question: Is there any conflict between the function of your office and that of Organization and Management which is under DD/A? Do not the responsibilities of O & M also include inspection of offices and activities?

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Answer: Yes, that is quite true. But the delineation between the Office of the Inspector General and that of Organization and Management is that O & M is here basically to be of assistance to the offices with respect to organization and in the solving of their management problems, and the IG is here more as an arbitrator--to take the burden off the Director and the Deputy Director in working out jurisdictional disputes which cannot otherwise be worked out.

Question: How does the career service affect typists, secretaries, and semi-professional people?

Answer: It affects them in the same way as it affects anybody else in the Career Service Program. If they are here to make a career in the Agency and indicate this, it will give them the benefit of a job security which it will not give to individuals who are here on a short period of time. Of course, we obviously cannot interfere with matrimony or motherhood, which are two of the largest causes of the ladies leaving us, but it is still quite important from a security point of view as well as from a straight cost point of view to keep our turnover down as much as possible. Consequently, the Career Service Program will encompass the clerical and semi-professional people just as thoroughly as it does professional people.

Question: Is the lack of a college education a hindrance to advancement within CIA? Is the career program, for which many of us were hired, going to work to our advantage even if we do not have advanced degrees?

Answer: You will be judged in CIA strictly upon your abilities and your qualifications regardless of whether you have a college degree or not. As far as advanced degrees are concerned, if you are in CIA and doing a job, your advancement will be based not upon the degrees that you hold but upon the job that you are doing and upon your qualifications to advance to another job. If there is any action to the contrary, as Inspector General, I would be glad to examine the case.

Question: What about rotation between Offices in the Agency in Washington and rotation between overseas and Washington?

Answer: Rotation is one of our most serious problems today. It is a very difficult job, indeed, to preserve compartmentation, which is absolutely essential in every intelligence agency; and also, simultaneously to encourage rotation because you get a certain amount of resistance to rotation. It is, I think, simply a matter of more education because we have a system of rotation from your office to a training site to another office and back to your own office, which should broaden your career. I think it is mainly a matter of maturing our career service. As far as overseas and Washington is concerned, that is almost strictly within the one area of the DD/P, and I think that in itself can be worked out with time. Today, I am very distressed by the fact that some individuals come back and do what I think is a very invidious thing which is forced upon them, and that is, shop for jobs.

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I think we can stop that in short order and when they come back, well before they come back, they will know what their future assignment will be.

Question: Is there any tendency toward setting up a specific period of time for work in an overt position within the Agency before applying for a position on the clandestine side?

Answer: Basically speaking, that is the opposite of the normal way. It is much preferable to move from the covert to the overt side, but there is absolutely no reason for not moving in the other direction provided you go into a staff job where the fact that you were overt and may be identified with CIA is not detrimental to your work on the covert side.

Question: Since CIA is putting emphasis on improving the calibre of its employees, has any regulation been put into effect to enable CIA to dismiss employees for incompetence or mediocrity?

Answer: This does not require a regulation, basically. There is an established system in the personnel procedures, an established method for eliminating incompetent or mediocre employees. That is through the Personnel Evaluation Report. This is something in which I am extremely interested because, to be very honest about it, it has never worked well in the past. It has never worked well because we are all human beings and we do not like to call a fellow in and say, "Well look, Joe, you haven't been doing too well and we're giving you an unsatisfactory efficiency report." You probably know him and you probably know he has a wife and children and when he gets that news, it is going to raise certain mental anguish, if not greater than that. But basically speaking, that is the way it has to work. If we are going to have a highly qualified service with only the best people in it, unhappily there will be those who get evaluation reports indicating that they are not on a level with their fellow employees. Those evaluation reports must be discussed with each individual before they are accepted. The individual must be told what his weaknesses are and only then can the procedures be implemented for his elimination or resignation from the Agency.

Question: Do we have a retirement system tied in with present planning? Has anything been done about a twenty-year retirement law for CIA people?

Answer: The answer to both of those questions is "yes." We have, of course, an existing retirement system. We are all under the Civil Service Retirement System which actually is quite a liberal one. As far as a twenty-year retirement for service of a particular nature, that would have to be enacted by legislation.

Question: Because of the economy wave, do you anticipate any RIF's--Reductions in Force--in our Agency?

Answer: There will be none, as far as we know today. We obviously cannot predict the future actions of Congress, and we will have to be very careful

on expansion either in our expenditures or in the use of personnel, but as far as RIF's are concerned, I certainly think that we will avoid them if we possibly can.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 11


23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell

1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 3 November 1953.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FILE NO. _____ DUE NO. 5 NO CHANGE
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REMARKS OF
GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL
AT THE
TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

3 November 1953

Six months ago I addressed the Tenth Agency Orientation Course. I then gave my impressions of CIA as it looked to me after a very short period as a part of the Agency. It has been a useful and necessary exercise on my part to take stock after six months, and maybe you too will be interested in the results. So, let us take another look at those first impressions to see how, if at all, they have changed.

At the time of that previous talk last May, I had actually been a full-fledged official of CIA only a matter of days, although before being sworn in, I had spent about two months being briefed by individuals from all parts of the various elements of the Agency. I pointed out that I had been struck by the great devotion to duty displayed by all of those to whom I had talked in CIA, and remarked on the absence of "clock watchers" and people just filling in time. My closer association with the people in CIA has reinforced that first impression. It has confirmed to my satisfaction their unusually high motivation. I don't believe that I have ever seen a group more dedicated to the tasks that face them and more selfless in their desire to serve and get their jobs done. Their willingness to work as long as necessary to complete the assignment that is before them, to revise and refine, time after time, in order that the product shall represent the very best of which they are capable; that is the good, solid foundation that this Agency has developed and it will permit continuing development throughout the coming years.

As the Old-Timers among you will know, CIA has had its full share of reorganizations. In 1952 we had our last major reorganization--the one that put in their present form the components of the Agency with which you are familiar: the DD/P, the DD/I, and the DD/A, the Office of Training and the Office of Communications. We have now lived with this organization for over a year, and while there have been necessary minor changes and adjustments, it has proved itself to be sound and workable. It is unlikely that there will be any major upheavals in the foreseeable future. There will, however, be changes. We cannot stagnate. Once we settle down and say, "This is perfect and no further improvements can be made," then we have come to a standstill and have lost the ability to grow and progress. What is even more important, the Director and I are very much aware that there are weaknesses which

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only careful administrative readjustments and better practices can do away with, and we intend to take all the steps that we can to secure their correction. We can, therefore, expect to see minor changes here and there in both organization and administration.

Looking back again to what I said last May, I voiced my enthusiasm about taking over my job. I looked upon it as a most important job, one that presented a tremendous challenge. With six months of it behind me, dealing intimately with the problems of this Agency and working closely with its members, I can see very clearly that "I didn't know the half of it." This is an organization that deals with many facets of government activity. The straight intelligence side I had been familiar with for years as Director of Intelligence for the Air Force, and as Director of the Joint Staff. It is an activity that has long interested me very much. The special operations side was one with which I was almost completely unfamiliar, but about which I am learning more and more as time goes on. It is impossible to stress too strongly the importance of accurate and timely strategic intelligence. The decisions reached by the President and the National Security Council must be based on something more than educated guesses. It is our job to produce the necessary information, properly evaluated, which will enable the heads of this government to make important foreign policy decisions. That intelligence must be scrupulously worked up to ensure its accuracy. Furthermore, it must be timely. A piece of intelligence otherwise perfectly done and completely accurate is no good, if it arrives too late to be used. As for special operations, I am learning about the infinite care and ingenuity that go into their planning and execution. But then we cannot talk about them!

I am particularly pleased to see the new people of the organization who are coming along to do the work. Originally we had to depend on some of the old hands from OSS, Army, Navy, Air Intelligence, and State to get the "know how" so necessary in intelligence work. We are now, through our own training program, developing new professionally trained officers, both men and women, who are well equipped to join this profession. We have produced, and are continuing to produce, intelligence officers with a combination of training and experience, who can be counted upon to make sound judgments, produce solid intelligence estimates, and carry out effective operations.

We have gone to some lengths to set up a Career Service Board to ensure that our people are most advantageously placed from their point of view and ours, that their service is well rounded, and that they have a chance to develop themselves to the utmost. At the same time an effective Career Service Program will assure those who are best suited to this type of work that, in continuing in it, they will have before them a good solid professional career in government. They will have a

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career of which they can be justly proud, both because of the growing recognition of the significance of their contribution to the national welfare, and because of the inner satisfactions which come from doing a job that one knows to be important. But this career service goal imposes on us, as an Agency, another responsibility: We must be highly selective in our recruitment of new people. The very process of clearing applicants weeds out a great many. It is pretty much the case of "Many are called but few are chosen." Those of you who have been chosen, therefore, represent the cream of the crop, and we already have an investment in you. As such you are a force to be carefully trained and nourished in what has already become the tradition of U. S. Intelligence. And we speak proudly of this developing tradition. Because you have been carefully chosen, you on your side have the responsibility of seizing every opportunity to increase your own fitness for the job that is before you.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 10

23 November 1953

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
SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November 1953.

25X1A

2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

JOB NO. _____ FILE NO. _____ SER. NO. _____ DOC. NO. 6 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/ TO: _____ CHANGED TO: TS S 6 RET. JUST. 22
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REMARKS OF

MR. ALLEN W. DULLES

AT THE

TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

6 November 1953

* * * * *

There are just one or two things I want to say. This is really a half-hour in which you talk to me rather than a half-hour in which I make an address.

I have no major reorganizations in mind. The only kind of reorganization I contemplate is a general tightening up and, as time and attrition take their toll, a slight reduction in numbers here in Washington. I think our headquarters should be smaller and our work in the field expanded. We have placed upon us from time to time new tasks and new responsibilities which require additional personnel. In certain areas additional personnel will be required in the field. This will demand of us here in headquarters more efficiency, more performance, and possibly--and this is a headquarters problem--more concentration on the main targets, the main responsibilities, and the most important issues of the day.

What we are seeking in our Agency is quality, devotion and performance. Intelligence can never become an assembly-line type of work. For its success it depends upon the character, ability and hard work of the individual, and no type of organization and no machinery that we install can take the place of that. In the last few months we have had some signal accomplishments, and I have had occasion to be very, very proud of a considerable number of individuals who have had an opportunity to show their mettle and have come through with success.

I have often mentioned my own experience during the war. I arrived in Switzerland in November of 1942 just at the time the curtain came down, and I had no chance to add substantially to my staff. Starting with a small group which was increased by local people whom I found on the spot, I built up an organization which had to concentrate only on certain essential operations. And I found that by and large during the first two years when I was unable to build up a large organization, I was able to do more effective work than when the curtain was raised and I had quite a flood of people.

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I am setting aside an afternoon each week to get around the Agency and to meet with you and talk with you and learn of your own problems and see how the work is being done. I hope to visit all of you in your various lines of work so that before twelve months are up I will have accomplished a complete personal on-the-spot survey. I may not thereby have the answers to all the problems, but I will have a better knowledge of your problems and difficulties, a better knowledge of the Agency, and a better knowledge of you personally.

CIA remains somewhat in the spotlight. I would like to see us stay out of the papers as much as possible. We will probably never stay completely out; but we have to be, to some extent, an anonymous agency. It is the most difficult thing in the world, I think, for a human being to do interesting work, to achieve interesting and significant results and not be able to tell them to the world, and sometimes not even to his own family or friends. And I realize the problem; I have it myself. You will all have it to some extent, but if we are going to succeed, we will have to resist the temptation to talk about what we are doing.

Our relations with other parts of the Government are steadily improving. In the intelligence community, State, Army, Navy, Air, the Joint Chiefs, Atomic Energy Committee, the FBI, all are working together as a team as we never have worked before. There is room for improvement but our present relations are quite satisfactory.

Every Thursday morning when the National Security Council meets, I, or in my absence General Cabell, have the opportunity to brief the National Security Council on the important intelligence developments of the week. This is becoming fixed as a governmental procedure and it gives us an opportunity at the very highest level to present quickly to the leaders in Government, including the President, a sketch of the situation from the intelligence angle. I consider these briefings a trust to exercise, not only on behalf of CIA, but also of the entire intelligence community.

In intelligence today, we face the most difficult task that any intelligence community has ever faced. The Iron Curtain is a reality and a real problem insofar as the procurement of intelligence is concerned. To meet that problem will require more ingenuity and more skill than intelligence agencies have shown in the past. Yet, if we do not meet it, we will not have fulfilled the vital mission we have. We are having a measure of success. The measure of success must be greatly increased in the weeks and months ahead. This is a very real challenge. It is because of the nature of the challenge that we must concentrate on building, on a career basis, individual skills and techniques backed by the greatest improvements available in technical, mechanical and scientific aids. I was greatly gratified recently to see in our Technical Services

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Staff that on the technical-mechanical side we are preparing, for you who will be the operators in that field, the most modern techniques to meet the modern problems of intelligence.

Since I place much emphasis, in fact the top emphasis, upon individual capabilities, I realize that the training programs that Matt Baird and his associates have set up here are a vital and essential part of our work. I had to learn my intelligence background by the case method, and I sometimes wish I could go through the training that you are having.

From this you will realize how much stress I put on protecting you in your jobs and in the opportunities which open to you a future of absorbing interests and of vital importance to the nation. I want you to know that that is my chief concern and I won't let you down.

* * * * *

Question: What influence do you, as Director of Central Intelligence, have in formulating U.S. policy?

Answer: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responsibility, in coordination with the other intelligence agencies of the Government, to lay before the National Security Council the facts of given situations. If policy makers propose to base their policy on facts they ought to listen to us and, in general, they do; but I have no absolute control. I cannot force them to take our estimate of a situation as the basis for their policies. I can say generally that a very great respect is shown to the reports and estimates which we present.

Question: Do you believe that Congress will set up a special committee for Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?

Answer: Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution for a Committee on Intelligence that is comparable to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the House and the Senate. There is no clear-cut decision as yet. It may be considered, to some extent, at the present session of the Congress. At the moment it seems to me that existing machinery is adequate to bring before the appropriate committees of Congress the essential facts of what we are doing. If the Congress feels that more is needed, naturally we ought to cooperate in giving it the information that it requires within the bounds of the security which is essential for our operations.

Question: As the Director of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted on the budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?

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Answer: You can realize that this is rather a difficult and delicate problem for I do not desire to be placed in the position of censor of the expenditures of other agencies although it is my duty under the law to provide a measure of coordination in the intelligence field, to endeavor to prevent duplication by the various agencies, and to try to see that the area is adequately covered by the agency most competent to cover it. I doubt, however, whether I should go into the question of whether the amount of money spent by other agencies in carrying out their intelligence mission should be left at my doorstep.

Question: What is your view regarding the administrative separation of the overt side of the Agency from the covert side in the interests of security and efficiency?

Answer: I think the present administrative arrangement is functioning quite well. We have the overt administration and then we have an Administrative Officer on the covert side, who protects the security of the covert side and maintains necessary liaison with the overt administration. Nothing is perfect in as complicated an organization as we have, but I think this arrangement is pretty satisfactory.

Question: In the past, new and high-ranking operations officers, who have had no previous interest or experience in language, area, or intelligence, have been brought aboard and have been set above career officers of known ability. What is the career management doing about these "political appointees?"

Answer: Since I have been associated with this Agency, and that means even before I became Director, nobody, as far as I know, has been appointed to the Agency for political reasons or under political pressure. If there has been anyone, I don't know the person and I doubt whether the assertion can be documented. I wish the person who asked this question would kindly give the Inspector General--it can be done anonymously--the names of those persons; the Inspector General and I will handle that situation entirely alone; and I may report on it the next time I speak here. But I doubt the assertion. I don't believe it's true.

Question: May we be so optimistic as to look forward to a new building in about three years?

Answer: I hope so. We become involved in the problem of dispersal when we consider a new building. Too wide dispersal would seriously affect our efficiency because of the close relationship we have to the Pentagon, the State Department, and other organizations of government. And, therefore, I think it would be rather difficult for us to accept a dispersal that would take us far away from Washington. We are working very hard on the question of a building. It is at the present time under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 9

8 October 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Charles P. Cabell

1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Charles P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation Course on 4 August 1953.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FLD NO. _____ DOC. NO. 2 NO CHANGE
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REMARKS OF

CHARLES P. CABELL

AT THE

ELEVENTH ORIENTATION COURSE

4 AUGUST 1953

* * * * *

There is something a little unusual about this particular gathering which may have escaped your immediate attention. Gathered here in this auditorium today are members of the Agency representing all its parts as well as members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence community. I say this is unusual because in your career with this Agency you will seldom have the opportunity of sitting down in one body with fellow CIA workers from the whole operation. If you will look at the people on your right and on your left, I will lay odds you will see faces that you will not see again during your entire experience with us. Now this is an unfortunate thing in a way, because it means that as an Agency, we can not always enjoy that comradeship which comes from continuous contact and interchange within a group, the size of this one. We are in fact compartmented, and however unfortunate it may be, this is inevitable in an essentially covert organization. There are two reasons for this, the latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence.

The first is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any extensive and complex process like making automobiles, running a railroad or a university, governing a great commonwealth, or producing intelligence, efficiency demands a division of labor. We produce so much that we must have many people on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person become a specialist so that he does those things he is best capable of doing in order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the development of this concept of division of labor is one of the most important contributions which the American genius has given to the world of industry. It is equally applicable to the field of government and thus to CIA. We find ourselves organized into offices, divisions, branches, and desks so that we can properly take advantage of this division of labor. Unfortunately, this means that the individual who works on one small aspect of a piece of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture, and more than that, he seldom comes into contact with others who contribute to the same piece of intelligence. This kind of compartmentation, although it keeps us apart and keeps us from seeing things whole, also helps us to operate efficiently.

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There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in this Agency. That is the reason of security. You have all had or will have security indoctrinations which stress the need to know. As CIA has grown, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of security upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that, immunity from having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across the hall in an adjacent office. For security reasons, we allow an individual to know only those portions of our business which he needs to know in order to do his job effectively. Inevitably this means that we have security fences between the different parts of our Agency, security fences which again are a part of compartmentation.

Now both efficient division of labor and the maintenance of security are important and useful devices. But they can be dangerous to the ultimate attainment of our objectives if they are abused because of exclusiveness, jealousy, false pride, or thoughtlessness. Then, instead of resulting in boundary lines dictated by considerations of efficiency and security, there will be barriers hampering the speedy and effective production of intelligence. The only counter-measure that I know which can overcome the inherent disadvantages of compartmentation is coordination.

Now, coordination is a term of which you may have already heard a great deal in your experience in government and you will hear a great deal more of it as time goes on. My definition of it means simply taking into account the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved in any particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production. This has almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You know, for instance, that the intelligence which CIA produces is the product not alone of its own efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence operations in other departments and agencies of the government. After some experience in intelligence before coming to CIA, and as Director of the Joint Staff, I have become convinced that there is no danger of over-emphasizing coordination. Rather we have got to stress it even more than in the past in order to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence community. This would be a community in which the resources of the whole could be geared through a process of coordination to satisfy the highest demands of policy for sound intelligence, without breaking down the boundaries which efficiency and security have erected between our agencies.

If coordination is important in the intelligence community at large, it is equally important in the specific part of the intelligence community in which you are engaged. In my experience I have seen too many instances where bureaucratic subdivisions and false conceptions of security have had the effect of hampering smooth operation of the activity, and I am determined that as rapidly as these come to light here, they will be eliminated. Without in any sense overlooking the importance of either the efficient organization of a complex operation like ours or the high importance of maintaining security between its operational units, I still insist that we keep our eye on the ultimate goal of greater and more effective contributions

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to policy makers. After all, that is why we exist, and anything which obstructs our attainment of this objective is to be avoided. Where there is a will for coordination, it will be rare indeed where a way cannot be found to effect coordination and still follow the dictates of sound security. In the final analysis there may be specific occasions when complete coordination will turn out to be incompatible with security requirements. But the burden of proof will be on the individual bypassing the particular step in the coordination process.

There is one more aspect of coordination upon which I want to say a word. That is the development of adequate coordination between what we call our customers and ourselves. Our customers, of course, are those whose policy and operating decisions demand sound intelligence. It is a self-evident fact which can escape no one in the age of commercials that the customer's wants and needs must be known to the producer and the distributor if the customer is to be adequately served. The same thing certainly applies to the field of intelligence. We must know what the policy makers want, and we must try in every way we can to see that this want is adequately met. This cannot be done in a vacuum. It can only be done as a result of close coordination between our policy makers and our intelligence producers. They must be frank with us as to what they need and we must as frankly tell them what we can do and what we cannot do. This is a two-way street, but just as we must know what the customers want, so also we are obliged in the customer's interest, of course, to do a little bit of advertising. I mean that we must convince the policy makers that sound decisions require sound intelligence and that before fundamental decisions are made, recourse should be had to the intelligence community. I trust we will always be ready to come up with a useful answer if not a perfect one. But the process is not complete, even then. If custom-built intelligence is to be the most useful, the producer of it needs to be called in by the customer to sit with him in counsel while that intelligence is being integrated with other factors to form a decision. And the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence regularly sits as an adviser to the National Security Council is a recognition of this need and is thus one of the most encouraging features of the current organizations and practices for national security.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 8

8 October 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation Course on 7 August 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

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REMARKS OF

MR. ALLEN W. DULLES

AT THE

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ELEVENTH ORIENTATION COURSE

7 AUGUST 1953

* * * * *

There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy Director. When I was Deputy Director I was supposed to come here and make a long speech. I still have to make a speech but it can be shorter and I can come to get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as I can in answering them. I have gained a good deal from your questions in the past, and I'll do my best to answer any that you have today. As you know, we have in the Agency the Office of Inspector General with one of our ablest career men in that job. Before I came here today I asked him if he had any objection to my advertising his office a bit, and he said, "No. My door is open at any time to anyone in the Agency." He and I work together very closely and any especially difficult problems that you put to him will always come to my attention.

We have been a bit in the spotlight recently--for my money, far too much. In our form of government, given the character of the American people, it is probably essential, probably inevitable that we should have more spotlight than a secret intelligence agency ought to have. It is right, in a way, and certainly understandable, that there should be inquiries, that people should want to know something about what we are doing. I've always felt it was very wise that the authors of the law setting up this Agency provided us with an umbrella of overt activities under which we could cover the more secret operations. I hope the fact that I've had a little bit too much spotlight, will not lead others to seek it. I think we can do our work better without it.

We do have certain problems these days. There is, as you all know, and rightly, a strong trend toward economy. Economy in Government means economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It means, in effect, that we will have to do a better job, probably with less money and with fewer people--and this means that all of us from the top down will have to be more highly trained. From now on we will have to put added emphasis on training, because it may be that in many parts of our Agency one man or one woman will have to do the work of two. I don't really regret this. Over these difficult weeks when our budget has been under consideration, we have had full and fair consideration by the members of Congress concerned. They have a pretty hard time of it because there is no Agency of Government for which it is more difficult to make appropriations, and where it is more difficult for those who are attempting to prune the budget to know

where they can rightfully prune. The members of the committee expressed that difficulty but they left it very largely to us, within the limits they prescribed, to do our own pruning--to select the wheat from the chaff--to try to do the things which are most essential and do them most efficiently.

We have for this coming year a budget within which we can operate and, I believe, operate effectively. We have, in effect, certain personnel ceilings which are not going to be easy to keep, but I am confident that within those ceilings we can do our work.

I remember an experience I had with personnel ceilings when I was assigned to Switzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I arrived in Switzerland as the last American to enter legally before the curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa and the occupation of the southern part of France. Events imposed a ceiling on my staff and nothing could be done about it, since no one could legally get into Switzerland from that time on and work with me officially.

Well, I was able to search around in other government departments, and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together a small, a very small establishment. But for about a year and a half I had to work without any reinforcements. That imposed upon me a great measure of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way, for I could not write long dispatches since everything had to be enciphered and sent through the air. I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The selectivity forced upon me resulted in my doing far better work during those eighteen months than I did after the frontier opened up. Thereafter, because of the notoriety which Switzerland had as a center from which so-called glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people descended upon me, whereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelligence officer. And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need administrators and must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of administrators and really build up the number of top intelligence officers--men and women--on our staff. We can only do it through training, through building up a Career Service.

The longer I'm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a highly personalized affair. It's not the amount of money we have; it's not the number of projects we have; it is the skill and the devotion of the individual. I consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that have been already put together: the magnificent work General "Beedle" Smith did in getting this Agency along the way, the work of his predecessors, the work done by predecessor organizations, and the work Matt Baird is doing in training the new arrivals. All this has meant that we have gathered together in this Agency men and women of whom I am sincerely proud, and I want you to know that in the performance of your duty you can always look to me to stand up for you and back you when you're in the right.

Question: How do you evaluate our present intelligence output? Are you satisfied with it?

Answer: I don't think in intelligence one should ever be satisfied. If we are, we are lying down on the job. I am highly satisfied with the manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that are given to me within the limits of the intelligence that we have. We don't have enough intelligence, however, on the major targets. I might just describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the highest policy-making body in government within the field of national security and foreign problems. It meets, you know, on Thursday morning, under the chairmanship of the President, with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as regular members. Then on specific topics of interest to any other department of government, the head of that particular agency meets with the Council. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as advisers on matters of military policy and intelligence, respectively. The usual procedure is for the Director of Central Intelligence, or my Deputy in my absence, to brief the Council on the intelligence background of matters that are coming before the Council or are on the agenda for the Council that day; and, in addition, to raise any urgent matters where an intelligence briefing is deemed necessary. If there is nothing that has transpired during that particular week which seems to me urgent enough to bring to the attention of the Council, I generally restrict the intelligence briefing to the particular subjects before the Council, occupying ten to fifteen minutes generally--sometimes, with a very intricate topic, up to half an hour. Subject to my own failings and shortcomings, I think the procedure is working satisfactorily.

Question: Does CIA suggest policy?

Answer: I've tried to keep the Agency out of policy. If we espoused a policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to fit the policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I've had this situation arise, though, at the National Security Council: if I present some situation that is critical, where something should be done, there is quite a tendency around the table to say, "Well, what should you do about it; what would you do about it?" Well, then I refer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it may be, pass the buck to him--very possibly because I haven't got the answer myself.

Question: We have read much about the possibility of the establishment of a joint committee on Central Intelligence something akin to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you believe Congress will set up such a committee and what do you think of the idea?

Answer: I rarely speculate as to what the Congress will do, and I think it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, however, which I have discussed with certain of the leaders in Congress, and I propose

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to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably next January. At the present time the practical situation is that we report, on matters which are of concern to Congress, to the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating to the budget, to the Appropriations Committees. Those arrangements are working satisfactorily and I would assume that they will continue. The problem of a new committee has, I think, been raised and will be studied in order possibly to protect the Agency from having to report to a multiplicity of committees. Such protection, of course, would be helpful. I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of the size now proposed would be the most effective way of doing it, but this question will be approached with an open mind by us here and, I believe, also by the members of the Congress.

Question: What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time of total war?

Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of military operations there would come into effect a new relationship between the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field. That has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect the integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war conditions in the field.

Question: Are you satisfied with the present structure throughout the Agency or do you contemplate reorganization?

Answer: I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I think it is wise to work with the organization we have--to give it a chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do find that in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly with the added assignments that we've had to take over because of the activities of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board and its proposed successor. That may require certain added personnel on the top echelon. Apart from this I have no plans for reorganization.

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Question: As a part of the Career Service Program, do you think it's a good idea to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and those from the Washington offices--ORR, OCI, etc.?

Answer: Yes, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in ORR, OCI, OSI, and so forth, to have periods of duty on the covert side and then have duty in the field, and that is being done. Apart

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Question: In answer to a question posed at the last Orientation Program regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done? And has the Inspector General made a report on alleged discrimination against women?

Answer: The Inspector General has, through the CIA Career Service Board, made an official pronouncement that there shall be no discrimination against women in the Agency. Also, we had a meeting a little while ago with a selected group representing the distaff side, and Kirkpatrick and I sat down and went into the problem. I was glad to find that a dozen or fifteen of the ladies sitting around the table did not seem to feel that there was discrimination. If there is any evidence of discrimination, I want it brought to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to mine. We are looking into that problem because I am not clear in my own mind that we have taken full advantage of the capabilities of women. I'm going to work on that some more.

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING**

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 10

23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November 1953.
2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

**S/MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training**

Attachment: 1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 11

23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell

1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 3 November 1953.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

S/MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 12

23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

1. The Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Kirkpatrick's remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

S/ MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

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Revised version

REMARKS OF

GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL

AT THE

TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

3 November 1953

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Six months ago I addressed the Tenth Agency Orientation Course. I then gave my impression of CIA as it looked to me after a very short period as a part of the Agency. It has been a useful and necessary exercise on my part to take stock after six months, and maybe you too will be interested in the results. So, let ^{us} take another look at those first impressions to see how, if at all, they have changed.

At the time of that previous talk last May, I had actually been a full-fledged official of CIA only a matter of days, although before being sworn in, I had spent about two months being briefed by individuals from all parts of the various elements of the Agency. I pointed out that I had been struck by the great devotion to duty displayed by all of those to whom I had talked in CIA, and remarked on the absence of "clock watchers" and people just filling in time. My closer association with the people in CIA has reinforced that first impression. It has confirmed to my satisfaction their unusually high motivation. I don't believe that I have ever seen a group more dedicated to the tasks that face them and more selfless in their desire to serve and get their jobs done. Their willingness to work as long as necessary to complete the assignment that is before them, to revise and refine, time after time, in order that the product shall represent the very best of which they are capable; that is the good, solid foundation that this Agency has developed and it will permit continuing development throughout the coming years.

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As the Old-Timers among you will know, CIA has had its full share of reorganizations. In 1952 we had our last major reorganization--the one that put in their present form the components of the Agency with which you are familiar: the DD/P, the DD/I, and the DD/A, the Office of Training and the Office of Communications. We have now lived with this organization for over a year, and while there have been necessary minor changes and adjustments, it has proved itself to be sound and workable. It is unlikely that there will be any major upheavals in the foreseeable future. There will, however, be changes. We cannot stagnate. Once we settle down and say, "This is perfect and no further improvements can be made," then we have come to a standstill and have lost the ability to grow and progress. What is even more important, the Director and I are very much aware that there are weaknesses which only careful administrative readjustments and better practices can do away with, and we intend to take all the steps that we can to secure their correction. We can, therefore, expect to see minor changes here and there in both organization and administration.

Looking back again to what I said last May, I voiced my enthusiasm about taking over my job. I looked upon it as a most important job, one that presented a tremendous challenge. With six months of it behind me, dealing intimately with the problems of this Agency and working closely with its members, I can see very clearly that "I didn't know the half of it." This is an organization that deals with many facets of government activity. The straight intelligence side I had been familiar with for years as Director of Intelligence for the Air Force, and as Director of the Joint Staff. It is an activity that has long interested me very much. The special operations side was one with which I was almost completely unfamiliar, but about which I am learning more and more as time goes on. It is impossible to stress too strongly the importance

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of accurate and timely strategic intelligence. The decisions reached by the President and the National Security Council must be based on something more than educated guesses. It is our job to produce the necessary information, properly evaluated, which will enable the heads of this government to make important foreign policy decisions. That intelligence must be scrupulously worked up to ensure its accuracy. Furthermore, it must be timely. A piece of intelligence otherwise perfectly done and completely accurate is no good, if it arrives too late to be used. As for special operations, I am learning about the infinite care and ingenuity that go into their planning and execution. But then we cannot talk about them!

I am particularly pleased to see the new people of the organization who are coming along to do the work. Originally we had to depend on some of the old hands from OSS, Army, Navy, Air Intelligence, and State to get the "know how" so necessary in intelligence work. We are now, through our own training program, developing new professionally trained officers, both men and women, who are well equipped to join this profession. We have produced, and are continuing to produce, intelligence officers with a combination of training and experience, who can be counted upon to make sound judgments, produce solid intelligence estimates, and carry out effective operations.

We have gone to some lengths to set up a Career Service Board to insure that our people are most advantageously placed, from their point of view and ours, that their service is well rounded, and that they have a chance to develop themselves to the utmost. At the same time an effective Career Service Program will assure those who are best suited to this type of work; that, in continuing in it, they will have before them a good solid professional career in government. They will have a career of which they can be justly proud, both because of the growing recognition of the significance of their

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which come from doing a job that one knows to be important. But this career service goal imposes on us, as an Agency, another responsibility: We must be highly selective in our recruitment of new people. The very process of clearing applicants weeds out a great many. It is pretty much the case of "Many are called but few are chosen." Those of you who have been chosen, therefore, represent the cream of the crop, and we already have an investment in you. As such you are a force to be carefully trained and nourished in what has already become the tradition of U. S. Intelligence. And we speak proudly of this developing tradition. Because you have been carefully chosen, you on your side have the responsibility of seizing every opportunity to increase your own fitness for the job that is before you.

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REMARKS OF

MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

AT THE

Agency
TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

6 November 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

I should like to talk only briefly about the Office of the Inspector General, and then I will devote most of my time to talking about a subject which is very close to my heart, a career in the Central Intelligence Agency, a subject with which I am sure all of you are concerned.

As to the Office of the Inspector General. Let us be quite frank about it and say that in a good organization or in a small, compact organization the necessity for an Inspector General does not exist, and I hope that some day, perhaps through some of my efforts, we can achieve that result in this Agency. This Agency has gone through a period of rapid growth-- a growth which, by the way, was not so much of our doing as of other governmental agencies which wanted us to do many things in many parts of the world, some far beyond our capabilities--and it became very large in a very short time. As many of you may realize, we are now going through a period of stability, in which we are regrouping, reorganizing, stabilizing, getting our organization set down and developing ourselves professionally to the degree where we will probably rank, in short order, with the best intelligence services in the world. However, we did grow too fast and some of the problems that come to the Office of the Inspector General are the result of too rapid growth.

What the IG's Office does in CIA is very briefly two things: First, it is my objective, with a very small staff, to perform at least once a year an inspection of every single component of the Agency. Inasmuch as this is the

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first year in which inspection has been performed, we will be much more thorough than in later years. In these inspections it will be our objective to see that the component which we are inspecting is operating within the jurisdiction of appropriate directives, is doing the job competently, is well organized, has its personnel well in hand, has good personnel management, handles its money ^{properly} and, in other words, is a sound part of the organization. Central

I report directly to the Director of ^{Central} Intelligence and, therefore, the Inspector General's reports go to the Director. However, it is my policy in reporting on a component to give the head of that component, generally the Deputy concerned, a chance to read the report before it goes to the Director, so that if he has any strong dissenting opinion as to the facts produced or the recommendations made, the Director will have the opportunity to review his comments simultaneously with my comments.

The second part of the IG's office is perhaps of more importance to you individually. We are open always to any individual in the organization who has any problems on which he cannot gain redress through the appropriate channels. I would like to stress that there are appropriate channels open to you, whether you have a personal problem or whether you have an official problem. But if you cannot solve your problem, if you become overly frustrated in trying to get it done through official channels, if you seem to run into a stone wall and feel that there is a problem there which should be taken up, the doors of the Inspector General's office are open at all times; and it is understood by all of the supervisors in this Agency that there will be no ~~reproach~~ ^{unfavorable reflection on} against anyone coming to the IG. I am there to listen, and in case I cannot see you personally, I have two able assistants who will be glad to see you, and we will be glad to do what we can to assist you. In certain instances we may be able to, but remember that bureaucracy in government is a great and complex organization, and we are not always able to cut the red tape

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or the organizational roadblocks which may be in your way.

Now, let us talk about career service. The very first question which I would like to answer is: "Why should the Agency have a career service which in any way differs from the rest of the Federal Government; why should it differ from Civil Service; are we a privileged group over and above any others?" The answer as far as "privileged group" is concerned is, of course, "no"; but the answer as far as the Agency is concerned is a very strong "yes." And it is "yes" because we have perhaps the gravest responsibility of any group of individuals in the Federal Government. It is not the Army or the Navy or the Air Force, with all due respect to the men in those services, who are the first line of defense, it is the intelligence service. And the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will come into combat only if the intelligence service fails. If our information is not sufficiently good, if our coverage of the world is not sufficiently accurate, if we fail to get advance indications of hostilities or of actions inimical to this country, then the military services will have to come in and pick up where we dropped the ball. Consequently, the first reason why there should be a career service is that we have a grave and important responsibility to our nation; the second, that we have authority and responsibilities given to us by the Congress, by mandate to the Director of Central Intelligence, over and beyond any other Government agency in the United States, and over and beyond any authority or responsibility ever given to any other Government agency in the history of this country. Obviously, the Director himself, cannot fulfill these obligations and responsibilities personally and must delegate them to practically each and every individual in the Agency. With these responsibilities and obligations it is vital that we have the highest-calibre people in this Agency that it is possible to have.

The third reason we should have a career service is that intelligence is a profession, a profession which is not easily acquired. We as a nation have

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always been, perhaps, as far behind as any power has been in the intelligence profession; only in recent years with the creation of the first Central Intelligence Group, and then with the creation of this Agency by Federal statute, have we started to catch up to the other great powers. We have a great distance to go to catch up. We have made amazing strides in the years since World War II but we have a large and sinister enemy in the Soviet Union and, perhaps, the most capable enemy that this country has ever faced in the field of intelligence and intelligence operations--sinister, ruthless, amoral, and with nearly all of the assets and abilities that we can put into the same field. Consequently, the intelligence officer who is brought into this Agency needs training, needs experience, and needs a broadening which only time and strenuous effort can give.

And, finally, the fourth and last reason for a career service is that it is extremely important that we encourage everybody entering this Agency to plan to make it a lifetime career and profession for security reasons and for reasons of cost.

As IG, switching rapidly to the other hat, I would like to say to you to remember always that the dollar you are spending as an employee of CIA is your own as a taxpayer and that it should be used with discretion whether you are writing a cable, typing up a memorandum, or engaging in an operation.

And it is very important from a security point of view that we have as small a turnover in personnel as we possibly can. Regardless of what the job of the individual is in an intelligence organization, he obviously acquires a certain amount of information as to its work, its assets, its capabilities, its competence, its knowledge; and the more people that enter this Agency and leave it after a short time, the more information about the work of this Agency there is outside of the Agency. I say that without impugning the motives of

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the individuals who are forced to leave the organization for personal reasons or for professional reasons, because we recognize that they are loyal and able American citizens or they would not have been here in the first place. Yet, regardless of how discreet an individual is, or how careful he or she may be after leaving the Agency, the security barrier is gone--we no longer have the daily knowledge of security by seeing guards on the doors, by having to lock papers at night. And, consequently, little by little the information about the work of the Agency starts to get out.

I am sure that all of you have heard about career service, and I am also sure that many of you are skeptical about what this Agency is doing about career service. So let me give you a very quick historical outline and tell you what is going on today.

The Career Service Program, as such, started under General Smith in 1951. He organized a CIA Career Service Board to study the problem and come up with recommendations as to what should be done. That Board was composed of Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors. They set up eight task forces on which individuals, through the level of Division Chief, were represented to study all of the problems that were necessary in order to establish a career service. Some of those problems were rotation of jobs, transfer between different components of the Agency, liberalized retirement benefits, medical benefits for dependents, tenure of office, job security, and so on down the line; all of the important factors that you are interested in as a career employee.

These task forces met on a weekly basis over a period of about a year, and they came up with voluminous studies covering each and every factor which affects your career. When the final report was submitted to General Smith, he established a CIA Career Service Board which was composed of the Deputy Directors, the Director of Training, the Assistant Director for Communications,

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and two representatives from each of the Deputies' areas on the Assistant Director level. That Board exists basically as constituted to this day.

Then each of the components of the Agency, each of the offices, established its own Career Service Board, and I might just say, ~~without any reflection~~ ^{none some} ~~upon any of these boards~~ that/ of them have worked exceedingly well. I would like to pay high tribute to the Career Service Board of the Office of Communications. It is one of the best organized and best operating in the Agency. Others have worked less well. The motivation on the part of some for establishing a career service and working toward this end has not been as great as others.

I would like to add parenthetically that I think the system as we have it today is a little cumbersome. It involves the work of too many high-level officials over too great a time. I think that in the very near future we will come up with a plan for streamlining and simplifying it, and for getting to what I think is the real basis for career service. This is the planning for each of your careers over a period from ten to fifteen years and talking over with you the plan for your career, and insuring that it is in accordance with your desires and your aptitudes, and then launching you forward on that career so that you will know that today you are going to hold such and such a job; then, perhaps, you will transfer to another office to broaden your basis of knowledge and experience, and then you will return to your own offices; then, perhaps, you will have a period of six months of training with the Office of Training, and so on down the line over a period of years, in order that you can project your career ahead. I also envisage a board which will screen not only applicants coming into the Agency but also individuals when they pass through their probationary period in career service and perhaps later at a date when specialists and executive-type individuals will be put in the ~~career~~ proper patterns for

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their future. I feel very strongly that each and everyone of us has different characteristics, different capabilities and different types of aptitude that should be developed for the best interests of the Agency.

I would like to tell you of some of the things that are going on currently. In addition to the regular meetings of all of the Career Service Boards, we have under the very able leadership of [] of the Office of Training, a Women's Panel which has been meeting for some three months and is studying the problems affecting women's careers in this Agency and seeing what should be done to ensure that women can make just as much of a career and go just as far forward as men can in CIA.

We have a Junior Officers' Panel which is studying the problems peculiar to junior officers--grade levels of say five up to nine--to see what should be done to ensure that they can make a better career in the Agency than exists today.

We have a Legislative Task Force studying all of the problems of career service to see what we should go to the Congress to ask for in order that our career service can be the equal of any in the Federal Government, offer the same benefits and, incidentally, the same obligations. I think all of you should recognize that you cannot be on a one-way street as far as a career is concerned. If you are to have retirement benefits, if the Agency is to look after you in sickness and health, you must also recognize that the Agency expects from you an obligation to serve, to stay with the Agency over a career, and to give it the best possible out of your professional abilities.

Then we have a Writing Task Force which is important from your point of view, because I have so many comments like this: "I don't really know what career service is." We have a group preparing a booklet which I hope will be issued to you by the end of this year telling you exactly what career service means to you, what your benefits are, and all of the details as to training,

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retirement, and so forth.

That is, in essence, a very quick thumbnail sketch of a very large amount of work that ~~a large number of the top level of the Agency is doing.~~ *is being done.* We are trying to make sure that it reflects, not the official views of the Division Chiefs or the Assistant Directors, but the official views of every individual working for the Agency.

If you have problems on career service which are not adequately covered today, I urge you to submit them, preferably in writing, to your Career Service Board, and it will surely forward them up to the CIA Board if there are questions which it cannot answer.

In conclusion, there is just one word which I would like to say. The objective of the CIA Career Service Program is extremely simple. It is to make the Central Intelligence Agency not only the best place to work in the Federal Government but also to make it the Agency that attracts the most qualified and the best individuals for this type of work throughout our entire country.

* * *

Question: Is there any conflict between the function of your office and that of Organization and Management which is under DD/A? Do not the responsibilities of O & M also include inspection of offices and activities?

Answer: Yes, that is quite true. But the delineation between the Office of the Inspector General and that of Organization and Management is that O & M is here basically to be of assistance to the offices with respect to organization and in the solving of their management problems, and the IG is here more as an arbitrator--to take the burden off the Director and the Deputy Director in working out jurisdictional disputes which cannot otherwise be worked out.

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Question: How does the career service affect typists, secretaries, and semi-professional people?

Answer: It affects them in the same way as it affects anybody else in the Career Service Program. If they are here to make a career in the Agency and indicate this, it will give them the benefit of a job security which it will not give to individuals who are here on a short period of time. Of course, we obviously cannot interfere with matrimony or motherhood, which are two of the largest causes of the ladies leaving us, but it is still quite important from a security point of view as well as from a straight cost point of view to keep our turnover down as much as possible. Consequently, the Career Service Program will encompass the clerical and semi-professional people just as thoroughly as it does professional people.

Question: Is the lack of a college education a hindrance to advancement within CIA? Is the career program, for which many of us were hired, going to work to our advantage even if we do not have advanced degrees?

Answer: You will be judged in CIA strictly upon your abilities and your qualifications regardless of whether you have a college degree or not. As far as advanced degrees are concerned, if you are in CIA and doing a job, your advancement will be based not upon the degrees that you hold but upon the job that you are doing and upon your qualifications to advance to another job. If there is any action to the contrary, as Inspector General, I would be glad to examine the case.

Question: What about rotation between Offices in the Agency in Washington and rotation between overseas and Washington?

Answer: Rotation is one of our most serious problems today. It's a very difficult job, indeed, to preserve compartmentation, which is absolutely essential in every intelligence agency; and also, simultaneously to encourage rotation because you get a certain amount of resistance to rotation. It is, I think,

simply a matter of more education because we have a system of rotation from your office to a training site to another office and back to your own office, which should broaden your career. I think it is mainly a matter of maturing our career service. As far as overseas and Washington is concerned, that is almost strictly within the one area of the DD/P, and I think that in itself can be worked out with time. Today, I am very distressed by the fact that some individuals come back and do what I think is a very ^{insidious} ~~individual~~ thing which is forced upon them, and that is shop for jobs. I think we can stop that in short order and when they come back, well before they come back, they will know what their future assignment will be.

Question: Is there any tendency toward setting up a specific period of time for work in an overt position within the Agency before applying for a position on the clandestine side?

Answer: Basically speaking, ^{that} ~~it~~ is the opposite of ~~what is~~ the normal way.

It is much preferable to move from the covert to the overt side, but there is absolutely no reason for not moving in the other direction provided ~~that~~ you go into a staff job where the fact that you were overt and may be identified with CIA is not detrimental to your work on the covert side.

Question: Since CIA is putting emphasis on improving the calibre of its employees, has any regulation been put into effect to enable CIA to dismiss employees for incompetence or mediocrity?

Answer: This does not require a regulation, basically. There is an established system in the personnel procedures, an established method for eliminating incompetent or mediocre employees. That is through the Personnel Evaluation Report and the Qualification Report. This is something in which I am ^{Questionnaire} extremely interested because, to be very honest about it, it has never worked well in the past. It has never worked well because we are all human beings

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and we do not like to call a fellow in and say, "Well look, Joe, you haven't been doing too well and we're giving you an unsatisfactory efficiency report." You probably know him and you probably know he has a wife and children and when he gets that news, it is going to raise certain mental anguish, if not greater than that. But basically speaking, that is the way it has to work. If we are going to have a highly qualified service with only the best people in it, unhappily there will be those who get evaluation reports indicating that they are not on a level with their fellow employees. Those evaluation reports must be discussed with each individual before they are accepted. The individual must be told what his weaknesses are and only then can the procedures be implemented for his elimination or resignation from the Agency.

Question: Do we have a retirement system tied in with present planning? Has anything been done about a twenty-year retirement law for CIA people?

Answer: The answer to both of those questions is "yes." We have, of course, an existing retirement system. We are all under the Civil Service Retirement System which actually is quite a liberal one. As far as a twenty-year retirement for service of a particular nature, that would have to be enacted by legislation.

Question: Because of the economy wave, do you anticipate any RIF's--Reductions in Force--in our Agency?

Answer: There will be none, as far as we know today. We obviously cannot predict the future actions of Congress, and we will have to be very careful on expansion either in our expenditures or in the use of personnel, but as far as RIF's are concerned, I certainly think that we will avoid them if we possibly can.

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WORK OF THE AGENCY
Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

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I apologize for the necessity of having to sit to address you today,
with
but I trust that this gadget in front of me which they tell me will carry
my voice to the back of the room that all of you will be able to hear what
I have to say.

It's a great pleasure to once again speak to an Orientation group.
concerning

As far as the remarks which Col. Baird made ~~regarding~~ the office of the
Inspector General, I should like to say only one or two brief sentences con-
cerning its operations, so that you will know what it is about and decide
whether the occupant wears horns or is the kindly type which Col. Baird refers
to. *And then I will* I would like to devote the bulk of my time to talking about a
subject which is not only very close to ^{Mr.} Col. Baird's heart but also to mine --
and that is a career in the Central Intelligence Agency--a subject with which
I am sure all of you are concerned.

Functions of the Inspector General
Now as to the Office of the Inspector General. Let's be quite frank
about it and say that in a good organization or in a small, compact organization
the necessity for an Inspector General doesn't exist, and I hope that some
day perhaps through some of my efforts we can achieve that result in this
Agency. At the present time, having gone through a period of rapid growth,
a growth which, by the way, was not so much of our doing as ^{the} the other agencies
in Washington which wanted the CIA to do many things in many parts of the world,
some far beyond our capabilities, this Agency grew very large in a very short
time. As many of you may realize we are now going through a period of stability
in which we are regrouping, reorganizing, stabilizing ^{ourselves} ~~ourselves~~, getting our or-
ganization set down and developing ourselves professionally to the degree where
we will probably rank in short order with the best intelligence services in
the world.

However, we did grow too fast and part of the problems that come to the
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office of the Inspector General are as the result of too rapid growth. What the IG's office does in CIA is very briefly this: It is my objective with a very small staff to ^{at least once a year,} perform an inspection of every single component of the Agency. In as much as this is the first year in which it has been done, we will be much more thorough this year than we will in later years. In these ~~x~~ inspections it will be our objective to see that the organization which we are inspecting is operating within the jurisdiction of appropriate directives, is doing the job competently, is well organized, has its personnel well in hand, has good personnel management, handles the money the way it should, ~~it is~~ in other words, is a sound part of the organization.

~~Now the Inspector General's reports, and if you noted the organization chart you will note that I report directly to the Director himself, go to the Director. However, it is my policy in reporting on a component to give the head of that component, generally the Deputy concerned, a chance to read the report before it goes to the Director, so that if he has any strong dissenting opinion, as to the facts produced or the recommendations made, the Director will have the opportunity to review his comments simultaneously with my comments.~~

The second part of the IG's office is one perhaps of more importance to you individually. Of course, as Col. Baird says, we are open always to having an organizational component come to us ~~in~~ ^{to help} say that they have a problem with another part of the organization and see what we can do to help out. But we are open always to any individual in the organization who has any problems on which he cannot gain/redress through the appropriate channels. Now, I would like to stress that ~~because~~ ^{if you} there are appropriate channels open to you whether you have a personal problem or whether you have an official problem. But if you cannot solve your problems, become overly frustrated in trying to get it done through official channels, if you seem to run into a stone wall and feel

that there is a problem there which should be taken up, as the Director has

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said, the doors of the Inspector General's office are open at all times, and it is understood by all of the supervisors in this Agency that there will be no redress to anybody coming to the IG. I think that should be thoroughly understood. I'm there to listen and in case I can't see you personally, I have two able assistants who will be glad to see you, and we will be glad to do what we can to assist you. In certain instances we may be able to but remember that ~~THE~~ ~~BEUROCRACY~~ ^{BUREAUCRACY} beurocracy in Government is a great and complex organization and we aren't always able to cut the red tape or the organizational roadblocks which may be in your way.

I might add that it was with a little bit of apprehension that I came to speak today becuase in the Orientation Courses which preceded this since I have been IG, it has been reported to me that when questions have been addressed to the Director he almost automatically says, "Well, I'll refer that one to the Inspector General," and inasmuch as he is following me immediately ^{why}/I may get some questions later in this period which are going to stop the IG. M

The Career Service
Now, ~~so much for the IG work~~, let's talk about career service. The very first question which I would like to answer is, "Why should CIA have a career service which in any differs from the rest of the Federal Government; why should it differ from Civil Service; are we a privileged group over and above any others?" Well, the answer as far as privileged group is, of course, no; but the answer as far as the Agency is concerned is a very strong yes. And it is ^{yes} because we have perhaps the gravest responsibility ^{of} ~~to~~ any group of individuals in the Federal Government. Some of the speakers preceding me may have told you this but I would like to reiterate it. It isn't the Army or the Navy or the Air Force with all due respect to the men in those services who are the first line of defense; it's the intelligence service. And the Army, the Navy and the Air Force will come into combat only if the intelligence

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service fails. If our information is not sufficiently good, if our coverage of the world is not sufficiently accurate, if we fail to get those advance indications of hostilities or of actions ^{real} inimicable to this country, then the military services will have to come in~~x~~ and pick up where we dropped the ball. Consequently, the first answer as to why there should be a career service is because we have a grave and important responsibility to our nation; ~~and~~, secondly, because we have ^yauthorities and responsibilities given to us by the Congress, by mandate to the Director of Central Intelligence, over and beyond any other Government agency in the United States, and over and beyond any authority or responsibility ever given to any other Government agency in ~~this~~ the history of this country.

Obviously, the Director, himself, ~~the~~ cannot fulfill these obligations and responsibilities personally and must delegate it to practically each and every individual in the Agency. Consequently, with those responsibilities and obligations it is vital that we have the highest-calibre people in this Agency that it is possible to have.

And, thirdly, we should have a Career service because intelligence is a profession and a profession which is not easily acquired, and we as a nation have always been, perhaps as far back as any power has been in the intelligence profession, and only in recent years with the creation of the first Central Intelligence Group and then with the creation of this Agency by Federal Statute have we started to catch up to the other great powers. ~~and~~ ^{HA} as your other speakers, I am sure, have told you, we have a great distance to go to catch up. We have made amazing strides in the years since World War II but we have a large and sinister enemy in the Soviet Union, and, perhaps, most capable enemy that this country has ever faced in the field of intelligence and intelligence operations. ^{nearby} ~~A~~ sinister, ruthless, amoral, and with all of the assets

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and abilities ~~Academy~~ that we can put into the same field. Consequently, the intelligence officer who is brought into this Agency needs training, needs experience, and needs a broadening which only time and strenuous efforts can give.

And, finally, of the four major points as to why we need a career service, the fourth and last one is because it is extremely important that we encourage everybody entering this Agency to plan to make it a lifetime career and profession for security reasons and for reasons of cost.

As IG, ~~switching~~ rapidly to the other hat, I would like to say to you to ~~always~~ ^{always} remember that the dollar you are spending as an employee of CIA is your own as a taxpayer and to use it with discretion whether you are writing a cable, whether you are typing up a memorandum or whether you are engaging in an operation. ~~Remember that the money that's being spent comes out of your pocket, too, and consequently, when you're writing that cable, decide whether you would like to pay for the cable out of your own pocket, and just because the Government happens to be paying for it in this instance.~~

And, finally, it's very important from a security point of view, that we have as small a turnover in personnel as we possible can. Regardless of what the job of the individual is in an intelligence organization, he obviously acquires a certain amount of information as to its work, its assets, its capabilities, its competence, its knowledge; and the more people that enter this Agency and leave it after a short spell, the more information ~~there is~~ ^{there is} about the work of this Agency in this country that shouldn't be. I say that with no implication or impugning of the motives of the individuals who come ~~and~~ and are forced to leave the organization for personal reasons or for professional reasons, because we recognize that they are loyal and able American citizens or they wouldn't have gotten in in the first place. ~~Regardless of how discreet~~

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an individual is, or how careful he may be or she may be in the years after leaving the agency the security barrier is gone, we no longer have the daily knowledge of security by seeing the guards on the doors, by having to lock the papers at night. And, consequently, little by little the information about the work of the Agency starts to get out.

So much for why we should have a career service. Now, I'm sure that all of you have heard about career service and I'm also sure that many of you are skeptical about what this Agency is doing about career service. So let me give you a very quick historical outline and tell you as to what's going on today.

The career service program as such started under Gen. Smith in 1951. He organized a CIA career service board to study the problem and come up with recommendations as to what should be done. That board has been composed of Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors. They set up under themselves, eight task forces on which individuals, through the level of Division Chiefs, were represented to study all of the problems that were necessary in order to establish a career service.

Now some of those problems were rotation of jobs, transfer between different components of the Agency. Others were liberalized retirement benefits, medical benefits for dependents, tenure of office, job security, and so on down the line—all of the important factors that you are interested in as a career ~~work~~ employee.

Those task forces met on a weekly basis over a period of about a year and covering they came up with voluminous studies which affects each and every aspect which affects your career. When the final report was submitted to General Smith, he then established a CIA Career Service Board which was composed of the Deputy Directors, the Director of Training, the Director of Communications, and two representatives from each of the Deputy areas on the Assistant Director level.

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That board exists basically as constitutde to this day.

Then each of the components of the Agency, each of the offices, established ~~their~~ own Career Service Board, and I might just say without any reflection upon any of these Boards, ~~some~~ ^{NONE} of them have worked exceedingly well. I would like to pay high tribute to the Career Service Board of the Communications Office. Undoubtedly, ^{it is} one of the best organized and best operating in the Agency. Others have worked less well. The motive ^{ration} on the part of some for establishing a Career service and working toward this end has not been as great as others.

I would just like to add parenthetically, I think the system as we have it today is a little cumbersome. ~~It~~ ^I involves the work of too many high-level officials over too great a time. ~~and~~ I think that in the very near future we will come with a plan for streamlining and simplifying it, and for getting to what I think is the real basis for career service, ~~and that~~ ^{This is the} planning for each of your careers over a period from ten to fifteen years and talking over with you the plan for your career and insuring that it is in accordance with your desires and your aptitudes and then launching you forward on that career so that you will know that today you are going to hold such and such a job, then perhaps you will transfer to another office to broaden your basis of knowledge and experience and then you will return to your own office. ~~and then~~ ^{perhaps} you will have a period of ~~perhaps~~ six months of training with the ~~the~~ Training Office, and so on down the line over a period of years ^{in order} that you can project your career ahead. I also envisage a board which will screen not only applicants coming into the Agency but also individuals when they pass through their probationary period in the career service and perhaps later at a date when specialists and executives-type individuals will be put in the proper patterns for their future. ~~and~~ ^I I feel very strongly that each and everyone of us has ~~different~~ ^S different characteristics and different capabilities.

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and obviously has a different type of aptitude that should be developed for the best interests of the Agency. I don't think a man ~~that~~ ^{who} is a great area specialist or who is a great linguistic specialist or who is a good operator should necessarily picture himself as being a top executive. He may not have the qualities of leadership ^{or} of executive management that are necessary.

Now that's projecting ^{the career concept} that somewhat into the future.

In view of the fact ^{*} that my time's running short, ^{*} you can probably ^{*} elicit ^{*} a lot of information by questions. I'd just simply like to tell you of some of the things that are going on currently. In addition to the regular meetings of all of these career service boards, we have under the very able leadership of of the Training Office, a Women's Panel which has been meeting for some three months now studying the problems affecting women's careers in this Agency and seeing what should be done to ensure that women can make just as much of a career and go just as far forward as men can in CIA.

We have a junior officers panel to study the problems peculiar to the junior officers--grade levels of say five up to nine and to see what should be done that the Agency isn't doing to ensure that they can make a better career in the Agency than exists today.

We have a Legislative Task Force studying all of the problems of career to see what we should go to the Congress to ask for in order that our career service can be the equal to any career service in the Federal Government--offer the same benefits and, incidentally, the same ~~benefits~~ obligations. Because I think all of you should recognize that you can't be on a one way street as far as a career is concerned. If you are to have retirement benefits, if the Agency is to look after you in sickness and in health, you must also recognize that the Agency expects from you an obligation to serve, to stay with the Agency over a career and to give it the best possible out of

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your professional abilities.

Then we have a ~~Writing Task Force~~ ^{Writing Task Force} which is important from your point of view, ~~because~~ ^{because} I have so many comments. I don't really know what career service is. We've had a group preparing a booklet which I hope will be issued to you by the end of this year telling you exactly what the Career service means to you, what your benefits are, and exactly all of the details as to training, retirement and so ~~on down the line~~ ^{forth}.

That is, in essence, a very quick thumbnail sketch of a very large amount of work that a large number of the top level of the Agency ~~is~~ ^{are} doing and that we're trying to make sure that it reflects, not the official views of the Division Chiefs or the Assistant Directors, but it reflects the official views of every individual working for the Agency.

If you have problems on career service which aren't adequately today, I urge you to submit them, preferably in writing, to your career service board, and they will surely forward them up to the CIA Board if ~~they~~ ^{they} are questions which they can't answer themselves.

There is just one word in conclusion which I would like to mention. The objective of the CIA career service ~~board~~ program is extremely simple. It's to make the Central Intelligence Agency not only the best place to work in the Federal Government but also the Agency that attracts the most qualified and the best individuals for this type of work throughout our entire country.

Thank you very much.

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Question: How do you explain the advance of women to positions of authority; are we headed for a matriarchy? So you're damned in you and damned if you don't.

Question: Is there any conflict between the function of your office and that of Organization and Management which is under DD/A? Do not the responsibilities of O&M include inspection of offices and activities also?

Answer: Yes, that's quite true, they do. But the dileneation between the Office of the Inspector General and that of Organization and Management is that Organization and Management is here basically to be of assistance to the offices in the organization and in the solving of their problems, and the IG is here more as an ~~arbitrator~~ and an individual to take the burden off the Director and the Deputy Director for working out jurisdictional disputes which can't otherwise be worked out. In other words, management is exactly what its term is. Its here to improve management of the different components.

Question: You didn't have much time to touch on the subject of rotation. What about rotation between offices in the Agency in ~~Washington~~ Washington and rotation between overseas and Washington?

Answer: ~~Well~~ that, quite frankly, ~~ladies and gentlemen~~ is one of the subjects which perplexes me most and is one of our most serious problems today. Its a very difficult job, indeed, to preserve compartmentation, which is absolutely essential in every intelligence agency, and also, simultaneously to encourage rotation, because you get a certain amount of resistance to rotation, ~~from the~~ I think, ~~more~~ powers that be, but its simply a matter of education because we have a system of rotation from your office to a training site, to another office and back to your own office which should broaden your careers. I think it's mainly a matter of maturing our career service. As far as overseas and Washington, that's almost strictly within the one area of the DD/P and I think that in itself can be worked out with time. Today, I am very distressed by the fact that some individuals come back and do what I think is a very invidious thing

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which is forced upon them, and that is shop for jobs. I think we can stop that in short order and when they come back, well before they come back, they will know what their future assignment is to be.

Question: Is the lack of a college education a hindrance to advancement within CIA, and is the career program for which many of us were hired going to work to our advantage even if we do not have advanced degrees?

Answer: Within CIA I would say that the answer is you will be judged strictly upon your abilities and your qualifications regardless of whether you have a college degree or not. As far as advanced degrees are concerned, if you're in CIA and doing a job, your advancement will be based not upon the degrees that you hold but upon the job that you're doing and your qualifications to advance to another job. If there is any action to ^{the} contrary as IG, I'd be glad to examine the case.

Question: Is there any tendency toward setting up a specific period of time for work in an overt position within the Agency before applying for a position on the clandestine side?

Answer: Well, that's a very tough one to answer. Basically speaking it's the ~~x~~ opposite of what is the normal way to be. ~~In other words,~~ our British cousins who I have talked to ~~to a very large degree~~ on their problems of a career service and I'm sort of happy to see that ~~they~~ have had a lot of the same problems that we've had, even though they're a lot older and more established service. But ~~the~~ basically it's much preferable to move from the covert to the overt side, but there's absolutely no reason for not moving in the other direction provided that you go into a staff job where the fact that you were overt here and may be identified with CIA is not detrimental to your work in that job.

Question: ~~What about the other side of the spectrum, Mr. Kirkpatrick.~~ Since CIA is putting the emphasis on improving the calibre of its employees, has any

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regulation been put into effect to enable CIA to dismiss employees for incompetence or mediocrity?

Answer: It doesn't need a regulation, basically. There's an established system and if our supervisors read the procedures as laid down in all of the personnel procedures, there is an established method for eliminating incompetent or mediocre employees. That is simply through the Personnel Evaluation Report and the Qualification Report. This is something in which I am extremely interested because, to be very honest about it, it has never worked very well in the past. It has never worked well because we are all human beings, and being humans we don't like to call a fellow in and say: Well look, Joe, you haven't been doing too well and we're giving you an ~~unsatisfactory~~ unsatisfactory efficiency report. You probably know him and you probably know he has a wife and children and when he gets that ^{news,} it's going to raise certain mental anguish if not greater than that. But basically speaking, that's the way it has to work. If we're going to have a highly qualified service with only the best people in it, unhappily there will be those who get evaluation reports indicating that they're not on a level with their fellow employees. Those evaluation reports must be discussed with each individual before they are accepted. The individual must be told what his weaknesses are and only then can the procedures be implemented for his elimination or resignation from the Agency.

Question: In the past we have seen new and high-ranking operations officers brought aboard who have had no previous experience in intelligence, in language, area or other such activities, yet they were set above career officers of known ability. What is the career management doing about such "political appointees?" In view of the emphasis on a career service, how do you account for a large turnover at the top of CIA officials who are brought in from the outside?

Answer: Well, now, I think we are talking a little in the past on both of those

subjects. In the first place, today I can assure you that very careful

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scrutiny is given to any officials brought in on a high level. They are brought in, almost 100 percent, because they have had experience of some nature, not necessarily in intelligence, it may be some area experience which qualifies them for the position which they're brought in for. As far as the high turnover on the top of Agency officials, I think you all recognize we have gone through a period of growth, we've gone through a period of maturing and I think that now we have stabilized and I certainly look forward to a long period in which the top echelon of the Agency will be fairly stable. With the Director here

to hear me say that, ~~so~~ he can indicate whether he agrees or not. (Note: The Director did answer this question also)

Question: How does the career service effect typists, secretaries, and semi-professional people:

Answer: It ~~will~~ effects them in the same way as it effects anybody else in the career service program. If they are here to make a career in the Agency, and indicate that, it will give them the benefit of a job security which it will not give to individuals who are here on a short period of time. Of course, we obviously can't ~~interfere~~ with matrimony or motherhood, which are two of the largest causes of the ladies leaving us, but it still is quite important from a security point of view as well as from a straight cost point of view to keep our turnover down as small as possible. Consequently, the career service program will encompass the clerical and the stenographic, semi-professional individuals just as thoroughly as it does the professional.

Question: Would you care to comment, and are you concerned about the large personnel turnover of the Agency?

Answer: Well, I think I touched on that in the previous comment. Of course, it is ~~our~~ ^{to} our interest, not only from a financial point of view but from a security point of view and from the point of view of sound management to have the smallest possible turnover we can.

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~~outweigh the benefits.~~

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Question: How long is the wage freeze going to continue? P.S. I'm also very hungry.

Answer: We certainly don't want any of our people going hungry. If there's a specific case involved, I'd be glad to look into it. As far as the freeze, itself is concerned, I can't answer as to how long it will continue.

Question: Because of the pressure of time, Mr. Kirkpatrick, we'll make this the last and we'll see that you see all these questions. What weaknesses have heard about the intelligence system, so what weaknesses in intelligence organization are of most concern to you at the present time?

Answer: Well, Shane, I don't think it was fair holding that till last because that could occupy ~~in~~ a great length of time. I'd like to cover it very briefly in this fashion. The weaknesses that exist in the intelligence organization at the present time are mainly those due to the rapidity of growth which I mentioned in my talk. ~~and~~ the fact that we're now being able to settle down and acquire maturity without having forced upon us so many jobs that we couldn't possibly do that were beyond our capabilities. Most of the weaknesses stem out of that. We have some organizational weaknesses, ~~I think~~ I think we're a little large ~~without~~. I don't want to worry any of you about your jobs, because ~~National~~ ~~attr~~ natural attribution takes care of most of that, but I think we could be more compact. As far as our relations with the other intelligence services, I simply reiterate what I am sure has been said to you, that they are at the highest level they have ever been and they are constantly improving.

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REMARKS OF

MR. ALLEN W. DULLES

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AT THE

TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

6 November 1953

There are just one or two things I want to say. This is really a half-hour in which you talk to me rather than a half-hour in which I make an address.

I have no major reorganizations in mind. The only kind of reorganization I contemplate is a general tightening up and, as time and attrition take their toll, a slight reduction in numbers here in Washington. I think our headquarters should be smaller and our work in the field expanded. We have placed upon us from time to time new tasks and new responsibilities which require additional personnel. In certain areas additional personnel will be required in the field. This will demand of us here in headquarters more efficiency, more performance, and possibly, and this is a headquarters problem, more concentration on the main targets, the main responsibilities, and the most important issues of the day.

What we are seeking in our Agency is quality, devotion and performance. Intelligence can never become an assembly-line type of work. For its success it depends upon the character, ability and hard work of the individual, and no type of organization and no machinery that we install can take the place of that. In the last few months we have had some signal accomplishments, and I have had occasion to be very, very proud of a considerable number of individuals who have had an opportunity to show their mettle and have come through with success.

I have often mentioned my own experience during the war. I arrived in Switzerland in November of 1942 just at the time the curtain came down, and I had no chance to add substantially to my staff. Starting with a small

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group which was increased by local people whom I found on the spot, I built up an organization which had to concentrate only on certain essential operations. And I found that by and large during the first two years when I was unable to build up a large organization, I was able to do more effective work than when the curtain was raised and I had quite a flood of people.

I am setting aside an afternoon each week to get around the Agency and to meet with you and talk with you and learn of your own problems and see how the work is being done. I hope to visit all of you in your various lines of work so that before twelve months are ~~up~~ ^{accomplished} I will have ~~completed~~ a complete personal on-the-spot survey. I may not thereby have the answers to all the problems, but I will have a better knowledge of your problems and difficulties, a better knowledge of the Agency, and a better knowledge of you personally.

CIA remains somewhat in the spotlight. I would like to see us stay out of the papers as much as possible. We will probably never stay completely out; but we have to be, to some extent, an anonymous agency. It is the most difficult thing in the world, I think, for a human being to do interesting work, to achieve interesting and significant results and not be able to tell them to the world, and sometimes not even to ~~one's~~ ^{his} own family or friends. And I realize the problem; I have it myself. You will all have it to some extent, but if we are going to succeed, we will have to resist the temptation to talk about what we are doing.

Our relations with other parts of the Government are steadily improving.

In the The intelligence community, State, Army, Navy, Air, the Joint Chiefs, Atomic Energy Committee, the FBI, ~~we are all~~ ^{are} working together as a team as we never have worked before. There is room for improvement but our present relations are quite satisfactory.

Every Thursday morning when the National Security Council meets, I, or in my absence, General Cabell, have the opportunity to brief the National

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Security Council on the important intelligence developments of the week. This is becoming fixed as a governmental procedure and it gives us an opportunity at the very highest level to present quickly to the leaders in Government, including the President, a sketch of the situation from the intelligence angle. I consider these briefings a trust to exercise on behalf not only of CIA, but also of the entire intelligence community.

In intelligence today, we face the most difficult task that any intelligence community has ever faced. The Iron Curtain is a reality and a real problem ^{insofar} as the procurement of intelligence is concerned. To meet that problem will require more ingenuity and more skill than intelligence agencies have shown in the past. Yet, if we do not meet it, we will not have fulfilled the vital mission we have. We are having a measure of success. That measure of success must be greatly increased in the weeks and months ahead. This is a very real challenge. It is because of the nature of ^{the} ~~that~~ challenge that we must concentrate on building, on a career basis, individual skills and techniques backed by the greatest improvements available in technical, mechanical and scientific aids. I ^{was} greatly gratified recently to see in our Technical Services Staff that, on the technical-mechanical side, we are preparing, for you, who will be the operators in that field, the most modern techniques to meet the modern problems of intelligence.

Since I place much emphasis, in fact, the top emphasis, upon individual capabilities, I realize that the training programs that Matt Baird and his associates have set up here are a vital and essential part of our work. I had to learn my intelligence background by the case method, and I sometimes wish I could go through the training that you are having.

From this you will realize how much stress I put on protecting you in your jobs and in the opportunities which open to you a future of absorbing

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interests and of vital importance to the nation. I want you to know that that is my chief concern and I won't let you down.

* * *
Question: What influence do you, as Director of Central Intelligence, have in formulating U. S. policy?

Answer: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responsibility, in coordination with the other intelligence agencies of the Government, to lay before the National Security Council the facts of given situations. If policy makers propose to base their policy on facts they ought to listen to us and, in general, they do; but I have no absolute control. I cannot force them to take our estimate of a situation as the basis for their policies. I can say generally that a very great respect is shown to the reports and estimates which we present.

Question: Do you believe that Congress will set up a special committee for Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?

Answer: Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution for a Committee on Intelligence that is comparable to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the House and the Senate. There is no clear-cut decision as yet. It may be considered, to some extent, at the present session of the Congress. At the moment it seems to me that existing machinery is adequate to bring before the appropriate committees of Congress the essential facts of what we are doing. If the Congress feels that more is needed, naturally we ought to cooperate in giving it the information that it requires within the bounds of the security which is essential for our operations.

Question: As the Director of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted on the budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?

Answer: You can realize that this is rather a difficult and delicate problem for I do not desire to be placed in the position of censor of the expendi-

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measure of coordination in the intelligence field, to endeavor to prevent duplication by the various agencies, and to try to see that the area is adequately covered by the agency most competent to cover it. I doubt, however, whether I should go into the question of whether the amount of money spent by other agencies in carrying out their intelligence mission should be left at my doorstep.

Question: What is your view regarding the administrative separation of the overt side of the Agency from the covert side in the interests of security and efficiency?

Answer: I think the present administrative arrangement is functioning quite well. We have the overt administration and then we have an Administrative Officer on the covert side, who protects the security of the covert side and maintains necessary liaison with the overt administration. Nothing is perfect in as complicated an organization as we have, but I think this arrangement is pretty satisfactory.

Question: In the past, new and high-ranking operations officers, who have had no previous interest or experience in language, area, or intelligence, have been brought aboard and have been set above career officers of known ability. What is the career management doing about these "political appointees?"

Answer: Since I have been associated with this Agency, and that means even before I became Director, nobody, as far as I know, has been appointed to the Agency for political reasons or under political pressure. If there have been ^{anyone} any, I don't know the person~~s~~ and I doubt whether the assertion can be documented. I wish the person that asked this question would kindly give the Inspector General, it can be done anonymously, the names of those persons; the Inspector General and I will handle that situation entirely

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the assertion. I don't believe it's true.

Question: May we be so optimistic as to look forward to a new building in about three years?

Answer: I hope so. We become involved in the problem of dispersal when we consider a new building. Too wide dispersal would seriously affect our efficiency because of the close relationship we have to the Pentagon, the State Department, and ~~the~~ other organizations of government. And, therefore, it would be, I think, rather difficult for us to accept a dispersal that would take us far away from Washington. We are working very hard on the question of a building. It is at the present time under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

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ILLEGIB

The Director Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles

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From
the tapes

Matt Baird, Lyman and ladies and gentlemen.

As I looked over my notes last night ^{of} ~~at~~ my previous appearances before this, I can't say this group, but groups like this, I found that this was my tenth consecutive appearance. I didn't really realize I'd been here as long as that—the time has gone so rapidly. I think I'm always inclined to feel as I come here at these periodic intervals that I am more or less making a report to the same audience. I don't fully realize that each time we have a rotation and new faces and new people, but all with the same purposes and all working to the same end.

I was interested to come in and to hear some of the questions and I want to get back one of the questions, I think, that was very adequately answered but I want to add a little to it. This is really a half-hour in which you talk to me rather than a half-hour in which I make an address.
~~Organization, 10/1/2005, 10/1/7~~
There are just one or two things that I want to say. I have no major reorganizations in mind. I think Mr. Kirkpatrick has mentioned that. The only kind of a reorganization is a general tightening up to which Mr. Kirkpatrick referred with, I hope, as time and attrition takes it toll, a slight reduction in numbers. Possibly, a slight reduction particularly here in Washington. I think our headquarters should be smaller and our work in the field expanded. We have placed upon us from time to time ~~still too rapidly~~ a new task, new responsibilities and ^{these} ~~that~~ require personnel. In certain areas it's going to require added personnel ^{will be required} in the field. And that will ^{demand} ~~require~~ of us here in headquarters more efficiency, more performance, and possibly, I think, and this is a headquarters problem, more concentration on the main targets, the main responsibilities and the most important issues of the day. Intelligence and our other related activities can never become an assembly-line type of work.

For its success it depends upon the character, ability and hard work of the individual; and no type of organization, no machinery that we can install, can

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take the place of that. We have had examples of that recently in our work. We have had in the last few months some signal successes, and I have had occasion to be very, very proud of a very considerable number of our personnel who have had an opportunity to show their mettle and have come through with success.

I ~~think~~ I have mentioned before, in the other meetings, my own experience during the war where I was in Switzerland arriving ~~in Switzerland~~ in November of 1942 just at the time when the ~~Iron~~ ^C Curtain came down around Switzerland, and I had no chance of adding substantially to my staff. Starting in with a small group which was increased by local accretion of people whom I had found on the spot, we built up an organization which had to concentrate only on certain essential operations and discard ~~the~~ other operations. And I found that by and large during the first almost two years when I was in Switzerland without the ability of building up a large organization, I was able to do more effective work than when the ~~Iron~~ ^C Curtain was raised and I had quite a flood of people who thought that Switzerland was the place to exercise the esoteric what they mistakenly thought was the cloak and dagger side of the work.

Now I know what I say may seem inappropriate to some of you, many of you have been with us quite a long while, some of you coming on in the been here with us only a shorter time but that only means that what we are seeking ^{in our Agency} is quality, devotion and performance, and when we can get that, we will find the place for you to show those qualities.

Visits of DCI

"I hope myself now to be able to get around in the Agency and to meet with you and ~~to~~ talk with you and get to learn of your own problems and see how the work is being done. ^{for this purpose} I'm setting aside an afternoon each week. I've done that now for the past two weeks and I'm going to ^{continue this practice} carry it forward of

of visiting all of you ~~and~~ in your various lines of work so that I hope that before twelve months are gone I will have completed a complete personal on-the-spot ^{Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2} ~~the~~ answers to the

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problems, but I will have a better knowledge of your personal problems and difficulties, a better knowledge of the Agency, a better knowledge of you personally.

Anonymity

CIA remains somewhat in the spotlight in government, fortunately not quite as much as when I appeared before this comparable group last August. I would like to see us get more and more out of the papers. We'll probably never achieve that, and I ~~personally~~ ^{personally} have ~~achieved~~ more personal notoriety and publicity than I would have liked. We have to be, to some extent, an anonymous agency. It's the most difficult thing in the world, I think, for a human being to work on interesting things, maybe to achieve and often to achieve interesting and significant results and not be able to tell them to the world, and sometimes not even to one's own family or friends. And I realize the problem. I have it myself. You will all have it to some extent; but if we're going to succeed, we have to resist the temptation to talk about what we are doing.

Inter Agency Relationships

"As Mr. Kirkpatrick said, as I came in, our relations with the other parts of the Government are steadily improving. In the case of the service agencies we have, as you know, the weekly meetings with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee that you've heard about in the ~~early~~ ^{earlier} part of this ~~part~~ brief course. To that instrumentality and to the personal relationships, the intelligence community, State, Army, Navy, Air, the Joint Chiefs, Atomic Energy Committee, the FBI, we're working together as a team as we never have worked before in this Government. There's room for improvement and improvement will come, but that is satisfactory.

NSC Meetings

"Our relationship with other parts of Government are satisfactory. Every Thursday morning when the National Security Council meets, I have the opportunity, or in my ~~absence~~ absence, Gen. Cabell, to brief the National Security Council on the important intelligence developments of the week. That is

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becoming now fixed, ~~I think~~, as a procedure in Government which gives us an opportunity at the very highest level to present quickly to the leaders in Government, including the President, a sketch of the situation from the intelligence angle. I consider that a trust to exercise on behalf, not only of CIA, but on behalf of the entire intelligence community.

The Current Challenge

"Now a moment on the present world situation." In the intelligence field, today, we face the most difficult task that any intelligence community has faced. The Iron Curtain is a reality insofar as the procurement of intelligence is concerned. To meet that problem will require more ingenuity, more skill than intelligence agencies have shown in the past, and yet if we do not do that we will not have fulfilled the vital mission that we have. We are having a ~~measure~~ measure of success. That measure of success must be greatly increased in the weeks and months that lie ahead of us. It presents a very real challenge, and it is because of the nature of that challenge that we must concentrate on building on a career basis ~~of~~ individual skills and techniques backed by the greatest improvements that one can have in technical, mechanical and scientific aids.

Yesterday I spent the afternoon looking over our TSS shop and I was greatly gratified to see there that on the technical-mechanical side, that we are preparing for you, who will be the operators in that field, the most modern techniques to meet the problems--the modern problems--of intelligence.

Training Essential

From what you have heard and what I have ~~said~~ said, you will realize how much emphasis, in fact, the top emphasis that I place upon individual capabilities and how clearly I realize that the training programs that Matt Baird and his associates have set up here ~~are~~ a vital and essential part to our work. I sometimes wish I could go back and go through the training that you are having. I had to learn my intelligence background by the case method.

Guarantee of Support

"And from this you will also realize how much stress I put on you ~~in the~~

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~~feeling~~ protecting you in your jobs and in the opportunities which open
to you for a future of absorbing interests and of vital importance to the
nation. I want you to know that that is my chief concern and I won't let
you down. "

~~Thank you very much.~~

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Responsibility of the DCI

Questions

Question: As Director of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted on the organizational plans and budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?

Answer: The person that asked that question must have a very good source of intelligence, because that ~~very~~ ^{that is a very current} problem was one that was discussed for an hour yesterday by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget who came over to see me. You can realize that ~~it~~ ^{this} is rather a difficult and delicate problem ~~for~~ and I don't desire to be placed in a position of being a censor of the expenditures of other agencies of the Government in the field of intelligence, although it is my duty under the law to provide a measure of coordination in the intelligence field and to endeavor to prevent a duplication by various agencies in that field and to try to see that the area is adequately covered by the agency most competent to cover it. I doubt, however, whether I should go into the question as to whether the amount of money that other agencies spend in carrying out that mission should be left at my doorstep.

CIA does not decide policy
Question: (Here's one question you always kill, very, very definitely.) You spoke about briefing the National Security Council, Mr. Director, what influence do you have as Director in formulating U. S. policy?

Answer: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responsibility to lay before the National Security Council in coordination with the other intelligence ~~and~~ ^{If} agencies of government the facts of given situations. Policy makers propose to base their policy on facts they ought to listen to us and in general they do but I have no absolute control. I cannot always force them to take our estimate of a situation as the basis for their policies, but I can say that in general a very great respect is shown to the reports and estimates which we prepare ~~very generally~~ in coordination with the representatives of the other services.

By my saying that you kill it, do you specify definitely that

we don't make policy, we're not in on the decisions to make policy, don't tell

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them what to do or say)

(Dulles: Are you answering the question)

No, I'm just asking you, sir)

Answer: Our main task is to give the facts, but ~~but~~ I don't think that it's breaking any confidence, but one day at the National Security Council I made a briefing of a situation--it was a fairly critical one--and the President turned to me and said, ~~well~~ "Well, what would you do?" Well, I said I thought the others around the table would have more ideas on that, but occasionally one steps out of one's character. One doesn't restrict oneself to what one ~~ought~~ ought to do. But, in general, it is perfectly correct that ~~we~~ we deal with the facts. ~~Others~~ Others determine the policy.

*Congressional
Committee
on*

Question: Do you believe, Mr. Director, that Congress will set up a special committee for Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?

Intelligence

Answer: At the present time CIA matters come before these committees of the Congress: The Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House and the Appropriation Committees of the Senate and the House. We have reasonably frequent meetings with selected members of those committees, particularly with the Appropriations Committee in connection with our budget. The Congress, of course, will have to decide whether it wishes to set up other and further machinery to deal with our work. That matter may come up. Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution for a Committee on Intelligence that is comparable to the ~~Atomic~~ Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the House and the Senate. There is no clear-cut decision as yet. It may be considered, to some extent, at the present session of the Congress. I would say at ~~the~~ the moment it seems to me the existing machinery is adequate to bring before the appropriate committees of Congress the essential facts of what we are doing. If the Congress feels that more is needed, naturally we ought to cooperate in giving them the information that they require within the bounds of the proper security which

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is essential for our operations. ~~and~~ I have never found any members of Congress who wanted to pry beyond that. ~~They're perfectly willing to accept general statements of our activities without prying into the details of our operations.~~

Question: ~~When you spoke about eliminating coffee, you didn't mention about the building business.~~ ~~So~~ ^{whether we might be} we have some questions here about ~~may we be~~ so optimistic as to look forward to a new building in about three years?

New Building

Answer: I hope so. We're working on that very hard. We come up in that situation against this problem of dispersal. ~~There have been~~ I believe I am correct in stating there have been no large government office buildings erected in Washington in the last few years--not since this problem has arisen--with regard to the possible dispersion of government buildings in connection with the atomic menace. So we have one or two questions of principle such as that to determine. I wouldn't want to get dispersed too far ^{since} ~~because~~ I feel that that would seriously affect our efficiency because of the close relationship we have to the Pentagon, the State Department and to other organizations of Government. And, therefore, it would be, I think, rather difficult for us to accept a dispersal that would take us far away from Washington, ~~we~~ ^W we are working very hard on the question of a building and we have it up at the present time at the Bureau of the Budget.

Internal CIA Organization

Question: What are your views, Mr. Dulles, regarding the separation both administratively and physically of the overt side of the Agency from the clandestine side in the interests of security and efficiency?

Answer: Well, I think the present set-up on the administrative side is functioning quite well. We have the overt administration and then we have on the covert side an Administrative Officer who protects the security of the covert side that maintains the necessary liaison with the overt administration. I think

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that's working reasonably satisfactorily. Nothing is perfect in as complicated an organization as we have but I think it's pretty satisfactory.

Question: Taking you on the world scene for the moment, do you think that the abandoning of the peace movement by the Soviets is beneficial in view of our more ~~aggressive~~ aggressive attitude of late?

Answer: There you're getting me into a rather broad field; but I would think that the person that wrote that question may not have read the 18-page note from the Soviet and I must admit that I haven't read it yet but I'm putting it over to read over the weekend. But interpretations of that note ~~which~~ that the very efficient people in OCI have given me, and which I read in the press don't seem to encourage the idea that there has been any very substantial peace move or peace gesture on the part of the Soviets.

Make this last
stat Question: This will be the last question, sir. Are there any stand-by Agency plans for the day when the Communist threat is reduced to manageable proportions?

Answer: No. When that time comes, that will be about the easiest plan to make.

(Dulles: There was one question that came to Mr. Kirk about political appointees or something of that kind. That was one that I wanted to crack in the head if I could get hold of it.)

Key
Appointees
in CIA.
was coupled with this one:
Question: In the past we have seen new and high-ranking operations officers brought aboard who have had no previous interests or experience in language or in area or intelligence, yet they're set above career officers of known ability. What is the career management doing about these "political appointees?" ^{at} The question with ~~the~~ this one: In view of the emphasis on a career service, how do you account for the large turnover of top CIA officials who are brought in from the outside?

Answer: Taking the first question, since I have been associated with the Agency, and that means even before I was Director, as far as I know, nobody has been appointed to this Agency for political reasons or under political pressure. If there has been such I don't know the person and I doubt whether the person that

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wrote this question could document any such assertion. Would you give me the second part of that first question.

Question: In the past we have seen new and high-ranking operations officers brought aboard who have had no previous experience in language, area, or intelligence . . .

Answer: Now, I wish the person that wrote that would kindly give the Inspector General, you can do it entirely anonymously, he or she, but I would like very much to have those names presented on a sheet of ~~mylar~~ paper to the Inspector General and the Inspector General and I will handle that situation entirely alone and maybe I'll make a report on that the next time I'm here. But I doubt whether that assertion could be implemented. I don't believe it's true.

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Mr. Director, speaking for everyone here, thank you very much.

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NO.

DATE 19 November 1953

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| | 122 Admin. | | | <i>[initials]</i> | <i>[initials]</i> 25X1A |
| 2. | 4 | | | <i>e</i> | <p>Both the edited version, (in draft) and the actual tape recording of the remarks of Messrs. Dulles, Cobell & Kirkpatrick are attached. Any comments or changes you care to make will be appreciated. If you will then call <i>[initials]</i> on X 3531, arrangements will be made to pick these up, in order to expedite their publication.</p> |
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 9

8 October 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Charles P. Cabell

1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Charles P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation Course on 4 August 1953.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

MATTHEW BAIRD
/ Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB .

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 8

8 October 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation Course on 7 August 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

/ MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

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4-5502 Attachment

DCI's MESSAGE Eleventh Agency Orientation Course 7 August 1953

There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy Director. When I was Deputy Director I was supposed to come here and make a long speech. I still have to make a speech but it can be shorter and I can come to get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as I can in answering them. I have gained a good deal from ^{your} ~~these~~ questions in the past, and I'll do my best to answer any that you have today. As you know, we ~~also~~ have in the Agency the Office of Inspector General with one of our ablest career men in that job. Before I came ~~down~~ here today I asked him if he had any objection to my advertising his office a bit, and he said, "No. ^{My} ~~The~~ door is open ~~there~~ at any time to any ^{one in the Agency} of you." He and I work ^{very} closely together and any especially difficult problems that you put ~~to~~ to him will always come to my attention.

We have been a bit in the spotlight recently--for my money, far too much. In our form of government, given the character of the American people, it is probably essential, probably inevitable, that we should have more spotlight than a secret intelligence agency ^{ought to} ~~should~~ have. It is right, in a way, and certainly understandable, that there should be inquiries, that people should want to know something about what we are doing. I've always felt it was very wise that the authors of the law setting up this Agency provided us with an umbrella of overt activities under which we could cover the more secret operations. I hope the fact that I've had a little bit too much spotlight, will not lead others to seek it, ~~for I don't~~ desire it ~~and I hope from now on we can have less of it because I think~~ we can do our work better ~~in that way,~~ ^{without it.}

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IN CLASS 16
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AUTH: HR 70-3
ORG COMP // OPL // ORG CLASS S
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~~And we've had~~ ^{we do have} certain problems these days. There is, as you all know, and rightly, a strong trend toward economy. Economy in Government means economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It means, in effect, that we will have to do a better job, probably with less money and with fewer people--and this ~~fact~~ means that all of us from the top down will have to be more highly trained. From now on we will have to put added emphasis on training, because it may be that in many parts of our Agency one man or one woman will have to do the work of two. I don't really regret this. Over these difficult weeks when our budget has been under considerations, we have had ~~ourselves~~ full and fair consideration by the members of Congress concerned. They have a pretty hard time of it because there's no Agency of Government for which it is more difficult to make appropriations, and where it is more difficult for those who are attempting to prune ^{the} a budget to know where they can rightfully prune. ~~in~~ ~~talking with~~ the members of the committee, ~~they~~ expressed that difficulty ~~but~~ and they left it very largely to us, within the limits they prescribed, to do our own pruning--to select the wheat from the chaff--to try to do the things which are most essential and do them most efficiently.

We have for this coming year a budget within which we can operate and, I believe, operate effectively. We have, in effect, certain personnel ceilings which are not going to be easy to keep, but I am confident that within those ceilings we can do our work.

I remember an experience I had with personnel ceilings when I was assigned to Switzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I arrived in Switzerland as the last American to enter legally before the curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa and the

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occupation of the southern part of France. ~~and~~ ^{Events} imposed a ceiling on my staff ~~that~~ ^{and} nothing could be done about ^{it} since no one could legally get into Switzerland from that time on and work with me officially.

Well, I was able to search around in other government departments, and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together a small, a very small establishment. But for about a year and a half I had to work without any reinforcements. That ^{imposed} ~~forced~~ upon me a great measure of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way, for I could not write long dispatches ^{since} ~~because~~ everything had to be enciphered and sent through the air. I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The selectivity forced upon me resulted in my doing far better work during those ^{eighteen} ~~months~~ ^{thereafter,} ~~about eighteen months~~ than I did after the frontier opened up. ^{notoriety} ~~Because of the advertisement~~ which Switzerland had as a center from which so-called glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people descended upon me, whereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelligence officer. And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need administrators and must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of administrators and really build up ^{the} number of top intelligence officers--men and women--on our staff. We can only do it through training, through building up a Career Service.

The longer I'm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a highly personalized affair. It's not the amount of money we have; it's not the number of projects we have; it is the skill and the devotion of the individual. I consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that have been already put together [:] ~~the reorganizations and~~ magnificent work

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General "Beedle" Smith did in getting this Agency along the way, the work of his predecessors, the work done by predecessor organizations, and the work Matt Baird is doing in training the new arrivals. All this has meant that we have gathered together in this Agency men and women of whom I am sincerely proud, and I want you to know that in the performance of your duty you can always look to me to stand up for you and back you when you're in the right.

Question 1. How do you evaluate our present intelligence output. Are you satisfied with it?

Answer: I don't think in intelligence one should ever be satisfied. If we are, we are lying down on the job. I am highly satisfied with the manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that are given to me within the limits of the intelligence that we have. We don't however have enough intelligence^{any} on the major targets. I might just describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the highest policy-making body in government within the field of national security and foreign problems. It meets, you know, on Thursday morning, under the chairmanship of the President, with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as regular members. Then on specific topics of interest to ^{any} other departments of government, the head of that particular agency meets with the Council. ~~The~~ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence

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serve~~ing~~ as advisers on matters of military policy and intelligence, respectively. The usual procedure is for the Director of Central Intelligence, or ~~the~~ ^{my} Deputy in my absence, to brief the Council on the intelligence background of matters that are coming before the Council or ^{and} on the agenda for the Council ~~at~~ that day; and, in addition, to raise any urgent matters where an intelligence briefing is deemed necessary. If there is nothing that has transpired during that particular week which seems to me urgent ~~and should be brought~~ ^{enough to bring} to the attention of the Council, I generally restrict the intelligence briefing to the particular subjects before the Council, occupying ten to fifteen minutes generally--sometimes, with a very intricate topic, up to half an hour. Subject to my own failings and shortcomings, I think the procedure is working satisfactorily.

Question 2. Does CIA suggest policy?

Answer: I've tried to keep the Agency out of policy. If we espoused a policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to fit the policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I've had this situation arise, though, at the National Security Council: if I present some situation that is critical, where something should be done, there is quite a tendency around the ~~board~~ ^{table} to say, "Well, what should you do about it; what would you do about it?" Well, then I refer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it may be, pass the buck to him--very possibly because I haven't got the answer myself.

Question 3. We have read much about the possibility of the establishment

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of a joint committee on Central Intelligence something akin to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you believe Congress will set up such a committee and what do you think of the idea?

Answer: I rarely speculate as to what the Congress will do, and I think it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, however, which I have discussed with certain of the leaders in Congress, and I propose to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably next January. At the present time the practical situation is that we report, on matters ^{which are} of concern to ~~the~~ Congress, to the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating to the budget, to the Appropriations Committees. Those arrangements are working satisfactorily and I would assume that they ^{will} ~~would~~ continue. The problem of a new committee has, I think, been raised and will be studied in order possibly to protect the Agency from ^{having} ~~being responsible~~ to report to a multiplicity of committees. ^{such protection,} ~~That~~ of course, would be helpful. I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of the size now proposed would be the most effective way of doing it, but this question will be approached with an open mind by us here and, I believe, also by the members of the Congress.

Question 4. What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time of total war?

Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of military operations there would come into effect a new relationship between the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field. That has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect

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the integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war conditions in the field.

Question 5. Are you satisfied with the present structure throughout the Agency or do you contemplate reorganization? .

Answer: I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I think it is wise to work with the organization we have--to give it a chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do find that in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly with the added assignments that we've had to take over because of the activities of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board and its proposed successor. That may require certain added personnel on the top echelon. Apart from this I have no plans for reorganization.

Question 6. Is the possible transfer of ~~the PM~~ the Paramilitary function, to the Department of Defense still under consideration?

Answer: No. There is some consideration being given to the transfer of one very limited activist segment of that, where we really get out of the PM field into what is more nearly the functions of Defense, but that will not involve, in any way, a turnover of that whole function. That is rightfully, and under NSC directives, a part of the function of this Agency. But ^{what} ~~that~~ ^{transformed is} ~~is being done~~ ^{at} ~~an~~ ^{urgent} request of CIA, ^{it} ~~and~~ ^{is} not being wrenched from us. I would like to turn ^{the} ~~it~~ over; ^{this} ~~and~~ ^{in fact} have tried for about a year to turn over this one particular small segment of work in ~~this~~ field.

Question 7. ~~This is a specific part of that element of CIA which you have endorsed already~~ ^{As a part of} the Career ^{Service} Program, ~~do~~ you think it's a good idea to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and those

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from the Washington offices--ORR, OCI, etc.?

Answer: Yes, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in

ORR, OCI, OSI, and so forth, to have periods of duty on the covert

side and then have duty in the field, and that is being done. ~~of~~ Apart from

~~this~~ course, there are certain stations, particularly 25X1A

and others, where there are representatives of the overt offices

already--and quite a large number--so that ~~it does not necessarily~~

~~mean that~~ to go into the overt offices ^{does not necessarily} preclude or exclude the

possibility of working in the foreign field.

Question 8. In answer to a question posed at the last Orientation

Program regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done?

~~and another question~~ ^{And} has the Inspector General made a report on alleged discrimination against women? ^{new} The Inspector General has, through

the ^{Cia} ~~top~~ Career Service Board, ~~already~~ made an official pronouncement that there shall be no discrimination against women in the Agency.

Answer: ~~That is correct and,~~ Also, we had a meeting a little while ago

with a selected--~~I didn't go into the question exactly how the group was selected--but with a selected~~ group representing the distaff side,

and Kirkpatrick and I sat down and went into the problem. I was glad to find that a dozen or fifteen of the ladies ~~representation~~ sitting around the table, did not seem to feel that there was discrimination.

If there is any evidence of discrimination, I want it ~~brought out~~ brought to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to mine. We are looking into that problem because I am not clear in my own mind that we have taken full advantage of the capabilities of women, ~~very especially in this field of the distaff side of the organization~~. I'm going to work on that some more.

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DCI's MESSAGE Eleventh Agency Orientation Course 7 August 1953

Matt Baird and ladies and gentlemen.

There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy Director.

When I was Deputy Director I was supposed to come here and make a ^{long} speech.

I still have to make a speech - but it can be shorter - and
Now I can come ^{to} and get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as

I can in answering them. I have gained a good deal from those questions in the past, and I'll do my best to answer any that you have today. As you know, we also have in the Agency the Office of Inspector General with one of our ablest career men in that job. Before I came down here today I asked him if he had any objection to my advertising his office a bit, and he said, "No. The door is open there at any time to any of you." He and I work very closely together and any ^{especially difficult} problems that you put up to him, unless they can be settled easily, will always come to my attention.

And We've had certain problems these days. There is as you all know, and rightly, a strong trend toward economy. Economy in Government ~~that~~ means economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It means, in effect, that we will have to do ^a ^{job} better, probably with less money and with fewer people; ^{this fact} and that means that all of us from the top down ^{will} have ^{more highly} to be better trained. That is one of the reasons ^{from now on} that we will have to put added emphasis on train-

ing, because from now on it may be that in many parts of our Agency one man or one woman will have to do the work of two. I don't really regret this.

In our relations with Congress ^{over} these difficult weeks when our budget has been under consideration, we have had, ourselves, full and fair con- sideration by the members of ^{concerned} the Congress that have considered our budget.

They have a pretty hard time of it because there's no Agency of Government

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where it is more difficult to budget, and where it is more difficult for those who are attempting to prune a budget to know where they can rightfully prune. In talking with the members of the committee, they expressed that difficulty and they left it very largely to us within the limits they prescribed to do our own pruning—to select the wheat from the chaff—to try to do the things which are most essential and do them most efficiently.

We have for this coming year a budget within which we can operate and, I believe, operate effectively. We have, in effect, certain personnel ceilings which are not going to be easy, *to keep* but I am confident that within those ceilings we can do our work.

with personnel ceiling

I remember an experience ~~that~~ I had ~~in this field of work~~ when I was assigned to Switzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I arrived in Switzerland as the last American to ~~arrive~~ *enter* there legally before the curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa and the occupation of the southern part of France, which cut off Switzerland from the ~~outside world~~. God imposed a ceiling on my staff that nothing could be done about, since no one could legally get into Switzerland from that time on and work with me officially.

Well, I was able to search around in other government departments, and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together a small, a very small establishment, ~~and~~ *But* for about a year and a half I had to work without any reinforcements. That forced upon me a great measure of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way, *for* I could not write long dispatches because everything had to be enciphered and sent through the air. I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The ~~result~~ *resulted in my doing* of the selectivity forced upon me ~~was that~~ I personally did far better work during

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those months—about eighteen—than I did after the frontier opened up. Because of the advertisement which Switzerland had as a center from which so-called glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people descended upon me, whereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelligence officer. And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need administrators and must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of administrators and really build up a number of top intelligence officers—men and women—on our staff.

We can only do it through training, through building up a Career Service, and I am (every day) deeply grateful to Matt Baird for what he has done in that field.

We have been a bit in the spotlight recently—for my money, far too much. In our form of government, ^{given} with the character of the American people, it is probably essential, probably inevitable that we should have more spotlight than a secret intelligence agency should have. It is right, in a way, ^{and} certainly understandable, that there should be inquiries, ^{that} people should want to know something about what we are doing. I've always felt it was very wise ^{that} when the authors of the law setting up this Agency provided us with an umbrella of overt activities under which we could cover the more secret activities. ^{operations I hope} The fact that I've had a little bit too much spotlight, I hope will not lead others to seek it—^{for} I don't desire it—and I hope from now on we can have less of it because I think we can do our work better in that way.

The longer I'm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a highly personalized affair. It's not the amount of money we have; it's not the number of projects we have; it is the skill and the devotion of the individual.

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I consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that have been ^{already} put together ~~by General Beetle Smith~~ during the period that he was here and the reorganizations and magnificent work ^{Gen. "Beetle" Smith} he did in getting this Agency along the way, the work of his predecessors, the work done by predecessor organizations and the work Matt Baird is doing in training the new arrivals. All this has meant that we have gathered together in this Agency men and women of whom I am sincerely proud, and I want you to know that in the performance of your duty you can always look to me to stand up for you and back you when you're in the right.

Thank you very much.

Question: How do you evaluate our present intelligence output. Are you satisfied with it?

Answer: I don't think in intelligence one should ever be satisfied. If we are, we are ^{lying} laying down on the job. I am highly satisfied with the manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that are given to me within the limits of the intelligence that we have. ^{however,} We don't have enough intelligence on the major targets. I might just describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the highest policy-making body in government within the field of National Security and foreign problems. It meets, as you know, on Thursday morning, under the chairmanship of the President, with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as ^{regular} ~~usual~~ members, and then on specific topics of interest to other departments of government, the head of that particular ^{meets with the Council} agency, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director

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seeing
of Central Intelligence, ~~meeting with the Council~~ as advisors, on matters of military policy and intelligence, respectively. And the usual procedure is for the Director of Central Intelligence, or his Deputy in my absence, to brief the Council on the intelligence background on matters that are coming before the Council or on the agenda for the Council of that day; and, in addition, to raise any urgent matters where I think an intelligence briefing is ^{deemed} necessary. If there is nothing ^{which} ~~that~~ seems to me urgent and that should be brought to the attention of the Council (that has transpired during that particular week), then I generally restrict the intelligence briefing to the particular subjects that ~~is~~ before the Council, occupying ten to fifteen minutes generally, sometimes with a very intricate topic, up to half an hour. I think the procedure is working, ^{satisfactorily} (subject to my own failings and shortcomings), it's working satisfactorily.

Question: [We have several questions, Mr. Dulles, about reorganization.

One says, "I've been with ORR two years and it has had two or three re-^{org} organizations. Are you satisfied with the present structure throughout the Agency or do you contemplate more reorganization?"

Answer: I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I think it is wise to work with what we have, with the organization we have, and ^{to} give it a chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do find that in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly with the added ^{assignments} work that we've had to take over because of the activities of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board and its proposed successor, ~~and~~ that may require certain added personnel on the top echelon. Apart from ^{this} that I have no plans for reorganization.

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4 Question: What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time of total war?

Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of military operations there would come into effect a new relationship between the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field. That has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect the integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war conditions in the field.

3 Question: We have read much about the possibility of the establishment of a joint committee on Central Intelligence something akin to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you believe Congress will set up such a committee and what do you think of the idea?

Answer: I rarely speculate as to what the Congress, ^{leave out} (in its wisdom) will do, and I think it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, however, which I have discussed with certain of the leaders in Congress, and propose to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably, next January. At the present time the practical situation is that we report on matters of concern to the Congress, to the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating to the budget, to the Appropriations Committees. Those arrangements are working satisfactorily and I would assume that they would continue. The problem of a new committee has, I think, been raised and will be studied, of course, in order possibly to protect the agency from being responsible to report to a multiplicity of committees. That, of course, would be helpful. I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of the size now proposed would be the most effective way of doing it, but this

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question will be approached with an open mind by us here and, I believe, from my talks with the members of the Congress, also by the members of the Congress.

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Question: Does CIA suggest policy?

Answer: I've tried to keep the Agency out of getting into policy. If we espouse ^a the policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to fit the policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I've had this situation arise, though, at the National Security Council, where I present some situation that is critical, where something should be done, there is quite a tendency around the Board to say, "Well, what should you do about it; what would you do about it?" Well, then I refer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it may be, pass the buck to him--very possibly because I haven't got the answer myself.

9
Question: [We have certain questions here from the distaff side of the organization.] In answer to a question posed at the last Orientation Program regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done; and another question, has the Inspector General made a report on alleged discrimination against women? ~~Well,~~ the Inspector General has, through the top Career Service Board, already made an official pronouncement that there shall be no discrimination against women in the Agency. ~~Isn't~~ that so, sir?

Answer: That is correct and, also, we had a meeting a little while ago with a selected--I didn't go into the question exactly how the group was selected--but with a selected group representing the distaff side,

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and we sat down, Kirkpatrick and I, and went into the problem. I was glad to find that there did not seem to be on the part of that particular representation—there were about a dozen of fifteen ladies sitting around the table—they did not seem to feel that there was discrimination. If there is any evidence of discrimination I want it brought out, brought to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to mine. We are looking into that problem because I am not clear in my own mind that we have taken full advantage of the capabilities, very especially in this field of the staff side of the organization. I'm going to work on that some more.

Question: We still hear it said that because of your previous associations, Mr. Dulles, with OSS, you will emphasize the clandestine activities at the expense of overt, basic research. Is there anything to this?

Answer: I think you will have to ask the deputies that work on that side, really. It is perfectly true that I have a very deep interest in the clandestine side of the work; but recognizing that I have that, I have tried to compensate for it by keeping my fingers out of that work much more than I should like to do. And I have, I believe, been devoting half of my time to the intelligence production side—the overt side—of the work.

Question: This is a specific part of that element of CIA which you have endorsed already—the Career Program. Do you think it's a good idea to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and those from the Washington offices—ORR, OCI, etc.?

Answer: Yes, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in ORR, OCI, OSI, and so forth, to have periods of duty on the covert side and then have duty in the field, and that is being done. Of course, there are certain stations, particularly [redacted] and others where

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there are representatives of the overt offices already and quite a large number so that it does not necessarily mean that to go into the overt offices precludes or excludes the possibility of working in the foreign field.

(10) Question: This puts you on the spot about the fact that you made a statement of too much paper work at the last Orientation Program; are you still trying to eliminate paper work?

Answer: Correct. I think the memoranda are too long, telegrams are generally too long. If we're going to cut down on personnel, we've got to send fewer telegrams and say what we mean clearly and more concisely and on one page, if possible.

(7) Question: Is the possible transfer of the PM, the Paramilitary function, to the Department of Defense still under consideration?

Answer: No. There is some consideration being given to the transfer of one very limited activist segment of that where we really get out of the PM field into what is more nearly the functions of Defense, but that will not involve, in any way, a turnover of that whole function. That is rightfully, and under NSC directives a part of the function of this Agency. But that is being done at urgent request of CIA and is not being wrenched from us. I would like to turn it over and have tried for about a year to turn over this one particular small segment of work in this field.

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DDCI's MESSAGE

Eleventh Agency Orientation Course

4 August 1953

Charles P. Taber

There is something a little unusual about this particular gathering which may have escaped your immediate attention. Gathered here in this auditorium today are members of the Agency representing all its parts as well as members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence community. I say this is unusual because in your career with this Agency you will seldom have the opportunity of sitting down in one body with fellow CIA workers from the whole operation. If you will look at the people on your right and on your left, I will lay odds you will see faces that you will not see again during your entire experience with us. Now this is an unfortunate thing in a way, because it means that as an Agency, we can not always enjoy that comradeship which comes from continuous contact and interchange within a group, the size of this one. We are in fact compartmented, and however unfortunate it may be, this is inevitable in an essentially covert organization. There are two reasons for this, the latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence. The first is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any extensive and complex process like making automobiles, running a railroad or a university, governing a great commonwealth, or producing intelligence, efficiency demands a division of labor. We produce so much that we must have many people on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person become a specialist so that he does those things he is best capable of doing in order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the development of this concept of division of labor is one of the most important contributions

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which the American genius has given to the world of industry. It is equally applicable to the field of government and thus ~~in~~ ^E CIA, too. We find ourselves organized into offices, divisions, branches, and desks so that we can properly take advantage of this division of labor. Unfortunately, this means that the individual who works on one small aspect of a piece of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture, and more than that, he seldom comes into contact with ~~the~~ others who contribute to the same piece of intelligence. This kind of compartmentation, although it keeps us apart and keeps us from seeing things whole, also helps us to operate efficiently.

There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in this Agency. That is the reason of security. You have all had or will have security indoctrinations which stress the need to know. As CIA has grown, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of security upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that, immunity from having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across the hall in an adjacent office. For security reasons, we allow an individual to know only those portions of our business which he needs to know in order to do his job effectively. Inevitably this means that we have ~~secured defenses~~ ^{security fences} between the different parts of our Agency, ~~secured defenses~~ ^{security fences} which again are a part of compartmentation. ^{*} Now both efficient division of labor and the maintenance of security are important and useful devices. But they can be dangerous to the ultimate attainment of our objectives if they are abused because of exclusiveness, jealousy, false pride, or thoughtlessness. Then, instead of resulting in boundary lines dictated by considerations of efficiency and security, there will be barriers hampering the speedy and effective production of intelligence. The only counter-measure

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that I know which can overcome the inherent disadvantages of compartmentation is coordination.

Now, coordination is a term of which you may have already heard a great deal in your experience in government and you will hear a great deal more of it as time goes on. My definition of it means simply taking into account the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved in any particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production. This has almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You know, for instance, that the intelligence which CIA produces is the product not alone of its own efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence operations in other departments and agencies of the government. After some experience in intelligence before coming to CIA, and as Director of the Joint Staff, I have become convinced that there is no danger of over-emphasizing coordination. Rather we have got to stress it even more than in the past in order to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence community. This would be a community in which the resources of the whole could be geared through a process of coordination to satisfy the highest demands of policy for sound intelligence, I don't mean that we must break ^{without} down the boundaries which efficiency and security have erected between our agencies. For example, air order of battle certainly is not a CIA field of endeavor. If coordination is important in ^{the} intelligence community at large, it is equally important in the specific part of ^{the} intelligence community in which you are engaged. In my experience I have seen too many instances where bureaucratic subdivisions and false conceptions of security have had the effect of hampering the smooth operation of the activity, and I am determined that as rapidly as these come to light here, they will be eliminated. Without in

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any sense overlooking the importance of either the efficient organization of a complex operation like ours or the high importance of maintaining security between its operational units, I still insist that we keep our eye on the ultimate goal of greater and more effective contributions to policy makers. After all, that is why we exist, and anything which obstructs our attainment of this objective is to be avoided. Where there is a will for coordination, it will be rare indeed where a way cannot be found to effect coordination and still follow the dictates of sound security. In the final analysis there may be specific occasions when complete coordination will turn out to be incompatible with security requirements. But the burden of proof will be on the individual bypassing the particular step in the coordination process.

There is one more aspect of coordination upon which I want to say a word. That is the development of adequate coordination between what we call our customers and ourselves. Our customers, of course, are those whose policy and operating decisions demand sound intelligence. It is a self-evident fact which can escape no one in the age of commercials that the customer's wants and needs must be known to the producer and the distributor if the customer is to be adequately served. The same thing certainly applies to the field of intelligence. We must know what the policy makers want, and we must try in every way we can to see that this want is adequately met. This cannot be done in a vacuum. It can only be done as a result of close coordination between our policy makers and our intelligence producers. They must be frank with us as to what they need and we must as frankly tell them what we can do and what we cannot do. This is a two-way street, but just as we must know what the customers want, so also we are obliged in the

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customer's interest, of course, to do a little bit of advertising. I mean that we must convince the policy makers that sound decisions require sound intelligence and that before fundamental decisions are made, recourse should be had ^{to} with the intelligence community. I trust we will always be ready to come up with a useful answer if not a perfect one. But the process is not complete, even then. If custom-built intelligence is to be the most useful, the producer of it needs to be called in by the customer to sit with him in counsel while that intelligence is being integrated with other factors to form a decision. And the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence regularly sits as an adviser to the National Security Council is a recognition of this need and is thus one of the most encouraging features of the current organizations and practices for national security.

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DDCI'S MESSAGE AT THE ELEVENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

4 August 1953

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I'm very happy to welcome you to this Eleventh Orientation Course because these courses have come to be very important and, I believe, the most interesting part of the experience of Agency personnel and really are a vital part of the development of your service in the agency. The cordial reception which past classes have given the course, I believe, is the best possible compliment to the Director of Training and his staff. I share the pride of Colonel Baird and [] in this course because even though I am relatively new in the Agency, I'm a kind of dutch uncle to the whole program. You see, Colonel Baird as Director of Training reports directly to the Director or to me and, therefore, like a proud relative, I bask in the satisfaction which he must feel in the continued value and warm reception which the Orientation Courses receive.

Although my principal purpose in appearing before you today really is to introduce the guest speaker, I can't pass up this opportunity before a captive audience to get a little point of my own across. ~~Now~~ There is something a little unusual about this particular gathering which may have escaped your immediate attention. Gathered here in this auditorium today are members of the Agency representing all its parts as well, indeed, as members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence community. I say this is unusual because (you will seldom have) in your career with this Agency the opportunity of sitting down in one body with fellow CIA workers from the whole operation. If you will look at the people on your right and on your left, ^{I will lay odds} you will see faces that ~~I will lay odds~~ you will not see again during your entire experience with us. Now this is an unfortunate

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thing in a way, because it means that as an agency, we can not always enjoy that comradeship which comes from continuous contact and interchange within a group, ^{the} let us say, in a size of this one. We are in fact compartmented, and however unfortunate it may be, this is inevitable in an essentially covert organization. There are two reasons for this, the latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence. The first is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any extensive and complex process like making automobiles, ~~or~~ running a railroad or a university, ~~or~~ governing a great commonwealth, or producing intelligence, efficiency demands a division of labor. We produce so much that we must have many people on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person become a specialist so that he does those things he is best capable of doing in order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the development of this concept of division of labor is one of the most important contributions which the American genius has given to the world of industry. It is equally applicable to the field of government ^{or} (as our distinguished guest knows) and thus in CIA too. We find ourselves organized into offices, divisions, branches, and desks so that we can properly take advantage of this division of labor. Unfortunately, this means that the individual who works on one small aspect of a piece of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture, and more than that, he seldom comes into contact with the others who contribute to the same piece of intelligence. This kind of compartmentation, although it keeps us apart and keeps us from seeing things whole, also helps us to operate efficiently.

There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in this Agency. That is the reason of security. You have all had or will have

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security indoctrinations which stress the need to know. As CIA has grown, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of security upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that, immunity from having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across the hall in an adjacent office. For security reasons, we allow an individual to know only those portions of our business which he needs to know in order to do his job effectively. Inevitably this means that we have secured defenses between the different parts of our Agency, secured defenses which again are a part of compartmentation. Now both efficient division of labor and the maintenances of security are important and useful devices. But they can be dangerous ^{to} by the ultimate attainment of our objectives if they are abused because of exclusiveness, ~~or~~ jealousy, ~~or~~ false pride, or thoughtlessness. Then, instead of resulting in boundary lines, dictated by considerations of efficiency and security, there will be barriers hampering the speedy and effective production of intelligence. The only counter-measure ^{that} ~~which~~ I know ~~of~~ which can overcome the inherent disadvantages of compartmentation is coordination.

Now, coordination is a term of which you may have ^{already} heard a great deal ~~of already~~ in your experience in government and you will hear a great deal more of it as time goes on. My definition of it means simply taking into account the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved in any particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production. This ^{has} is almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You know, for instance, that the intelligence which CIA produces is the product not alone of its own efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence operations in other departments and agencies of the government. After some experience

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in intelligence before coming to CIA, and as Director of the Joint Staff, I have become convinced that there is no danger of over emphasizing coordination. Rather we have got to stress it even more than in the past in order to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence community. This would be ^{a community} ~~one~~ in which the resources of the whole ^{could} ~~community~~ can be geared through a process of coordination to satisfy the highest demands of policy for sound intelligence. I don't mean that we must break down the boundaries which efficiency and security have erected between our agencies. ^{for example} ~~Certainly~~ ^{certainly} air order of battle ^{is} not a CIA field of endeavor. [I do mean, however, that we must live up to the spirit of coordination at every point so that the final output can be along the line.] If coordination is important in intelligence community at large, it is equally important in ^{the} ~~a~~ specific part of an intelligence community in which you are engaged. In my experience I have seen too many instances where bureaucratic subdivisions and false conceptions of security have had the effect of hampering the smooth operation of the activity, and I am determined that as rapidly as these come to light here, they will be eliminated. Without in any sense overlooking the importance of either the efficient organization of a complex operation like ours or the high importance of maintaining security between its operation ^{at} ~~units~~, I still insist that we keep our eye on the ultimate goal of greater and more effective contributions to policy makers. ^{after all} ~~That is,~~ ^{that is} after all, why we exist, and anything which obstructs our attainment of this objective is to be avoided. Where there is a will for coordination, it will be rare indeed where a way cannot be found to effect coordination and still follow the dictates of sound security. In the final analysis there may be specific occasions when complete coordination will turn out

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to be incompatible with security requirements. But the burden of proof will be on the ^{individual} one bypassing the particular step in the coordination process.

There is one ^{point} aspect of coordination upon which I want to say a word.

and that more closely involves our distinguished guest speaker this morning.]

^{that} It is the development of adequate coordination between what we call our customers and ourselves. Our customers, of course, are those whose policy and operating decisions demand sound intelligence. It is a self-evident fact which can escape no one in the age of commercials that the customer's wants and needs must be known to the producer and the distributor if the customer is to be adequately served. The same thing certainly applies to the field of intelligence. We must know what the policy makers want, and we must try in every way we can to see that this want is adequately met. This cannot be done in a vacuum. It can only be done as a result of close coordination between our policy makers and our intelligence producers. They must be frank with us as to what they need and we must as frankly tell them what we can do and what we cannot do. This is a two-way street but just as we must know what the customers want, so also we are obliged in the customer's interest, of course, to do a little bit of advertising. I mean that we must convince the policy makers that sound decisions require sound intelligence and that before fundamental decisions are made, recourse should be had with the intelligence community, ^{we will} ~~which~~ I trust, ~~will~~ always be ready to come up with a useful answer if not a perfect one. But the process is not complete, even then, if custom built intelligence is to be the most useful, the producer of it needs to be called in by the customer to sit with him in counsel while that intelligence is being integrated with other factors to form a

decision. One of the most encouraging features of the current organization and the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence regularly acts as an **CONFIDENTIAL** advisor to the National Security Council is thus one of the most encouraging features of this need and ~~one~~ of the most encouraging features of the current organization and practices for national security.

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and practices for national security is the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence regularly sits as an advisor to the National Security Council.

In inviting our distinguished guest to speak to you today, perhaps we had in mind both of the aspects of coordination. On the one hand we hope that through his remarks and through the continuing contact which he has with our Director, and which his subordinates have with their opposite members in this Agency, we shall better find the type of intelligence which is the most use to the agency which he heads. At the same time I hope that we are doing a little bit of subtle advertising in laying before him in this and other contacts the potentialities which this Agency and the other elements of the intelligence community have for better and more effectively meeting his demand for sound intelligence, which is one of the essential ingredients for his own sound decisions.

Our speaker is one of the most eminent and broadly experienced administrators on the national scene today. Starting his public life at a very early age, he has had a long stand of selfless public service already and he is still a young man. Governor of Minnesota at the age of 31, he served his native state in this highest office for 3 terms before resigning to serve with equal distinction in the Navy during the war in the Pacific. Adding to this record a period of brilliant public service as a delegate to the San Francisco conference which established the United Nations and as a lay religious leader, our guest could not escape the ceaseless search for persons of national political stature, as the presidential nominating conventions of 1948 and 1952 show. At length, he placed his talents at the service of education in accepting the presidency of one of our oldest and most illustrious universities. Thence, he was called by President Eisenhower to assume the directorship of Mutual Security, now expanded in responsibility and renamed

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the Foreign Operations Administration. Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted and honored to welcome to our Eleventh Orientation Course, Governor Harold Stassen.

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8 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Training Bulletins

1. The records of Mr. Dulles' and General Cabell's remarks are attached hereto, along with the revised and edited versions, in draft form, which are to be issued as Training Bulletins Nos. 8 and 9 respectively.

2. It is requested that the attachments be reviewed and, with whatever comments or changes you care to make, returned to the Office of Training for publication as Training Bulletins.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Acting Chief, Plans & Policy Staff

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Attachments

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FILE NO. _____ DOC. NO. /8 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/ [REDACTED] CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S [REDACTED] JUST. 22
NEXT REV DATE 89 RE. DATE 11-12-79 REVIEWER [REDACTED] TYPE DOC. 02
NO. PGS. / CREATION DATE _____ ORG COMP // CFI // ORG CLASS S
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 7

30 June 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Tenth Agency Orientation Course on 8 May 1953.
2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

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MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

JOB NO. _____ DOC NO. _____ FILE NO. _____ DOC. NO. 19 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/DECLASSIFIED CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S 6 RET. JUST. 22
NEXT REV DATE 89 REV DATE 11-12-79 REVIEWER 30 TYPE DOC. 30
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REMARKS OF

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ALLEN W. DULLES

AT THE

TENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

8 May 1953

* * * * *

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of it, but I had not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of my time to doing what I can to build up the Agency; to build up its esprit de corps, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the Government of the United States.

From time to time, I have received presents from visiting dignitaries, very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his presence. I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang. I asked him whether he thought I should accept the boomerang as the emblem of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only comes back half way." I have adopted the symbol of the "boomerang-only-comes-back-half-way" for the moment. Occasionally I find the boomerang comes back all the way. But we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.

In my experience in intelligence work, I have been impressed with two primary factors: one is the character of personnel; the other is the training that such personnel receive. There is no alternative, no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all professions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with the help of those working with me, who among you (and I hope it will be practically all of you) have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, resourcefulness, perseverance, and patience, which are the essence of a good intelligence officer.

One of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans particularly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in explaining to outsiders what you do--how in your ordinary social life can you appear to tell what you are doing without really doing so?--and I've been looking into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly. I hope to get out some other regulations on this subject, as soon as we've explored it further, because I think there have been a good deal too many rigid rules without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you to be natural in your ordinary contacts without giving away any of the secrets of your work. In the work I

did in Switzerland, I found that it was very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a little bit near the truth, but it put the inquirer off on the wrong scent. If I had tried to pretend that I was doing something totally different from what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.

I plan to do everything I can to build up CIA as a career service. It is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that direction. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come largely from the work itself. But I can assure you that in the long run, that is the greatest satisfaction one gets out of any career. It's not the ephemeral self-advertisement that one may get.

We are working now in the most difficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get intelligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind the Iron Curtain. There are new difficulties because some of the most important targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which makes it harder and harder for the ordinary individual to be able to operate. But that difficulty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.

I can assure you that intelligence in this government has come of age; it has found its position; its importance is recognized; it is being supported. Each week, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council; that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelligence community indicates the importance which the highest officials of government place on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.

Finally, I want to say that, as your Director, I propose to see that the rights of the individual employee are protected and I shall see to it as a high privilege and a high duty.

I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions at me. I'll do my best to answer all your questions, but if any of them are not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our very able Inspector General for study and later answer.

Question: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as good as you would like to have it?

Answer: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage, then something is wrong. One never has all the facts; all one can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied, because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging on to even greater efforts those who are furnishing the information. No, I'm not wholly satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities, we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact on the basis of which to firm up policy.

Question: In view of the fact that most well-known Republicans are known for their rather conservative viewpoints relative to world affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any effect upon our estimating function?

Answer: If we allow ourselves to be influenced in our estimating by political or other considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively or to have any political activity, had better leave, right away quick, because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow myself to do it; I won't allow anybody else to do it while in the Agency. Obviously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want politics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency out of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep politics out of our estimating.

Question: The CIA organization is functional, but 90% of our problems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional set-up so that we could go to one place for the answer to the average question instead of going to half a dozen functional places at the present time?

Answer: Well, I don't think one has to go to half a dozen. I do often find that I go to two places. Let's take a question like I want to get ideas from the fellow that is carrying on the operations in that area, collecting intelligence from that area, and then I also want to get, as a check on him, the views of the person who is studying reports and looking at the problem in the broad perspective. I find that if I get those two angles on the subject, I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is. Now I realize that there are many elements that feed up to each of those two individuals, let us say, in his own side of the shop. I don't think you could wisely put those two sides of the shop together, because the operational fellow tends to have an operational view of things, and it's well to temper that with the view of the person who looks at it from the broad historical and research angle.

Question: Would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modified change of heart and begins to behave itself?

Answer: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a while we get a bit of criticism here and there, but I have never run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes

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of tactics and strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible as advances, the basic policy remains. I don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it, that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of this Agency, or its importance.

Question: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in the Agency?

Answer: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through a lot of organizational changes. Those were very largely patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted several years ago, the Jackson-Dulles report, that was adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that report are carried out in the present organization and I think the thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization that we have and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments are necessary.

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Question: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions in CIA?

Answer: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have probably read in the press about the President's Committee on Informational Activities, I believe it is called--somewhat of a cover name, because that Committee, presided over by Mr. William Jackson, will also deal with the relationship in government of our own activities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it. And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial organizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.

Question: Do you feel that in the long run the PM type of operation belongs in an agency like this?

Answer: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry on covert operations through two different agencies with different controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it, I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dictated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our covert operations should remain under one leadership and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that there are certain paramilitary activities which may reach a volume and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and that is a problem which is now under consideration.

Question: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities imperiled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy?

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Answer: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time to time. If we start to answer attacks directly, even false attacks, I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us. I believe in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I think I have very good relations personally with a large number of people of the press, but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies.

Question: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

Answer: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done.

Question: When do we get a new building?

Answer: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situation among the Congressional leaders. I find everyone sympathetic, but the question is, what to do. There are two possibilities: one is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, and the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building. We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest priority that I have, because I realize the conditions under which you work.

Question: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a civilian organization?

Answer: The percentage of military personnel with us is relatively low, about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable and indispensable addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't change that in any respect. We have very important responsibilities to the armed services in the field of intelligence.

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don't think we have too many. The percentage is about right. I think the caliber is very high.

Question: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men? (2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition in the Central Intelligence

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Agency? (3) And as the new Director of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?

Answer: That first question I'll refer to the Inspector General for a report as to whether the facts are true. As to the second question I am inclined to think that they are not. And the third one: If it exists, I shall. I'll give that to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.

Question: You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intelligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?

Answer: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to be. As you know, there was quite a long while before General Cabell came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of administration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The new officials of government had to be briefed about our activities. The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important, takes a vast amount of time--far more time than it did in the past--because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty busy. Now General Cabell is on board and I think we're getting the administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.

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1 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Remarks of Allen W. Dulles at the Tenth Agency Orientation Course

1. The verbatim record of Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions at the Tenth Agency Orientation Course on 8 May 1953 (Attachment #1), and the revised version (Attachment #2), in draft form, for issuance as a Training Bulletin, are attached.

2. The revised version has been edited and the questions and answers organized in logical sequence.

3. It is requested that Attachment #2 be reviewed and, with whatever comments or changes you care to make, returned to the Office of Training for publication as a Training Bulletin.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

[Redacted Signature Block]

Chief, Plans & Policy Staff
Office of Training (General)

Attachments - 2

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FLD NO. _____ DOC. NO. 2 NO CHANGE
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Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of it, but I had not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of ~~my~~ ~~the time that I have~~ to doing what I can to build up the Agency; ^{to} build up its esprit de corps, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the Government of the United States.

I have, ^{from time to time,} received presents from visiting dignitaries, very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his presence. I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang. I asked him whether he thought I should accept the boomerang as the emblem of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only comes back half way." I have adopted the ^{symbol of the} "boomerang-only-comes-back-half-way" for the moment. Occasionally I find the boomerang comes back all the way. But we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.

In my experience in intelligence work, I have been impressed with ~~the~~ ^{fact that two} ~~elements~~ ^{factors} are primary: one is the character of ~~the~~ personnel; the other is the training that such personnel receive. There is no alternative; ~~there is~~ no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all professions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with the help of those working with me, ^{who} ~~these~~ among you, (and I hope it will be practically all of you) ~~who~~ have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, resourcefulness, perseverance, and patience, which are the essence of a good intelligence officer.

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One of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans particularly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in explaining ^{to outsiders} what you do--how in your ordinary social life can you ^{appear to} tell what you are doing without really ^{doing so?} telling what you are doing?--and I've been looking into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly. I hope to get out some ^{other} ~~further~~ regulations on this subject, as soon as we've explored it further, because I think there has been a good deal too much ~~many~~ rigid ^{rules} ~~regulation~~ without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you, in your ordinary contacts to be natural without giving away any of the secrets of your work. In the work I ^{P2} did in Switzerland, I found that it was very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a little bit near the truth, but it put the inquirer off on the wrong scent. If I had ~~tried~~ to pretend that I was doing something totally different from what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.

I plan to do everything I can to build ^{up} CIA as a career service. It is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that direction. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come largely from the work itself. But I can assure you that in the long run, that is the greatest satisfaction one gets out of any career. It's not the ephemeral ^{self-} advertisement that one may get. We are working now in the most difficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get intelligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind the Iron Curtain. There are new difficulties because some of the most important targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which ~~makes~~ it harder and harder for the ^{ordinary} ~~normal and usual~~ individual to be able to operate. But that difficulty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.

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~~I think~~ I can assure you that intelligence in this government has come of age; it has found its position; its importance is recognized; ^{it is being supported.} Each week, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council; that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelligence community, indicates the importance which the highest officials of government place on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.

~~And Finally,~~ I want to say that, as your Director, I propose to see that the ~~individual~~ rights of the individual employee are protected and I shall ^{see to it} ~~do so~~ as a high privilege and a high duty. ~~Thank you very much.~~

I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions at me. I'll do my best to answer all your questions, but if any of them are not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our ~~ew~~ very able Inspector General ^{study and} for later answer.

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QUESTION: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as good as you would like to have it?

ANSWER: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage, then something is wrong. One never has all the facts; all one can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied, because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging on those who are furnishing the information to even greater efforts. No, I'm not wholly satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities, we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact on the basis of which to firm up policy.

QUESTION: In view of the fact that most well-known Republicans are known for their rather conservative view points relative to world affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any effect upon our estimating function?

ANSWER: If we allow ourselves to be influenced by political or other considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies in our estimating, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively or to have any political activity, ^{had} better leave, right away quick, because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow myself to do it; I won't allow anybody else to do it while ~~they're~~ in the Agency. Obviously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want politics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency out of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep politics out of our estimating.

QUESTION: The CIA organization is functional, but 90% of our problems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional set-up so that we would go to one place for the answer to the average question instead of going to half a dozen functional places at the present time?

ANSWER: Well, I don't think one has to go to a half a dozen. I do often find that I go to two places, ~~that is, I'll want to get the ideas about I of the operational fellow.~~ Let's take a question like

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of the person who is studying reports, and looking at ~~the~~ ^{the problem} in the broad perspective. ~~But~~ I find that if I get those two angles on the subject, I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is, Now I realize that there are many elements that feed up to ~~both~~ ^{each} of those two individuals, let us say, in ~~their respective~~ ^{his own} sides of the shop. ~~By and~~

~~large, if I get hold of two or three, I think I can get a pretty~~
~~good slant.~~ I don't think you could wisely put those ^{two sides of the shop} together,
because the operational fellow tends to have ^{an operational} ~~one~~ view of things,
~~looking at it from operations,~~ and it's well to temper that with
the view of the person ^{who} ~~that~~ looks at it from the ~~long~~ broad his-
torical and research angle.

QUESTION: Would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modified change of heart and begins to behave itself?

ANSWER: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a while we get a bit of criticism here and there, but I have never run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes^{p4} of tactics^{and} strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible ~~in that~~ ~~theory~~ as advances, the basic policy ~~of the Kremlin~~ remains, and I don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it, that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of this Agency, or its importance.

QUESTION: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in the Agency?

ANSWER: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through a lot of organizational changes. Those changes were very largely patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted several years ago, the Jackson Dulles report, that was adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that report are carried out in the present organization and I think the thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization that we have and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments are necessary.

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QUESTION: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions in CIA?

ANSWER: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have probably read in the press about the President's Committee on Informational Activities, I believe it is called, somewhat of a cover name, because that Committee, presided over by Mr. William Jackson, will also deal with the relationship in government of our own activities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it. And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial organizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.

QUESTION: Do you feel that in the long run the PM type of operation belongs in an agency like this?

ANSWER: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry on covert operations through two different agencies with different controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it, I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dictated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our *covert* operations ~~covert operations~~ should remain under one leadership and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that there are certain para-military activities which may reach a volume and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and that is a problem which is now under consideration.

QUESTION: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities imperiled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy?

ANSWER: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time to time. If we start to answer attacks directly, even false attacks, I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us. I believe in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I think I have very good relations personally with a large number of people ^{of the press,} but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies.

QUESTION: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

ANSWER: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done. ~~One of the troubles in intelligence today is we have almost too many reports, and we don't concentrate on the essential elements.~~

QUESTION: When do we get a new building?

ANSWER: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situation among the Congressional leaders, and I find everyone sympathetic, but the question is, what to do. There are two possibilities: one is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, and the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building. We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest priority that I have, because I realize the conditions under which we you work.

QUESTION: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a civilian organization?

ANSWER: ~~Well,~~ the percentage of military personnel with us is relatively low, about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable and indispensable addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't change that in any respect. We have very important responsibilities in the field of intelligence to the Armed Services Take the situa-

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job. No, I don't think we have too many. The percentage is about right. I think the caliber is very high.

QUESTION: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men?

(2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition

in the Central Intelligence ^{PL} Agency? (3) And as the new Director of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?

ANSWER: That first question, I'll refer to the Inspector General

for a report as to whether the facts are true. ~~All~~

^{As to}
~~right, etc.~~ the second question, I am inclined to think that they are not. And the third one, ¹if it exists, I shall. I'll give that to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.

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QUESTION: You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intelligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?

ANSWER: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to be. As you know, there was quite a long while before General Cabell came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of administration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The new officials of government had to be briefed about our activities. The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important, takes a vast amount of time--far more time than it did in the past--because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty busy. Now General Cabell is on board and I think we're getting the administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.

DCI'S MESSAGE at the TENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE 8 May 1953
Mr. Allen Dulles

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the first time I have had the honor of addressing ~~one of the classes~~ ^{you} as the Director of Central Intelligence. The last time ~~when~~ I was here, ~~three or four months ago,~~ I was on the verge of it, but I had not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of the time that I have to doing what I can to build up the Agency; build up its esprit de corps, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the Government of the United States.

I have received from time to time (I have to be a little careful about it) presents from visiting dignitaries, very small presents, and the other day I received a rather ^{an} unusual one from the head of a friendly service. It was a long package ~~(the package)~~ ^{which} and I opened ~~it~~ ^{it} in ~~the~~ ^{the} presence of ~~this representative of the Allied friendly service who was visiting me, and when I took it out,~~ I was somewhat surprised to find that the present ~~he had given me~~ ^{whether} was a boomerang. I asked him ~~if~~ ^{the} he thought I should accept the boomerang as ~~my~~ ^{the} emblem of office, and I don't know how much humor he had, but he said, "Oh, this was ~~quite all right~~ ^{is} this boomerang was all right. It ~~because it only came back half way.~~ So I have adopted the "boomerang only comes back half way," for the moment, ~~the emblem on my desk and use it from time to time.~~ Occasionally I find ~~for~~ the boomerangs come back all the way. But, we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.

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I was told ~~by~~ that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions at me, ~~and~~ [†] therefore, I'm going to reduce my introductory remarks to a very few points. I don't expect that I will be able to answer all your questions, but we have a very able Inspector General, and if any of the questions are not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to him for later answer. I may adopt the British ^{the right} Parliamentary rule of having ~~to write~~ ^{to refer} questions for later answer, but

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I'll do my best to answer what you have.

In my experience in intelligence work, ~~that has been fairly long~~ (it started in World War I with some interruptions for other work) I have been impressed with the fact that two ^{elements} ~~factors~~ are primary: One is the character of the personnel; the ^{other} ~~second~~ is the training that ^{such} ~~that~~ personnel receives. There is no alternative; there is no substitute for ^{either} ~~that~~. Intelligence, above all professions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind and character. I hope, ~~in my work here in the Agency,~~ to do everything possible to try to find out, with the help of those working with me, those among you, and I hope it will be practically all of you, who have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, resourcefulness, perseverance, ^{and} ~~patience,~~ which ^{are} ~~is~~ the essence of a good intelligence officer.

And on that comes on top, really, one of the hardest things ^{in intelligence work,} ~~that I think for~~ Americans particularly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in explaining what you do; ~~and I've been looking into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly;~~ how in your ordinary social life can you tell what you are doing without really telling ^{it} ~~what~~ you are doing? I hope to get out some further regulations on ^{the} ~~that~~ subject, as soon as we've explored it further because I think ~~that~~ there has been a good deal too much ~~of~~ rigid regulation without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you, in your ordinary social contacts, to be natural, without giving away any of the secrets of your work, ~~or of your office.~~ I ~~know~~ ^{that} in the work ~~that~~ I did in Switzerland, I found that it was very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a little bit near the truth, but ^{it} ~~which~~ put the inquirer off on the wrong scent. If I tried to pretend that I was doing something totally different from what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it. ^P I plan too, as Director, to do everything I can to build ^{cia} ~~the~~ up as a career service. It is not easy, but it is possible. We've ^{already} ~~made~~ real strides in that direction, ^{already} ~~already~~. ^{Intelligence} ~~This~~ is a kind of a career in which the satisfaction has ^{to come largely from the work itself.} But I can assure you that in the

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the long run, that is the greatest satisfaction ~~that~~ one gets out of any career.

It's not in the ^(4/10) ~~external~~ advertisement that one may get. We are working now ~~in~~

~~intelligence~~ in the most difficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was

child's play to get intelligence during the war ~~and~~ ^{the} the days when I was working

in Switzerland, for example, ~~as~~ ^{getting} compared to ~~today~~ ^{today} to get intelligence ~~from~~ behind

the Iron Curtain. Intelligence ~~has~~ ^{this is true} taken on new difficulties because some of ~~our~~ ^{the}

~~highest~~ and most important targets are in the scientific and technical fields,

which makes it harder and harder for the normal and usual individual to be able

to operate ~~in certain of these fields~~. But that difficulty is, and must remain, a

challenge to ~~the~~ us all. I think I can assure you that intelligence in this gov-

ernment has come of age; it has found its position; ~~we are getting support in this~~

Agency, and that applies also to the allied and friendly intelligence agencies and

the Armed Services, State Department, and elsewhere. ~~The~~ importance is recognized

in the highest places of government. I have, each week now, the task of giving the

intelligence briefing for the National Security Council ~~as before it meets~~, and that

privilege which I exercise, ^{to} some extent on behalf of the intelligence community,

indicates the importance which the highest officials of government place ~~this~~ on

this phase of their work. Policy cannot be established firmly unless it is estab-

lished on the basis of fact. And finally, in conclusion, I want to say that, as your

Director, I propose to see that the individual rights of the individual employee

are protected and I shall do that as a high privilege and a high duty. Thank you

very much.

Question: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in the Agency?

Answer: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through a lot of organiza-

tional changes. Those changes were very largely patterned on a report that three

of us prepared and submitted several years ago, that is the Jackson Dulles

report, ~~a classified document~~, the one that was adopted by the NSC. ~~I am not joint~~

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responsibility ~~with the others~~ for that report. ~~By~~ and large, the recommendations of that report are carried out in the present organization and I think the ~~time now~~ ^{thing to business} is to go ahead with the organization that we have and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments are necessary.

Questions: Referring back to your briefing of the National Security Council and the work we do, ~~How~~ do you evaluate the present intelligence support that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as good as you would like to have it?

Answers: ~~Well, that's up to the National Security Council to say. Intelligence~~
~~Let us start again.~~ If we ~~are~~ are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage, then something is wrong. One never has all the facts; all one can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied because ~~if I were satisfied with what I get~~ then I would not be urging on those who are furnishing the information to even greater efforts. No, I'm not wholly satisfied, ~~On the other hand,~~ ^{but} I feel that, given our capabilities, we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact on the basis of which to firm up policy.

Questions: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions in CIA?

Answer: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have probably ^{read} seen in the press about the President's Committee on Informational Activities—I believe it is called—somewhat of a cover name because that Committee, presided over by Mr. William Jackson, will also deal with the relationship in government of our own activities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it, And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial organizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.

Question: As related to that question, Mr. Dulles, of course, in the clandestine operations, ~~as refer to PI, PP, and PM. This question says~~ ^{Do} you feel that in the long run ~~the~~ and the PM type of operation belongs in an agency like this?

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Answer: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry on covert operations through two different agencies with different controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus ~~organistic~~ organized and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it, I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dictated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our operations—covert operations—should remain under one leadership and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that there are certain ~~PM~~ ~~I suppose by PM you mean para-military, don't you? (That's right Sir).~~ Certain para-military activities which may reach a volume and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon ^{which} than with us, and that is a problem ~~that~~ ^{which} is now under consideration.

Question: We have combined these three questions, Mr. Dulles; and you've been asked this kind of question before: (Dulles—It doesn't relate to coffee, does it?) Do you want that one first? It says would it be possible to have the food at K Building as high in quality as in price? Then it goes on to a parenthetical question: our work is seasoned but our food is not.

Answer: ~~Shane~~, will you fix a day that I can go down and try this myself. May I say that the food down below in our little shop ^{where we have it} comes up just about as bad as it can be.

Question: ① Why are women hired at a lower grade than men? ~~This is serious now.~~
② Do you think that women are given ~~sufficient~~ sufficient recognition in the Central Intelligence Agency? ③ And as the new Director of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?

Answer: ~~I'll answer those. (They're all about women). I know they are. (One talks about women being hired at a lower grade, one talks about the professional status of women, and one talks in general categories about the insufficient recognition)~~

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Well, ~~will you refer~~ ^{see after} that first question to the Inspector General for a report as to whether the facts are true. (All right sir) ~~The facts~~ The second question, ~~(The second question is the general one—do you think that women are given sufficient recognition in CIA?)~~ I am inclined to think that they are not. (And the third one—As Director are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?) ^{And the third one—} If it exists I shall. ^{see} ~~The question~~ Give that to the Inspector General too, and ~~let him~~ have a report on it. I'm serious about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and if there is discrimination, ^{we're going to} ~~let him~~ see that it's stopped.

Question: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

Answer: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. ^I I recall in Switzerland, during the war, I arrived in Switzerland to carry on my work there, and the day I arrived, the frontier closed so that it was then impossible to get anyone else into Switzerland to add to my force until the ~~end of~~ frontier opened about two years later. And I started off there with—let's see—I was there and I had two men and two women, and most of us had to spend our time ciphering. We were able to recruit a certain number of people, probably by stealing them from other departments of government, ^{and} Since the frontier was closed those other departments didn't learn about it until the frontier ~~was~~ opened. And in various ways. But I found I did very much better work with that small force, with some recruits that I picked up here and there, in Switzerland itself, than I did after the frontier ^{body} opened and everyone wanted to come to Switzerland to practice the spy game. And I had about 40 or 50 arrive within two or three weeks. From that time on, I was an administrative officer, ^{and} trying to find ways of keeping people busy without getting into trouble. So that I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations

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where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done. One of the troubles in intelligence today is we have almost too many reports, and we don't concentrate on the essential ~~effort~~ elements; ~~and send too much on the frills and the marginal subjects.~~

Question: ~~Again this problem has been asked of you before, Mr. Dulles, when do we get a new building? Is it true that Buildings I, J, K, and L are going to be moved out to Suitland, Maryland? (Never heard of that one) Will CIA be one of the agencies to be housed in the building soon to be constructed for all security agencies? The last question is, When do we get a new building?~~

Answer: That's on the very top of the basket. ~~As a matter of fact, at our staff meeting this morning, we spent most of our time talking about the possibility of a new building.~~ I have canvassed the situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situation among the Congressional leaders, and I find everyone sympathetic, but the question is what to do. There are two possibilities: one is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present occupants on the theory of ^{the} higher sensitivity of our work; and the other is to get ^{the} authority and money to build a new building. We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest priority ^{about} I have, because I realize the conditions under which you work.

Question: ~~We have some very interesting questions coming up here, Sir. In view of the fact that most well-known republicans are known for their rather conservative view points relative to world affairs, this is an assumption in your opinion, will these conservative leanings have any effect upon the future thought and operations of CIA? I assume by the word "thought" they mean our estimating function.~~

Answer: If we allow ourselves to be influenced by political or other considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies in our estimating, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role in this agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively or to have any political activity, better leave right away quick.

because I won't tolerate that, I won't allow myself to do it, I won't allow anybody else to do it while they're in the Agency. Obviously you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want politics coming into this Agency. ~~I may just tell a little secret—last fall, during the campaign, I deliberately went abroad. I ^{really} ~~didn't~~ ^{rather} ~~didn't~~ want to go abroad, but I went abroad during the campaign so that the fact that I was there, with a name that has sometimes been associated with politics, would not get the Agency into any politics whatsoever. And I left the end of September and I came back about a week before the election. We're going to keep this Agency out of politics as far as I'm concerned and we're going to keep politics out of our estimating.~~

Question: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities imperiled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy, ² ~~the U.S. foreign service?~~

Answer: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time to time. If we start to answer attacks, directly, I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble, (even false attacks) ^{false attacks} If we answer the ~~faults~~ ^{faults} and don't answer the other attacks, ~~then we might be deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us.~~ I believe in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I think I have very good relations personally with a large number of people, but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies. ~~I did write a letter to Westbrook Pegler, but I don't know whether that was wise or not.~~

Question: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a civilian organization?

Answer: Well, the percentage of military personnel with us is relatively low, ~~is~~ about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable ~~addition~~ and indispensable addition to our staff. We have some of the ~~very~~ ablest men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't change that in any respect. We have very important

responsibilities in the field of intelligence to the Armed Services. Take the

Services, we wouldn't be able to do our job. No, I don't think we have too many. The percentage is about right. I think the caliber is very high.

Question: ~~Here's a question with a little element of human interest.~~ You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intelligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?

Answer: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to be. As you know, there was quite a long while before General Cabell came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of administration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The new officials of government had to be briefed about our activities. The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important, takes a vast amount of time; far more time than it did in the past, ~~most~~ because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty busy. Now General Cabell is on board and I think we're getting the administrative organization up ~~what do they call it—the hill,~~ ~~do they call it, up where we are?—up on the hill—up in the ivory tower—is getting~~ working more smoothly and I can assure you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.

~~Comment:~~
Question: Mr. Dulles, before we get you and the Inspector General upset about this female problem, here's a note from the audience. You might be interested in knowing that one lady in a key position has just revised her plans about going back into a job in private industry. *She's staying with us.*

Answer: I'm delighted to hear that. I hope it's more than one though.

Question: ~~This is a very interesting question, sir.~~ The CIA organization is functional but 90% of our problems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional set-up so that we would go to one place for the answer to the average question instead of going to half a dozen functional places at the present time?

Answer: Well, I don't think one has to go to a half a dozen. I do often find that I go to two places; that is, I'll want to get the ideas of the operational

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views of the person who is studying ~~the~~ reports, and looking at it in the broad prospective. But I find that if I get those two angles on the subject, I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is. Now I realize that there are many elements that feed up to both of those two individuals, let us say, in their respective sides of the shop. By and large, if I get hold of two or three, I think I can get a pretty good slant. I don't think you could wisely put those together, because the operational fellow tends to have one view of things looking at it from operations, and its well to temper that with the view of the person that looks at it from the long broad historical and research angle.

Question: ~~This will be the last question, Mr. Dulles. And in answering it, you might want to give us your opinion of Khrushchev's recent piece of peace offensive. It says,~~ would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modified change of heart and begins to behave itself?

Answer: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact during these last ~~two or three~~ ^{few} weeks with the Congress, and every once in a while, we get a ^{lot of} criticism here and there. ^{but} I have never run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought

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to be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes of tactics, strategic retreats are permissible, and just as permissible in that theory as advances, the basic policy of the Kremlin remains and I don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it, that this peace offensive will change in any way the work load of this Agency, or its importance.

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~~Your answer, sir, is quite a stimulant for career service in intelligence. Thank you, very much.~~

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Security Information

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Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of it, but I had not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of the time that I have to doing what I can to build up the Agency; build up its esprit de corps, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the Government of the United States.

I have, from time to time, received presents from visiting dignitaries, very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his presence. I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang. I asked him whether he thought I should accept the boomerang as the emblem of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only comes back half way." I have adopted the "boomerang-only-comes-back-half-way" for the moment. Occasionally I find the boomerang comes back all the way. But we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.

In my experience in intelligence work, I have been impressed with the fact that two elements are primary: one is the character of the personnel; the other is the training that such personnel receive. There is no alternative; there is no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all professions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with the help of those working with me, those among you, and I hope it will be practically all of you, who have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, resourcefulness, perseverance, and patience, which are the essence of a good intelligence officer.

Security Information

One of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans particularly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in explaining what you do--how in your ordinary social life can you tell what you are doing without really telling what you are doing?--and I've been looking into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly. I hope to get out some further regulations on this subject, as soon as we've explored it further, because I think there has been a good deal too much rigid regulation without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you, in your ordinary contacts, to be natural without giving away any of the secrets of your work. In the work I did in Switzerland, I found that it was very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a little bit near the truth, but it put the inquirer off on the wrong scent. If I had tried to pretend that I was doing something totally different from what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.

I plan to do everything I can to build CIA up as a career service. It is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that direction. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come largely from the work itself. But I can assure you that in the long run, that is the greatest satisfaction one gets out of any career. It's not the ephemeral advertisement that one may get. We are working now in the most difficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get intelligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind the Iron Curtain. There are new difficulties because some of the most important targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which makes it harder and harder for the normal and usual individual to be able to operate. But that difficulty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.

I think I can assure you that intelligence in this government has come of age; it has found its position; its importance is recognized. Each week, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council; that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelligence community, indicates the importance which the highest officials of government place on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.

And finally, I want to say that, as your Director, I propose to see that the individual rights of the individual employee are protected and I shall do that as a high privilege and a high duty. Thank you very much.

I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions at me. I'll do my best to answer all your questions, but if any of them are not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our ~~ew~~ very able Inspector General for later answer.

QUESTION: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

ANSWER: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done. One of the troubles in intelligence today is we have almost too many reports, and we don't concentrate on the essential elements.

QUESTION: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in the Agency?

ANSWER: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through a lot of organizational changes. Those changes were very largely patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted several years ago, the Jackson, (?), Dulles report, that was adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that report are carried out in the present organization and I think the thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization that we have and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments are necessary.

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QUESTION: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as good as you would like to have it?

ANSWER: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage, then something is wrong. One never has all the facts; all one can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied, because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging on those who are furnishing the information to even greater efforts. No, I'm not wholly satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities, we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact on the basis of which to firm up policy.

QUESTION: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions in CIA?

ANSWER: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have probably read in the press about the President's Committee on Informational Activities, I believe it is called, somewhat of a cover name, because that Committee, presided over by Mr. William Jackson, will also deal with the relationship in government of our own activities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it. And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial organizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.

QUESTION: Do you feel that in the long run the FM type of operation belongs in an agency like this?

ANSWER: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry on covert operations through two different agencies with different controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it, I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dictated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our operations--covert operations--should remain under one leadership and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that there are certain para-military activities which may reach a volume and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and that is a problem which is now under consideration.

QUESTION: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men?

(2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition

in the Central Intelligence Agency? (3) And as the new Direc-

tor of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?

ANSWER: That first question, I'll refer to the Inspector General

for a report as to whether the facts are true.

All

right, sir.) The second question; I am inclined to think that they

are not. And the third one; if it exists, I shall. I'll give that

to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious

about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and

if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.

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QUESTION: In these days of ~~economy~~, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

ANSWER: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I recall in Switzerland, during the war, I arrived in Switzerland to carry on my work there, and the day I arrived, the frontier closed so that it was then impossible to get anyone else into Switzerland to add to my force until the frontier opened about two years later. And I started off there with--let's see--I was there, and I had two men and two women, and most of us had to spend our time ciphering. We were able to recruit a certain number of people, probably by stealing them from other departments of government, and since the frontier was closed, those other departments didn't learn about it until the frontier opened. And in various ways. But I found I did very much better work with that small force, with some recruits that I picked up here and there, in Switzerland itself, than I did after the frontier opened and everybody wanted to

come to Switzerland to practice the spy game. And I had about 40 or 50 arrive within two or three weeks. From that time on, I was an administrative officer and trying to find ways of keeping people busy without getting into trouble. So that I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done. One of the troubles in intelligence today is we have almost too many reports, and we don't concentrate on the essential elements.

QUESTION: When do we get a new building?

ANSWER: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situation among the Congressional leaders, and I find everyone sympathetic, but the question is what to do. There are two possibilities: one is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, and the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building. We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest priority that I have, because I realize the conditions under which we you work.

QUESTION: In view of the fact that most well-known republicans are known for their rather conservative view points relative to world affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any effect upon our estimating function?

ANSWER: If we allow ourselves to be influenced by political or other considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies in our estimating, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively or to have any political activity, better leave right away quick, because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow myself to do it; I won't allow anybody else to do it while they're in the Agency. Obviously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want politics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency out of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep politics out of our estimating.

QUESTION: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities imperiled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy?

ANSWER: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time to time. If we start to answer attacks, directly, even false attacks, I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us. I believe in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I think I have very good relations personally with a large number of people, but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies.

QUESTION: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a civilian organization?

ANSWER: Well, the percentage of military personnel with us is relatively low, about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable and indispensable addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't change that in any respect. We have very important responsibilities in the field of intelligence to the Armed Services. Take the situa-

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job. No, I don't think we have too many. The percentage is about right. I think the caliber is very high.

QUESTION: You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intelligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?

ANSWER: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to be. As you know, there was quite a long while before General Caball came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of administration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The new officials of government had to be briefed about our activities. The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important, takes a vast amount of time--far more time than it did in the past--because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty busy. Now General Caball is on board and I think we're getting the administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.

QUESTION: The CIA organization is functional, but 90% of our problems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional set-up so that we would go to one place for the answer to the average question instead of going to half a dozen functional places at the present time?

ANSWER: Well, I don't think one has to go to a half a dozen. I do often find that I go to two places; that is, I'll want to get the ideas ~~about~~ of the operational fellow. Let's take a question like

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prospective. But I find that if I get those two angles on the subject,

I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is. Now I realize

that there are many elements that feed up to both of those two indi-

viduals, let us say, in their respective sides of the shop. By and

large, if I get hold of two or three, I think I can get a pretty good slant. I don't think you could wisely put those together, because the operational fellow tends to have one view of things looking at it from operations, and its well to temper that with the view of the person that looks at it from the long broad historical and research angle.

CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION: Would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modified change of heart and begins to behave itself?

ANSWER: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a while we get a bit of criticism here and there, but I have never run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes of tactics, strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible in that theory as advances, the basic policy of the Kremlin remains and I don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it, that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of this Agency, or its importance.

CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION: We have combined these three questions, Mr. Dulles, and you've been asked this kind of question before. (Dulles: It doesn't relate to coffee, does it?) Do you want that one first? It says would it be possible to have the food at K Building as high in quality as in price? Then it goes on to a parenthetical question: Our work is seasoned but our food is not.

ANSWER: Shane, will you fix a day that I can go down and try this myself? May I say that the food down below in our little shop where we have it comes up just about as bad as it can be.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 6


4 June 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Lt. General Charles P. Cabell, USAF

1. General Charles P. Cabell, at the Tenth Agency Orientation Course, on 5 May 1953, spoke to Agency personnel for the first time as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



for MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Attachment: 1

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CONFIDENTIAL

REMARKS OF
LT. GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL, USAF
AT THE
TENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

5 May 1953

* * * * *

Col. Baird and fellow members of CIA: You know that "fellow members of CIA" business sounds pretty good to me, a little strange, but still pretty good. This is my first speech since assuming the Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and I am pleased that the occasion is a training program of our own. The strength of the Central Intelligence Agency, or any organization for that matter, depends to a large degree upon the brand and amount of training given to the men and women doing the various tasks. Maybe you notice my using the words "our own," which I have done with deliberate pride, because this is one method of driving home to myself the fact that I am now part of that Agency with which I've worked for a good number of years. I have always acknowledged this Agency as possessing a unique responsibility in the field of intelligence. Not only is the Director of Central Intelligence the leader in coordinating all efforts to produce the best national intelligence, but the whole Agency shares that leadership responsibility. Now, I find myself with you, as an integral part of this leadership function, and in the position of having to "put up or shut up." My intention is to "put up."

Many of you know that I have spent considerable time during the past few months going from office to office in the Agency, to be thoroughly briefed on organization and functions and current problems. I assure you that I could have spent much more time to very good advantage on these subjects that were covered with a degree of thoroughness which I appreciate. Since I have heard and read so much about our Agency, perhaps you would be interested in some of my impressions.

First, it is generally easy for any of us to distinguish between a "staged event" put on to impress, and the telling of a genuine story. I think that I heard genuine stories. Thus, as the personnel of the various offices explained their responsibilities and described their functions, I acquired a conviction of competence and dedication to their work. In every segment of the Agency I found men and women who did not appear to have attributes of "clock watchers," merely filling-in their time. Rather, they appeared to have a profound appreciation of why they were performing certain duties in this complex pattern of national intelligence. They seemed to know full well that in this intelligence business, there is no limit to the amount of time one can devote to it. An intelligence worker can always "dig a little deeper."

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When I considered that little over a decade ago no such structure as this existed, I was given a sense of confidence by the thoroughness of the continuing development of the Agency. I met collectors, linguists, couriers, coordinators, producers of estimates, administrative officials, clerical and secretarial personnel, lawyers, training officers, scientists, economists, operators, area specialists, machine experts, librarians, and a host of other categories that comprise the units of teamwork we call the CIA. It is obvious that one coach, whether he be Director or Deputy Director, cannot call all the signals to make the moves of national intelligence click with efficiency, which they must do in the vital interest of the security of our nation. Hence, my feeling of confidence was indeed great when I noted the assumption of individual responsibility by each one in the several offices of the organization. Working in this fashion, under the policies and regulations promulgated throughout the Agency, brings assurance of success in attaining our goals.

Besides the attitude of sincerity toward one's task, whatever it might be, I was also impressed by the efficiency of the product. Systems have been designed on the job, and adopted, to sift through the multitude and variety of material collected by the Departments and by CIA. Production machinery now works well to render support to the estimating function, both in CIA and the Departments. These are but two examples of worthwhile performances.

As I went through these pleasant experiences, I could not but feel that attitudes were outstandingly good, efficiency was of high calibre, and that all shared a conviction that our work here is of vital importance.

I noticed some other things too:

First, the Agency has had its share of organizational changes in the past few years. Having known the Agency for quite a long time with a certain degree of intimacy, I feel that the pattern of changes was needed to bring that strength of operation which now exists in our several functions. However, regardless of the benefits achieved by the alteration and modification of functions, I am very conscious of the human element which might be lost and receive no sympathetic consideration or explanation in the flux of change. From my observation, I believe that most of you must have had knowledge of the weaknesses, and a clear conviction of the reasons for adopting the new methods and procedures, because you now speak and act with assurances of strength.

A second thing I noticed was that the Agency has achieved stature, and you carry on with a unity of purpose even though you are scattered all over town and in a variety of buildings. Many of these buildings are hardly sound-proof enough to shelter a noisy argument. Though my old Alma Mater, the Pentagon, has been the butt of many jokes--some good--I must admit that the massive structure, by providing space for most military intelligence activities, does ease many problems which unfortunately we must continue to live with--at least for the time being--in CIA. The time consumed between

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buildings, the difficulties of security which increase in direct proportion to the number of locations, the human lethargy generated by distance which discourages persons getting together on items that could benefit by the "personal" touch, all these and many more problems will continue as long as we are housed in the bit and piece fashion.

Now that I've told you how I feel about you, you'll have to figure out for yourselves what to expect from me. Here are some indicators. Basically, you should know that I consider this a most important assignment, and that I come into it with enthusiasm. Having spent my entire adult life in the military service, I might be expected to consider this as merely another change of duty for me. Such is not the case. Let me assure you that I burned many bridges in the Air Force and, with a freedom of decision, cast my lot with you. I did so because I consider these functions, of producing national intelligence estimates and of coordinating the total intelligence effort of our Federal Government, of essential and prime importance if our policies are to possess the strength and accuracy to save civilization. Furthermore, instead of hastening into the job, I was doubly pleased to wait and to study the Agency, until the legislation covering my position was fully clarified, because I hope to be here a good long time.

Many persons too often jump to the conclusion that the arrival of a new official means inevitable drastic change in organization. Rest assured, however, that I, for one, come with no bias for alteration, and my words of sincere congratulations to you should assure you that what I saw and heard gave me confidence in present procedures. However, while I do not favor radical, revolutionary changes in the activities of any agency, I am a firm believer in evolutionary modifications which are made with temperate and thoughtful steps.

Therefore, I hope that we will never just tread water to keep ourselves abreast of events, but will always be alert to the necessity for developing and improving our methods. Without this approach, we could easily stagnate in mediocrity.

CIA is a tremendous challenge to all of us as individuals--and to all of us as members of a collective team.

All tasks to a degree are challenges, of course. Let me explain why I feel that this, as I see it, is something of a unique challenge.

CIA is engaged in a variety of intelligence activities and special operations, which have been housed in a single agency. The very job of conducting our work without disclosing our hand presents a tremendous obstacle.

Our intelligence work is carried on at a time when we are in greater need of good intelligence than at any time in the history of this nation. Sound National Policy and the success of our Armed Forces may be determined to a large extent, as well as those of the service intelligence agencies, by the

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success or failure of CIA effort. With this tremendous responsibility resting on our shoulders, we naturally would expect to look to the "old hands"--to the veterans of OSS and CIA. When we do this, we find that our Agency is so new that few men have more than six years of service--only rarely do we find one with ten years of service. There are few "old timers." The mantle of our great responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the very fine group of competent young men and women who now occupy the key positions in CIA. I might add that I served in England for a time in World War II and was in close touch with British Intelligence. That service has been in existence for generations. Yet today, as America assumes its heavy if not fundamental responsibilities in world affairs, we have little tradition in strategic intelligence. And so the very newness of our service, when related to the scope of its task, presents one of our great challenges.

We work, as I am sure you have already noticed, in a highly specialized atmosphere. It is certainly not an atmosphere for the faint of heart and those who are discouraged easily. To the conscientious and able, I believe it offers a wonderful opportunity.

Each day brings new tasks to CIA, which in some respects are unique. It is challenging to play a part in helping to solve these problems.

As we progress or as we encounter obstacles in our work, I believe we might profitably read again the history of the United States to refresh ourselves on the tremendous obstacles that our Forebears overcame. For, in the final analysis, the development of this Agency is a part of the growing maturity of America as a nation. While we do not travel as rough a road as the pioneers, there will be times when it appears as rough. It certainly is not always smooth. I am proud to have a part in this development, just as I know you are. One of the reasons that our intelligence service is so new is that we were reluctant for years to admit that participation in intelligence was a nationally permissible activity. Even today, as a nation, we tend to be very conservative regarding our political and psychological roles.

As for this Agency, it is important for us to understand that in many respects we are here to provide certain intelligence to the military services. It is likewise important that the military services understand our general objectives and capabilities. Effectiveness cannot be achieved unless the efforts of CIA and the efforts of the Department of Defense are brought into complete harmony. There is nothing more useless than highly organized military force lacking in intelligence. Perhaps one thing is more useless--a carefully documented intelligence report which is confined in its distribution and not made available to the military commanders. The two--intelligence and military power--are completely interdependent. To help bring them into correct relationship and to keep them there, is one of our constant challenges.

Because of my experience with Air Intelligence and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I hope to be helpful in continuing the marked improvement in mutual

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understanding between CIA and the Department, which has taken place during the past two years. Along this line, I like to insist on the thought that "Departments" and "Agencies" as such do not exist, for these are just general words covering a lot of people. Hence, the lessening and elimination of problems can be done by bringing persons together. This personal approach begets confidence and efficient results.

With the growth in size of organization and the development of complexities, we are compelled to allot functions and to divide tasks because of the pressure of time and the need for expert advice. This trend toward categories of "experts" creates the real but inevitable danger of putting blinkers over our vision of the total task to be done. The overemphasis of the segment distorts the whole product. This very human trait is augmented by the physical arrangement of our offices where distance might easily lend a false independence to what is being performed. Accordingly, I would like to remind you that while we must ever strive to get the best information on any pertinent subject and be able to refine and distill the products in minute fashion, we must never lose our focus on the total job to be done. In most positive manner, each person must do his or her task with the ever present recognition that said task is a piece of a jigsaw, which will have usefulness only when properly aligned with many other pieces to form a picture.

I shall conclude my remarks with a reminder that the most important factor for our success is the proper handling of people, at all levels throughout the Agency. This job cannot be left to chance. It must ever be done with education which comes from full knowledge and appreciation of duties. Our strength of the present and our advance for the future depends wholly on getting the best candidates, and on preparing them to assume their duties with zeal and competency. Experience has shown that we cannot go to the outside and get from academic institutions or from industry persons who can immediately be classed as "intelligence officers." Therefore, I am glad that we have developed under General Smith and our new Director, Mr. Dulles, the framework of a competent career system. This career service program and the various mechanisms which are to make it work comprise the very backbone for strength in the long-term approach of all our tasks. Its aim is to assure that we always get the best equipped person in the most appropriate spot, so that he can turn out the best product. That is the best way I know of for assuring good morale.

This reminds us that when individuals are selected to come into such a system, they should never overlook the fundamental point that throughout their career in intelligence the selectivity factor is recurring constantly as persons are being considered for certain jobs. Thus competency is continually being evaluated. This is where the ever-present task of training is conspicuous, to equip our people with the needed skills.

Throughout my remarks this morning I stressed the importance of the personal element in all we do. Therefore, I hope that I can live up to my own resolution to visit with you often and keep close to what you are doing.

~~INTRODUCTORY~~ REMARKS OF

~~1 May 1953~~

Lt. General Charles P. Cabell, USAF

Don't let the Agency Orientation Course
1953

Col. Baird ~~and fellow members of CIA~~ and fellow members of CIA. You know that

"fellow members of CIA" business sounds pretty good to me, a little strange, but still pretty good. This is my first speech since assuming the Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and I am pleased that the occasion is a training program of our own. The strength of the Central Intelligence Agency, or any organization for that matter, depends to a large degree upon the brand and amount of training given to the men and women doing the various tasks. May be you notice my using the words "our own", which I have done with deliberate pride, because this is one method of driving home to myself the fact that I am now part of that Agency with which I've worked for a good number of years. I have always acknowledged this Agency as possessing a unique responsibility in the field of intelligence. Not only is the Director of Central Intelligence the leader in coordination^{ing} all efforts to produce the best national intelligence, but the whole Agency shares that leadership responsibility. Now, I find myself with you, as an integral part of this leadership function, and in the position of having to "put up or shut up". My intention is to "put up".

Many of you know that I have spent considerable time during the past few months~~x~~ going from office to office in the Agency, to be thoroughly briefed on organization and functions and current problems. I assure you~~x~~ that I could have spent much more time to very good advantage on these subjects that were covered with a degree of thoroughness which I appreciate. Since I have ~~been~~ heard and read so much about our Agency, perhaps you would be interested in some of my impressions.

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First, it is generally easy for any of us to distinguish between a "staged event" put on to impress, and the telling of a genuine story. I think that I heard genuine stories. Thus, as the personnel of the various offices explained their responsibilities~~x~~ and described their functions, I acquired a conviction of competence and dedication to their work. In every segment of the Agency~~x~~ I found men and women who did not appear ~~to~~ have attributes of "clock watchers", merely filling-in their time. Rather, they appeared to have a profound appreciation of why they were performing certain duties in this complex pattern of national intelligence. They seemed to know full well~~x~~ that in this Intelligence business, there is no limit to the amount of time one can devote to it. An Intelligence worker can always "dig a little deeper".

p.2 When I considered that little over a decade ago~~x~~ no such structure as this existed, I was given a sense of confidence by the thoroughness of the continuing development of the Agency. I met collectors, linguists, couriers, coordinators, producers of estimates, administrative officials, clerical and secretarial personnel, lawyers, training officers, ~~scientists~~, economists, operators, area specialists, machine experts, librarians, and a host of other categories that comprise the units of teamwork we call the CIA. It is obvious that one coach, whether he be Director ^{or} Deputy Director, cannot call all the signals to make the moves of national intelligence~~x~~ click with efficiency~~x~~ which they must do in the vital interest of the security of our nation. Hence, my feeling of confidence was indeed great~~x~~ when I noted the assumption of individual responsibility~~x~~ by each one in the several offices of the organization. Working in this fashion, under the policies and regulations promulgated throughout the Agency, brings assurance of success in attaining our goals.

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Besides the attitude of sincerity toward one's task, whatever it might be, I was also impressed by the efficiency of the product. Systems have been designed on the job, and adopted, to sift through the multitude and variety of material collected by the Departments and by CIA. Production machinery now works well to render support to the estimating function, both in CIA and the Departments. These are but two examples of worthwhile performances.

As I went through these pleasant experiences, I could not but feel that attitudes were outstandingly good, efficiency was of high calibre, and that all shared a conviction that our work here is of vital importance.

I noticed some other things too:

First, the Agency has had its share of organizational changes in the past few years. Having known the Agency for quite a long time with a certain degree of intimacy, I feel that the pattern of changes was needed to bring that strength of operation~~x~~ which now exists in our several functions. However, regardless of the benefits achieved by the alteration and modification of functions, I am very conscious of the human element which might be lost and receive no sympathetic consideration or explanation in the flux of change. From my observation, I believe that most of you must have had knowledge of the weaknesses, and a clear conviction of the reasons for adopting the new methods and procedures, because you now speak and act with assurances of strength.

A ~~second~~ thing I noticed was that the Agency has achieved stature, and you carry on with a unity of purpose even though you are scattered all over town and in a variety of buildings. Many of these buildings are hardly soundproof enough to shelter a noisy argument. Though my old Alma Mater, the Pentagon, has been the butt of many jokes -- some good -- I must admit that the massive structure, by providing space ~~for~~ most military intelligence activities, does ease many problems which unfortunately we must continue to live with --

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at least for the time being -- in CIA. The time consumed between buildings, the difficulties of security which increase in direct proportion to the number of locations, the human lethargy generated by distance which discourages persons getting together on items that could benefit by the "personal" touch, all these and many more problems will continue as long as we are housed in the bit and piece fashion.

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Now that I've told you how ~~the~~ feel about you, you'll have to figure out for yourselves what to expect from me. Here are some indicators. Basically, you should know that I consider this a most important assignment, and that I come into it with enthusiasm. Having spent my entire adult life in the military service, I might be expected to consider this as merely another change of duty for me. Such is not the case. Let me assure you~~x~~ that I burned many bridges in the Air Force~~x~~ and, with a freedom of decision, cast my lot with you. I did so because I consider these functions, of producing national intelligence estimates, and of coordinating ^{the} total intelligence effort of our Federal Government, ~~as~~ of essential and prime importance~~x~~ if our policies are to possess the strength and accuracy to save civilization. Furthermore, instead of hastening into the job, I was doubly pleased to wait and to study the Agency, until the legislation covering my position was fully clarified, because I hope to be here a good long time.

Many persons too often jump to the conclusion that the arrival of a new official means inevitable drastic change in organization. Rest assured, however, that I, for one, come with no bias for alteration, and my words of sincere congratulations to you should assure you~~x~~ that what I saw and heard gave me confidence in present procedures. However, while I do not favor radical, revolutionary changes in the activities of any agency, I am a firm believer in evolutionary modifications which are made with temperate and thoughtful steps.

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Therefore, I hope that we will never just tread water to keep ourselves abreast of events, but will always be alert to the necessity for developing and improving our methods. Without this approach, we could easily stagnate in mediocrity.

CIA is a tremendous challenge to all of us as individuals - and to all of us as members of a collective team.

All tasks to a degree are challenges, of course. Let me explain why I feel that this, as I see it, is something of a unique challenge.

CIA is engaged in a variety of intelligence activities and special operations, which have been housed in a single agency. The very job of conducting our work without disclosing our hand~~x~~ presents a tremendous obstacle.

Our intelligence work~~x~~ is carried on at a time when we are in greater need of good intelligence~~x~~ than at any time in the history of this nation. Sound National Policy~~x~~ and the success of our Armed Forces~~x~~ may be determined to a large extent, as well as those of the service Intelligence agencies, by the^{p4} success~~x~~ or failure of CIA effort. With this tremendous responsibility resting on our shoulders, we naturally would expect to look to the "old hands~~x~~" - to the veterans of OSS and CIA. When we do this, we find that our Agency is so new~~x~~ that few men have more than six years of service~~x~~ - only rarely do we find one with ten years of service. There are few "old timers." The mantle of our great responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the very fine group of competent young men and women who now occupy the key positions in CIA. I might add~~x~~ that I served in England for a time in World War II~~x~~ and was in close touch with British Intelligence. That service has been in existence for generations. Yet today, as America assumes its heavy~~x~~ if not fundamental responsibilities in world affairs, we have little tradition in strategic intelligence. And so the very newness of our service~~x~~² when related to the scope of its task, presents one of our great challenges.

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Each day brings new tasks to CIA, which in some respects are unique. It is challenging to play a part in helping to solve these problems.

As we progress or as we encounter obstacles in our work, I believe we might profitably read again the history of the United States to refresh ourselves on the tremendous obstacles that our Forebears overcame. For, the final analysis, the development of this Agency is a part of the growing maturity of America as a nation. While we do not travel as rough a road as the pioneers, there will be times when it appears as rough. It certainly is not always smooth. I am proud to have a part in this development, just as I know you are. One of the reasons that our intelligence service is so new is that we were reluctant for years to admit that participation in intelligence was a nationally permissible activity. Even today, as a nation, we tend to be very conservative regarding our political and psychological roles.

As for this Agency, it is important for us to understand that in many respects we are here to provide certain intelligence to the military services. It is likewise important that the military services understand our general objectives and capabilities. Effectiveness cannot be achieved unless the efforts of CIA and the efforts of the Department of Defense are brought into complete harmony. There is nothing more useless than highly organized military force lacking in intelligence. Perhaps one thing is more useless - a carefully documented intelligence report which is confined in its distribution and not made available to the military commanders. The two: intelligence and military power - are completely interdependent. To help bring them into correct relationship and to keep them there, is one of our constant challenges.

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Because of my experience with Air Intelligence and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I hope to be helpful in continuing the marked improvement in mutual understanding between CIA and the Department, which has taken place during the past two years. Along this line, I like to insist on the thought that "Departments" and "Agencies" as such do not exist, for these are just general words covering^a lot of people. Hence, the lessening and elimination of problems can be done by bringing persons together. This personal approach begets confidence and efficient results.

With the growth in size of organization and the development of complexities, we are compelled to allot functions and to divide tasks because of the pressure of time and the need for expert advice. This trend toward categories of "experts" creates the real but inevitable danger of putting blinkers over our vision of the total task to be done. The overemphasis of the segment distorts the whole product. This very human trait is augmented by the physical arrangement of our offices where distance might easily lend a false independence to what is being performed. Accordingly, I would like to remind you that while we must ever strive to get the best information on any pertinent subject and be able to refine and distill the products in minute fashion, we must never lose our focus on the total job to be done. In most positive manner, each person must do his or her task with the ever present recognition that said task is a piece of a jigsaw, which will have usefulness only when properly aligned with many other pieces to form a picture.

I shall conclude my remarks with a reminder that the most important factor for our success is the proper handling of people, at all levels throughout the Agency. This job cannot be left to chance. It must ever be done with education which comes from full knowledge and appreciation of duties.

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Our strength of the present~~x~~ and our advance for the future~~x~~ depends wholly on getting the best candidates, and on preparing them to assume their duties~~x~~ with zeal and competency. Experience has shown that we cannot go to the outside and get from academic institutions~~x~~ or from industry~~x~~ persons who can immediately be classed as "intelligence officers." Therefore, I am glad that we have developed under General Smith and our new Director, Mr. Dulles, the framework of a competent career system. This career service program~~x~~ and the various mechanisms which are to make it work~~x~~ comprise the very backbone for strength in the long-term approach of all our tasks. Its aim is to assure that we always get the best equipped person~~x~~ in the most appropriate spot, so that he can turn out the best product. That is the best way I know of~~x~~ for assuring good morale.

This reminds us~~x~~ that when individuals are selected to come into such a system, they should never overlook the fundamental point that throughout their career in intelligence~~x~~ the selectivity factor is recurring constantly as persons are being considered for certain jobs. Thus competency is continually being evaluated. This is where the ever-present task of training is conspicuous, to equip our people with the needed skills.

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REMARKS OF
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE
13 February 1953

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I had a rather pragmatic introduction to intelligence in World War I, and from then on I have had a taste for it that I never have seemed to be able to get out of my system; and it looks as though now I have it in my system for good and all. I look upon this, as far as I am concerned, as a continuing job. That, of course, is subject to the pleasure of the President, and reasonably good behavior and some performance on my part.

Some years ago, Bill Jackson and I sat down and spent a good bit of a year, with such experience as we had behind us, in outlining the kind of organization that we felt should produce intelligence, provided you could get the key thing you need, trained personnel. That general blueprint is, I believe, sound. General Smith and Bill Jackson, and to some extent myself, during the past two years, with the able help of many others, have been trying to put that blueprint into effect. Naturally we have changed it here and there, but by and large, we have today, I believe, a working organization. We have a pattern which can produce intelligence. That is why the work that Matt Baird in the Office of Training and those that work with him is so important, because no blueprint of this kind is of any value whatsoever unless we have trained people to carry it out.

What I think has been accomplished over the past few years, as far as this Agency is concerned, is the gaining of the cooperation and confidence of other intelligence agencies throughout this government. We are now a team. We are working as a team. When we find there are problems, we have the machinery to work them out. We can start from today with that, I believe, as an assured and solid basis. I think, too, we have a workable organization, dividing our own functions up as they reasonably should be divided, between the covert and the overt, between the production of intelligence, ending up in the finished product of the National Estimates, and what is done on the covert side on the collection of intelligence.

Very largely thanks to General Smith, we have, I believe, a secure position--no, secure is too strong a word--we have a respectable position insofar as public opinion is concerned. But we can never rest on that. It is only by performance that we can maintain our

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position. We are going to make mistakes, and those mistakes will find their ways into editorials and columns of the press. That we can take, if we have a solid performance to counter-balance it. I wouldn't want to believe in an organization or be a part of an organization of this kind that was afraid to make mistakes, because if you're afraid of that, you're afraid of doing things. And we are in a dangerous game. The only thing that we have to do is to put our best judgment into each thing that we attempt.

And further, I think we have reached a point where intelligence is no longer a stepchild. Intelligence has really now found stature throughout this government. One of the most encouraging evidences of this is the willingness and desire of General Cabell, whom I consider one of our most outstanding officers in intelligence, to come with us and make intelligence a career.

Now, that is where we stand today. It is a very, very fine heritage and we must carry it on. We can only do that if we develop the highest professional standards. I'm not interested in numbers. I hope we can cut down on numbers, and maybe that is not only a hope, maybe we'll be forced to; the pressure in government now is to cut down, and I think it is a proper pressure. I hope this Agency will be known as the hardest agency of government to get into. And I hope that we will be able to build up the reputation that we have one of the lowest turnovers in government.

We want to build this as a career service. You know our plans for that. We don't want people here that only come for a few years of training and experience, because they think it may be a glamorous occupation. It is, I think, the most exciting occupation and the most exciting career that one can have. But it is a career, and you must face it very frankly, in which anonymity is important. The satisfaction has largely got to be in the fact that you are accomplishing something vital for the government and that in doing that you will have also some of the most interesting types of work that any people can have. It's rather against American traits, you know, not to tell what you're doing, not to be able to boast of accomplishments, and for that reason, I think, in some ways it is harder in this country, because of our background and training, to build an intelligence service than in some of the countries in Europe. But we are learning and must learn, and I am gratified by the extent to which so many of you throughout the Agency are devoting yourselves to this, selflessly, knowing what the work entails.

I think I can say that I haven't in my head at the moment any great new plans of reorganization. Don't worry about that. Let's go ahead on the blueprint that we have and only as time proves that changes are wise put them into effect.

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It is an unwritten rule that one does not quote the President but I think I'd be justified in breaking that rule on this point. President Eisenhower said to General Cabell and me the other day, very earnestly: "Your agency has the largest amount of unvouchered funds of any agency in government. I realize that it is necessary that you have them. But those unvouchered funds must be a sacred trust; and you must see to it that there is no abuse of the confidence and privilege which is reposed in you and in the Agency in handling those funds." I want that word to go right through this Agency. I'm going to watch the use of unvouchered funds with the greatest care and see that they can be justified in their expenditure just as much as other funds, even though we have the privilege of not advertising how we spend them.

In our work, anybody can make mistakes, that I realize. But the one unpardonable sin and where we have gotten into difficulty sometimes in the past is to try to cover up as among ourselves mistakes that are made. And that is one thing I want to impress on you. If you make a mistake, that will probably be forgiven. If you try to hide mistakes, so that proper and prompt action cannot be taken to correct them, there is no real excuse for that. And anyone in this Agency, too, has the right to be heard. General Smith, as you know, has established the Office of the Inspector General. While frivolous appeals over the heads of one's immediate superiors are a bad practice, there is there an appeal open to anyone in the Agency, if he has suggestions to make, or if he feels that injustices are being done.

I hope, personally, to try to establish personal relations with as many as possible in the Agency. One of the first things I want to do is to go around and travel among our far-flung buildings, much too far-flung and much too numerous, and get to know everyone as far as I can personally. Among the first things I'm going to work on is the improvement of the conditions under which we work and the provision of a new building so that we can add greatly to our efficiency and to the security of the Agency as a whole.

We have today, in the field of intelligence, the greatest challenge that intelligence has ever faced. I've often talked to you about some of my experiences in World War II when I was in Switzerland, working into the enemy countries, Germany and Italy. That was child's play in comparison with the task of getting intelligence with respect to our present main target, Soviet Russia. We've got to be a lot better than we were. We've got to be a lot wiser. We've got to develop new techniques. That is one of the reasons why training is so essential. It is one of the parts of the Agency that I will back to the hilt. The Iron Curtain is a real curtain against intelligence and it's being increased and improved every day. Berlin is really being cut in half. Satellite countries are being protected from contact with the west by every means, mechanical and technical and otherwise. That is the challenge, and it's up to us to make the response. We have in this country the men and women with the ability and courage to do it, and I consider it a great privilege to be with you in trying to see that it is done. Thank you very much.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 5

16 March 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. Mr. Allen W. Dulles, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course, on 13 February 1953, spoke to Agency personnel for the first time as the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as appropriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control in their respective Offices.

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution #4

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REMARKS OF

MR. ALLEN W. DULLES

AT THE

NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE

13 February 1953

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I had a rather pragmatic introduction to intelligence in World War I, and from then on I had a taste for it that I never have seemed to be able to get out of my system; and it looks as though now I had it in my system for good and all. I look upon this, as far as I am concerned, as a continuing job. That, of course, is subject to the pleasure of the President, and reasonably good behavior and some performance on my part.

Some years ago, Bill Jackson and I sat down and spent a good bit of a year, with such experience as we had behind us, in outlining the kind of organization that we felt should produce intelligence, provided you could get the key thing you need, trained personnel. That general blueprint is, I believe, sound. General Smith and Bill Jackson, and to some extent myself, during the past two years, with the able help of many others, have been trying to put that blueprint into effect. Naturally we have changed it here and there, but by and large, we have ~~done that so that~~ today, I believe, ~~we have~~ a working organization. We have a pattern which can produce intelligence, ~~and~~ That is why the work that Matt Baird in the Office of Training and those that work with him is so important, because no blueprint of this kind is of any value whatsoever unless we have trained people to carry it out.

What I think has been accomplished over the past few years, as far as this Agency is concerned, is the gaining of the cooperation and the confidence of other intelligence agencies throughout this government. We are now a team. We are working as a team. When we find there are problems, we have the machinery to work them out, ~~and we~~ can start from today with that, I believe, as an assured and solid basis. I think, too, we have a workable organization, dividing our own functions up as they reasonably should be divided, between the covert and the overt, between the production of intelligence, ending up in the finished product of the National Estimates, and what is done on the covert side on the collection of intelligence.

Very largely thanks to General Smith, we have, I believe, a secure position--no, secure is too strong a word--we have a respectable position insofar as public opinion is concerned. But, we can never rest on that. ~~We have to watch that all the time and~~ it is only by performance that we can maintain our position. We are going to make mistakes, and those mistakes will find their ways into editorials and columns of the press. That we can take, if we have a solid performance to counter-balance it. I wouldn't want to believe in an organization or be a part of an organization of this kind that was afraid to

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make mistakes, because if you're afraid of that, you're afraid of doing things. And we are in a dangerous game. The only thing that we have to do is to put our best judgment into each thing that we attempt.

And further, I think we have reached a point where intelligence is no longer a stepchild. Intelligence has really now found stature throughout this government. One of the most encouraging things that has occurred to me is the willingness and desire of General Cabell, whom I consider one of the most outstanding officers in intelligence, of this government, to come with us and make intelligence a career. *evidence of this is*

Now, that is where we stand today. It is a very, very fine heritage and we must carry it on. We can only do that if we develop the highest professional standards. I'm not interested in numbers. I hope ~~maybe~~ we can cut down on numbers, and maybe that is not only a hope, maybe we'll be forced to; because the pressure in government now is to cut down, and I think it is a proper pressure. I hope this Agency will be known as the hardest agency of government to get into. And I hope that we will be able to build up the reputation that we have one of the lowest turnovers in government.

We want to build this as a career service. You know our plans for that. We don't want people here that only come for a few years of training and experience, because they think it may be a glamorous occupation. It is, I think, the most exciting occupation and the most exciting career that one can have. But it is a career, and you must face it very frankly, in which anonymity is important. The satisfaction has largely got to be in the fact that you are accomplishing something vital for the government and that in doing that you will have also some of the most interesting types of work that any people can have. It's rather against American traits, you know, not to tell what you're doing, not to be able to boast of accomplishments, and for that reason, I think, in some ways it is harder in this country, because of our background and training, to build an intelligence service than in some of the countries in Europe. But we are learning that, and we must learn that, and I am gratified by the extent to which so many of you, ~~so many~~ throughout the Agency, are devoting ~~them~~ *yourselves* to this, selflessly, and knowing what the work entails. I think I can say that I haven't in my head at the moment any great new plans of reorganization. Don't worry about that. Let's go ahead on the blueprint that we have and only as time proves that changes are wise put them into effect.

It is an unwritten rule that one does not quote the President but I think I'd be justified in breaking that rule on this point. President Eisenhower said to General Cabell and me the other day, very earnestly: "Your agency has the largest amount of unvouchered funds of any agency in government. I realize that it is necessary that you have them. But those unvouchered funds must be a sacred trust; and you must see to it that there is no abuse of the confidence and privilege which is reposed in you and in the Agency in handling those funds." I want that word to go right through this Agency. I'm going to watch the use of unvouchered funds with the greatest care and see that they can be justified in their expenditure just as much as other funds, even though we have the privilege of not advertising how we spend them.

In our work, anybody can make mistakes, that I realize. But the one unpardonable sin and where we have gotten into difficulty sometimes in the past

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is to try to cover up as among ourselves mistakes that are made. And that is one thing I want to impress on you. If you make a mistake, that will probably be forgiven. If you try to hide mistakes, so that proper and prompt action can not be taken to correct them, there is no real excuse for that. And anyone in this Agency, too, has the right to be heard. General Smith, as you know, has established the Office of the Inspector General, ~~for that~~. And while frivolous appeals over the heads of one's immediate superiors ~~is~~ a bad practice, there is there an appeal open to anyone in the Agency, if he has suggestions to make, or if he feels that injustices are being done. ~~I~~ I hope, personally, to try to establish personal relations with as many as possible in the Agency. One of the first things I want to do is to go around and travel among our far-flung buildings, much too far-flung and much too numerous, and get to know everyone as far as I can personally. ~~And one of the first things I'm going to work on is to try to improve the conditions under which we work and try to get a new building so that we can add greatly to our efficiency and to the security of the Agency as a whole.~~

We have today, in the field of intelligence, the greatest challenge that intelligence has ever faced. I've often talked to you about some of my experiences in ~~the~~ World War when I was in Switzerland, working into the enemy countries, Germany and Italy. That was child's play in comparison with the task of getting intelligence with respect to ~~the~~ ^{our present} main target, Soviet Russia. We've got to be a lot better than we were. We've got to be a lot wiser. We've got to develop new techniques. That is one of the reasons why training is so essential. It is one of the parts of the Agency that I will back to the hilt. The Iron Curtain is a real curtain against intelligence and it's being increased and improved every day. Berlin is really being cut in half. Satellite countries are being protected, ~~as you know~~, from ~~the~~ contact with the west by every means, mechanical and technical and otherwise. That is the challenge, and it's up to us to make the response. We have in this country the men and women with the ability and courage to do it, and I consider it a great privilege to be with you in trying to see that it is done. Thank you very much.

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Mr. Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence

Return take from the tape show

Matt, thank you very much for that introduction. I feel a good deal of modesty standing here for a good many reasons but one of the principal reasons for that is that I haven't really been through your course of training. Somewhat like Bill Jackson, I had a rather pragmatic introduction to intelligence in World War I and from then on I had a taste of it that I ^{have} never ^{be} seemed to ~~have been~~ able to get out of my system and it looks though now like I had it in my system for good and all.

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When Matt were preparing this program today, that came out in this ^{pink} form, possibly because they knew this was going to be Valentine's day, they had quite a little difficulty because they didn't quite know where anybody was going to be when the program saw the light of day. They didn't quite know whether Gen. ~~Bedle~~ Bedle Smith would be in the State Department or here or where I would be or maybe even where Bill Jackson would be. So I see ^{that now} ~~now that~~ I'm sailing under slightly false colors when I am put down as Director--at the moment I am only Acting Director, subject to action by the Senate next week, when they come back, those on the Republican side anyway, from the spate of speeches on Abraham Lincoln. They tell me that they don't know of any great opposition but you never can tell what they may find out over the weekend. I have been rapidly selling three of four series of stock and I have been asking Administration for a list of all the companies with whom we have dealt covertly or overtly so as to be sure there is no taint there; and ^{I think} I will present myself before the Armed Services Committee some day next week relatively pure as far as that is concerned. And may I say it wasn't any

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→ As General Smith has indicated and as Matt Baird has said, I look upon this, as far as I am concerned, if I am confirmed in this position, as a continuing job. That, of course, is subject to the pleasure of the President, and reasonably good behavior and some ~~good~~ performance on my part.

I rather thought that Bill Jackson was going to talk about the CIA ~~in~~ in retrospect and that would give me sort of a key for my talk to you, that I could boldly talk about the CIA in prospect. But he has, in a way, given ~~us~~ CIA, or intelligence, in retrospect, in giving his own experiences which are the experiences, I think, of the many that went into intelligence in the past.

One of the things ~~that~~ we are trying to do to see that ^{that} experience in exactly that form is not repeated, although I may say that if that type of experience produces ^{the} ~~that~~ kind of product it produced in this case, I think it is probably pretty good and maybe we ought not to make so many changes. In any event, for the future as I see it, I think we can build pretty well on the background that Gen. Smith and Bill Jackson and others have prepared for us.

that are
I am one of these fellows, you know, ~~who~~ always told that I don't know anything about administration. Bill Jackson is one of the fellows ^{that are} ~~who is~~ ^{a great} told that he is ~~an~~ expert in Administration. Well, I think, probably in some ways, both are true; but having a certain amount of modesty as far as administration is concerned and having been told for a long ^{while} ~~time~~, as a lawyer and so forth and so on, I'm not much of an administrator. At least I'm a little bit on my mettle on that and I propose to gather around me, to take care of these defects, the best in the field of administration; and I can assure you I think we ~~have~~ have on board now those who know that field.

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Further, I think I can say that I haven't in my head at the moment any great new plans of reorganization. And I think we have a basis on which we can proceed. Some years ago, Bill Jackson [] and I sat down and spent ~~the~~ a good bit of a year, with such experience as we had behind us, in outlining the kind of organization that we felt should produce intelligence, provided you could get the key thing you need--the trained personnel. That general blueprint is, I believe, sound. Gen. Smith, ⁺ Bill Jackson, and to some extent myself, during the past two years, with the able help of many others have been trying to put that blueprint into effect. Naturally we have changed it here and there, but by and large we have done that so that today, I believe, we have a working organization, we have a pattern which can produce intelligence and that is ~~why~~ the work that Matt Baird and [] and those that worked with him is so important, because no blueprint of this time is of any value whatsoever, unless we have the trained people to carry it out. 25X1A

Now, what I think has been accomplished over the past few years, as far as this Agency is concerned, is to gain the cooperation and the confidence of other agencies' intelligence throughout this government. We are now a team. We have divided up the field. I don't know today of any point, of serious friction between this agency and any ^{of the} other intelligence agencies in government, the State, the Armed Services, the FBI, or wherever it may be. We are working as a team; when we find ~~we have~~ ^{there are} problems, we have the machinery to work them out and we can start from today with that, I believe, as an assured and solid basis. I think, as I have said before, too, we have a workable organization, dividing our own functions up as they reasonably should be divided, between the covert and the overt, between the production of intelligence that you have heard about, ending up in the finished product of the National Estimates, and what is done

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Very largely thanks to Gen. Bedle Smith, we have, I believe, a secure position, ~~no~~, secure is too strong a word, we have a respectable position insofar as public opinion is concerned. But, we can never rest on that. We have to watch that all the time and it is only by performance--and we are going to make mistakes, and those mistakes will find their ways into the editorials and columns of the press. That we can take, if we have a solid performance to counter-balance it. I wouldn't ~~tax~~ want to believe in an organization or be a part of an organization of this kind that was afraid to make mistakes, because if you're afraid of that you're afraid of doing things. And we are in a dangerous game. The only thing that we have to do is to try to see that each thing that we attempt to put our best judgment into it when we start.

And, further, I think we have reached a point where intelligence is no longer a stepchild. Intelligence has really now found stature throughout this government. One of the most encouraging things that has occurred to me was the willingness and desire of Gen. Cabal, whom I consider one of the ~~most~~ outstanding officers in intelligence of this government, to come with us and make intelligence a career, and I hope he will soon be on board.

Now, that is where we stand today. It is a very, very fine heritage and we must carry it on. We can only do that if we develop the highest professional ~~standing~~ standards. I'm not interested in numbers--I hope maybe we can cut down the numbers,--and maybe that is not only a hope, maybe we'll be forced to, because the pressure in government now is to cut down, and I think it is a proper pressure. I hope this Agency will be known as the hardest agency ~~in the~~ ^{of} government to get into. And I hope that we ~~is~~ will be able to ~~keep~~ ^{build} up the reputation that we have one of the lowest turnovers in government. I'm somewhat alarmed by the figures ~~that~~ Matt Baird gave of the numbers of us who are trying to desert CIA for the Jackson Committee, but maybe we can take steps ~~or~~ maybe Mr. Jackson will take steps in

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cooperation with us to see that doesn't become a stampede.

We want to build this as a career service. You know our plans for that. We don't want people here that only come for a few years of training and experience, because they think it may be a glamorous ~~organix~~ occupation. It is, I think, the most exciting occupation and the most exciting career that one can have. But it ~~is~~ a career, and you must face it very frankly, in which anonymity is important, ~~can't~~ advertise what you do. The satisfaction has largely got to be in the fact that you are accomplishing something vital for the government and that in doing that you will have also some of the most interesting types of work that any people can have. It's rather against the American traits, you know, not to tell what ~~you~~ you're doing, not to be able to boast of accomplishments, and for that reason, I think, in some ways it is harder in this country, because of our background and training, to build an intelligence service than in some of the countries in Europe. But we are learning that, and we must learn that and I am gratified to the extent to which ~~many~~ so many of you, so many throughout the Agency, are devoting themselves to this, selflessly, and knowing what the work entails. We have as you know, recently, under Presidential order, we have now decorations that can be given but not advertised for performance of your work. As I said before I don't ^{forsee} ~~see~~ any revolutionary reorganizations--don't worry about that. Let's go ahead on the blueprint that we have and only as time proves that ~~new~~ changes are wise put them in to effect.

I think

It is an unwritten rule that one does not quote the President but I'd be justified in breaking that rule on this point. When I talked with him the other day, when he said he was going to send my name to the Senate for this new job ~~job~~ (General Cabal was with me). He spoke to us both very earnestly on this ~~point~~ point. He said, "Your Agency has the largest amount of unvouchered funds of any agency in government. I realize that it is necessary that you have them. But those

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unvouchered funds must be a sacred trust; and you must see to it that there is no abuse of the confidence and privilege which is ~~reposed~~ ^{reposed} in you and in the Agency in handling those funds." And I want ~~this~~ ^{that} word to go right through this Agency. I'm going to watch ^{the use} of unvouchered funds with the greatest care and see that they can be justified in their expenditure just as much as ~~other~~ ^{not} funds, even though we have the privilege of advertising how we spend them.

In our work, anybody can make mistakes--that I realize. But the one unpardonable sin and where we have gotten into difficulty sometimes in the past is to try to cover up as among ourselves and between you and your superiors mistakes that are made. And that is one thing I want to impress on you. If you make a mistake, that will probably be forgiven. If you try to hide mistakes, so that the proper and prompt action can be taken to correct them, there is no real excuse for that. And anyone in this agency, too, will have the right to be heard. Gen. ^{Belle} Smith, as you know, has established the office of the Inspector General--that office remains; it is vacant at the moment. It will be filled shortly. And while frivolous appeals over the heads of one's immediate superiors is a bad practice, ~~where~~ there is, there, an appeal open to anyone in the Agency, if he has suggestions to make, or if he feels that injustices are being done. I hope, personally, to try to establish personal relations with as many as possible in the Agency. One of the first things I want to do is to go around and travel among our far-flung buildings, much too far flung and much too numerous, and get to know everyone as far as I can personally. And one of the first things I'm going to work on is to try to improve the conditions under which we work, ^{and} to try to get a new building so that we can add greatly to our efficiency and to the security of the Agency as a whole.

We have, today, in the field of intelligence, the greatest challenge that intelligence has ever faced. I've often talked to you ^{about} of some of my experiences in the World ~~Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A00010001-2~~ enemy countries,

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Germany and Italy. That was child's play in comparison with the task of really getting intelligence with respect to the main target--Soviet Russia. We've got to be a lot better than we were. We've got to be a lot wiser. We've got to develop new techniques. That is one of the reasons why the training is so essential. It is one of the parts of the Agency that I will back to the hilt. The Iron Curtain is a real curtain against intelligence and it's being increased and improved every day. Berlin is really being cut in half. Satellite countries are being protected, as you know, from contact with the west by every means mechanical and technical and otherwise. That is the challenge, and it's up to us to make the response. We have in this country, ^{the} men and women with the ability and courage to do it, and I consider it a great privilege to be with you in trying to see that it is done. Thank you very much.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 4

13 March 1953


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SUBJECT: Remarks of General Walter Bedell Smith

General Walter Bedell Smith, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course, on 10 February 1953, spoke for the last time to personnel of the Agency as the Director of Central Intelligence, prior to assuming his new duties as Under Secretary of State.

It is believed that General Smith's remarks will be of universal interest throughout the Agency, and are attached hereto for the information of all concerned.

Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as appropriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control in their respective Offices.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Attachment: 1

Distribution #4

JOB NO. _____ REV NO. _____ EID NO. _____ DOC. NO. 24 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/ (C)CLASS/ (C)CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S(C) NET. JUST 22
NEXT REV DATE 8-1-54 DATE 11-12-79 REVIEWER _____ TYPE DOC. 30
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REV CLASS C REV COORD. _____ AUTH: HR 70-3

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REMARKS OF
GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
AT THE
NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE

10 February 1953

* * * * *

Since this is the last time that I will be with you in my old capacity, I consider it appropriate to review some of our accomplishments.

This Agency is a highly selective one. It would be well if you knew the figures to illustrate this selectivity. Out of every hundred applicants for employment in this Agency, all but fourteen are screened out by Personnel before they ever get to Security. Another four or five are eliminated by Security, usually for reasons that reflect in no way on the character of the individuals. The small residue comes to our Agency as part of a career service. Now, this selectivity process is being rapidly reflected in the stature of our personnel.

We now have our own decoration, just approved by the President, which will be given rarely but will mean a great deal to the recipient. During the past year, I have given two such decorations to officers of this Agency for outstanding accomplishments involving great personal risk. The standard of discipline here is high and it is refreshing to realize that we do not have disgruntled employees speaking about the "inefficiency" and the "inadequacy" of their respective services, services to which they owe basic loyalty. Let's always remember that loyalty works both ways and will continue to work both ways in this organization as long as it is headed by the people who are now going to head it. That is the type of discipline, the kind of loyalty, and the calibre of devotion to duty that is necessary in a career service of this kind.

We have, of course, given to the personnel of this Agency adequate facilities for expressing their views, for indicating weaknesses in the organization, and for suggesting improvements. The Inspector General's office is open to everyone, on a highly confidential basis, for suggestions or complaints. As you well know, meritorious suggestions are rewarded with cash or with other recognition. During the past two years, a number of our personnel have given their lives to their service. Regrettably, the facts cannot be published at once nor can the recognition in the form of awards and decorations be acknowledged immediately. That is one of the penalties you pay for serving in a highly classified organization of this kind. The reward lies largely in your sense of accomplishment.

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When President Truman left office, he wrote a letter to the Director, in which he said: "Truly, no President has ever, in the history of the United States, been so well informed and so thoroughly and completely advised in the field of intelligence and foreign developments as I have, due primarily to the efficiency and the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency." In due time that fact will be more widely recognized. It is widely recognized now in Government circles. Now, those things are due entirely to you. The other day, President Eisenhower asked me to say to the personnel of this Agency that he expected, and realized he would receive, the same degree of efficient and loyal support as had been accorded his predecessor. Well, of course he will.

Our service is to the United States and it is a devoted and a dedicated and a loyal service. I have to thank you, individually and collectively, for the support you have given me. Nobody leaves this organization willingly. You may ask why I did. The reason is very simple. The length of time I can devote from now on to Government service is strictly limited for various reasons. We have reached a point in our development where continuity of leadership is essential. Our organization is good and sound. Our personnel are highly qualified and carefully selected. Now, what we need is a Director who will spend the rest of his active life at the head of this Agency. Furthermore, we need development in depth so that his deputy, another carefully selected and extremely able man, will be able to succeed him. In this way, the personnel of this fine organization will have a long period of continuity of leadership. You are going to have that, and it is that fact, and that fact alone, which reconciles me in leaving. Thank you very much.

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Security Information

OPENING REMARKS by
THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE

10 February 1953

Training
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. . . will be old hat to you because it is our attempt to show members of CIA the workings of the IAC. To some members of CIA, much of the course may also be old hat. It is geared to the incoming employee. It is a training course. In spite of the galaxy of stars on this morning's program, I'd like you always to keep in mind that the purpose of these Orientation Courses is that of training. One of, not the least of, General Smith's contributions in the last two years has been his ever growing insistence upon selection in the choosing of employees for the Agency.

The selection process doesn't begin with initial choice. The selection process continues for each assignment that you will take. Selection means qualification for a job. For some of you, this is the first approach that you have had toward qualifying you to be an intelligence officer. Many of you still believe that you are employed by CIA as auditors, as budget and fiscal officers, as personnel officers, as architects, as Doctors of Medicine or Doctors of Science, as engineers. Your effectiveness in your job will depend upon how quickly you become aware of the fact that you must be intelligence officers.

This is the first time that many of you have had the opportunity to attend a course in CIA. In spite of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency enjoys greater opportunity for training under Public Law 110 than any other agency of government, it is always surprising to those of us who come to CIA from the military, where we have spent most of our lives in training—as a matter of fact, all of you who have come from the military (and many of you are in civilian clothes in the audience) realize—that there are probably only two times in your military career when you're not in training. One when you're in combat and one when you have a hitch in the Pentagon.

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The accentuation on training is recognized for qualification to your job. It is only recently that we in CIA are becoming "training conscious." And we have the next speaker to thank for that on his insistence on selection.

* * * * *

Mr. Dulles, General Smith has always given me short shrift when I attempt to introduce him, but would you like to say a few words in introduction?

* * * * *

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GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH

Ninth Orientation Course
10 February 1953

*Cleaned
version*
Baird
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Since this is the last time that I will be with you in my old capacity I consider it appropriate to review some of our accomplishments. Col. Baird has just spoken to you about the "selectivity" of this organization. It would be well if you knew the figures to illustrate that selectivity. I learned them myself only a few months ago. Out of every hundred applicants for employment in this Agency, all but fourteen are screened out by Personnel before they ever get to Security. Another four or five are eliminated by the Security people, usually for reasons that reflect in no way on the character of the individuals. The small residue comes to our Agency as part of a career service. Now, that selectivity process is being rapidly reflected in the stature of our personnel.

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When President Truman left office, he wrote a letter to the Director, in which he said: "Truly, no President has ever, in the history of the United States, been so well informed and so thoroughly and completely advised in the field of intelligence and foreign developments as I have, due primarily to the efficiency and the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency." In due time that fact will be more widely recognized. It is widely recognized now in Government circles. Now, those things are due entirely to you. In talking with President Eisenhower the other day he asked me to say to the personnel of this Agency that he expected, and realized he would receive, the same degree of efficient and loyal support as had been accorded his predecessor. Well, of course he will.

Our service is to the United States and it is a devoted and a dedicated and a loyal service. I have to thank you, individually and collectively, for the support you have given me. Nobody leaves this organization willingly. You may ask why I did. The reason is very simple. The length of time I can devote from now on to government service is strictly limited for various reasons.

We had reached a point in our development where continuity of leadership was essential. Our organization is good and sound. Our personnel is highly qualified and carefully selected. Now, what we need is a Director who will spend the rest of his life at the head of this Agency--certainly the rest of his active life. Furthermore, we need that development in depth so that his deputy, another carefully selected and extremely able man, will be able to succeed him. In this way the personnel of this fine organization will have a long period of continuity of leadership. You're going to have such, and it is that fact and that fact alone which reconciles me in leaving. Thank you very much.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 3

6 March 1953


SUBJECT: Address of the Vice President of the United States, the
Honorable Richard Nixon

1. The Vice President, the Honorable Richard Nixon, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course, on 10 February 1953 presented an address on the current world situation.

2. The Vice President pointed out that he was presenting his subject from a Congressional point of view, and as representing Congressional opinion. His address should not, therefore, be interpreted in its entirety as representing current national policy.

3. Some of the subjects on which the Vice President commented are, of course, controversial, but it is believed that his speech and his point of view will be of universal interest throughout the Agency.

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MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution No. 4 with
routing to all employees

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IN CLASS/DECLASS CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C RET. JUST. 22
NEXT REV DATE 89 REV DATE 1-12-78 REVIEWER _____ TYPE DOC. 30
NO. PGS 41 CREATION DATE _____ ORG COMP 11 OPI 11 ORG CLASS C
REV CLASS C REV COORD. _____ AUTH: HR 70-3

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Security Information

ADDRESS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

THE HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON

AT THE

NINTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

10 February 1953

When Mr. Dulles invited me to talk before this group, I had very grave doubts as to what I might be able to contribute to this program. That you are all experts or potential experts in a very specialized field was clear to me when I read the contents of the printed program showing both the coverage of subject matter and the biographic sketches of the participants. I, therefore, know that I would be out of my depth were I to attempt to compete with intelligence experts in talking to you. Thus, it appeared that my most appropriate contribution to this training course should come from a recognition of your interest in gathering and analyzing facts which are then used as the basis for forming National Intelligence Estimates for the National Security Council of which I am a statutory member. Further, realizing that whatever is done in the formulation of foreign policy must in the final analysis receive the support and approval of the Congress, I felt I would attempt something which is rather unusual--namely, analyze the current situation with which we are confronted in the world as seen through the eyes of an average U.S. Congressman or Senator. This I can do because I have been an average Congressman and Senator. This I would like to do because much misunderstanding exists in the Executive Departments and Agencies regarding the Congress, both House and Senate, much of which is attributable to a tendency to be overly fearful of what the Congressman or Senator is going to think or do and, hence, what must be done to make him act in "proper fashion."

I came to the House in 1947 just at the beginning of the period when we were developing the programs which you are working with and under today. That was the year of CIA's creation in the National Security Act of 1947. Naturally, what I say will be colored to a great extent by my own background and experiences. However, in working up my thoughts today I have attempted to make them representative of the thoughts of most of the Senators and Congressmen, both Republican and Democrats--probably more Republicans--who believe that some changes in the direction and attitudes of our foreign, military and security policies need to be made.

First, I believe it is appropriate to start with an analysis of our foreign policy as inherited from the past administration. The first question we have to ask ourselves is whether this policy ought to be continued as is--intact--or modified to some degree. Fairness demands that we pose the query as to whether or not that policy has been successful. To answer this question we must go back at least to the end of World War II--the most costly war in the history of the world. That was the time when the people of the United States had great hopes for the future, with our complete military superiority, based justifiably on the possession of the best Army, Navy and Air Force plus the monopoly of the atomic bomb. In scanning the peoples of the world we felt that all were on our side with the exception of possibly 180 million to 200 million in the USSR and the satellites. Such was the situation at the end of World War II.

Since that time the Congress has appropriated approximately 100 billion dollars for military purposes and about 33 to 35 billion for foreign aid, most of which has gone to Europe.

We also developed certain plans and programs--the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, and others which were designed to stop the march of aggressive Communism throughout the world and to roll back that tide. But as we analyze the results of that policy today and after all, people in political life think usually in terms of results and not in terms of causes and excuses, no matter how good those excuses may be, I believe that most of us get somewhat of a shock in finding that we have lost our military supremacy--though not completely, certainly to a great degree. For example, we are stronger in strategic air power but we are definitely weaker in tactical air. Even though we are more powerful on the sea, I think even good Navy men, and I happen to be one, will admit that we are probably weaker under the sea. We no longer have a monopoly on the atomic bomb although, of course, we derive consolation from our conviction that we have many more and better ones than our enemy.

As far as peoples in the world are concerned, and that, of course, is the most dramatic part of this analysis, we find that we have lost 600 million people to Communist control, for various reasons, some of them probably pretty good.

Now those are the facts--the facts which concern the average U.S. Congressman, the average U.S. Senator, and accordingly the average American. Since this policy seems to have failed in some instances, the question arises as to how this did happen.

At this point I reject two extremes that probably you will find today in the Congress of the United States and through our country.

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One extreme contends that the only reason this happened is because the people that made the policy intended it that way. This morning I do not intend to go into any detail on the question of disloyalty in the Government. But without minimizing the importance of this problem, I think any reasonable person rejects the idea that the failures we have had in foreign policy since World War II have to any considerable extent been caused because those who made the policies deliberately intended that they fail.

At the other extreme is the fatalistic view of those who say that the results were inevitable because of the cleverness and aggressiveness of imperialistic Russian Communism. Proponents of this view conclude that the chicanery and subversive methods of the Soviets in their use of means that we would never adopt brought results which gave them their great successes and gains and that nothing we could or would have done would have changed the results.

I repeat that both of these extreme viewpoints must be rejected because I think that there is another ground which represents better the thinking of the great majority of the members of the House and the Senate and which I believe is representative of the American viewpoint. Frankly, it doesn't make a great deal of difference why it happened, except, perhaps, from the academic standpoint we may avoid the errors of tomorrow by examining the mistakes of yesterday. Today it doesn't make a great deal of difference to stable, current, national security whether those who made the policies intended them to fail or whether the failures were due to bad judgment. The important fact of the moment is that we are confronted with current errors in policy and recognizing the mistakes we must develop new policies that will not contain in them the seeds of error which caused the failures of our present policies.

At this point I believe some general conclusions can be drawn. In the first place I think the great basic error which has caused our present difficulties is that we misjudged the character of the world Communist conspiracy. It was, perhaps, quite easy to do that. All of us who served in World War II welcomed the participation of the Russians in that war. We recognized the great contribution that they made and we were happy in the realization that the assistance of Russia cut down the contributions and sacrifices that would have to be made by American men and American women. But as a result of this and because of very clever propaganda in the United States by persons whom we have since learned to recognize as actually serving the conspiracy of international Communism, an idea grew up even in high places in the United States that the Communist movement, the Communists, themselves, the power center of the Soviet Union, were all segments of a great peace-loving democracy and that you could therefore, trust the men in the Kremlin

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and believe what they said at the conference table. Yalta and Potsdam were primarily the results of that mistaken concept. Though some of those who attended the conferences had serious doubts about the sincerity of Soviet expressions, we know that these doubts were not ventilated in the open and removed. If they were made known at all, it was not until after the conferences took place. Thus, we must reach the conclusion that one of the basic reasons for the difficulties that exist today goes back to the concessions that were made at these conferences and that such concessions were granted because of a fundamental error in judging the character of the men in the Kremlin who run the Communist conspiracy.

Even after we began to recognize the fact that the men in the Kremlin could not be trusted at the conference table, we note a second fundamental error which, of course, is related to the first, viz., that we failed to realize that the Soviets were engaged in a conspiracy--a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the free nations. Even when we did realize this fact, we failed to appreciate fully the global character of that conspiracy. There was a theory, which, incidentally, is still prevalent in some places and can be sustained by fairly effective argument, holding that what we are confronted with in the world today is not World Communism but simply Russian imperialism which has taken the form of Communism. Hence, as we look over the past seven years, we find that in too many places there were people who said Communism was a danger within Russia. Some people of this kind would go even further and say that Communism was dangerous in Germany and possibly in Greece, in Turkey, in France, in Italy, but that Communism in Asia, and specifically Communism in China and in the United States was a different kind altogether. Such oversimplification, I remind you, is an effort to give you the average thinking of those in the national legislature which is representative of the country at large. The result of that line of thinking is quite obvious because it was the basis for what happened in China and, of course, what happened in China caused what happened in Korea. From my own experience I give you an example which I think points up the falsity of that approach and which, at the same time, proves the point that Communism is a global conspiracy, as President Eisenhower said in his State-of-the-Union message.

I was in Europe in 1947 with the Herter Committee. Allen Dulles was one of our advisers, without pay as I recall, and he did an excellent job. I am sure he will agree with me when I make the observation that if more members of the House and Senate could go on such trips, we would experience less difficulty in getting programs through the House and the Senate which are needed for the security of the country. The Herter Committee, as you recall, was making studies as to the needs of

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the various countries of Europe for Marshall Plan funds. Our recommendations to the House were in large part accepted and resulted in the adoption of the ECA program in the House and, of course, its counterpart, in the Senate. On that European trip some of us made it a point not only to talk to the heads of the governments which were anti-Communist in the countries which we visited, but whenever and wherever we could we got an audience or an interview with the Communist leaders. This was of particular interest to me because I wanted to see what made them tick.

I remember on one occasion a very interesting conversation I had with Togliatti, the leader of the Communist party in Italy. One segment I remember quite vividly. I informed him that I was a member of the Labor Committee of the United States House of Representatives and that, consequently, I was interested in his thinking on labor problems. I said, "Mr. Togliatti: In the event that the Communists take over in Italy (the Italian elections were coming up within a few months) what kind of a program would you favor as far as labor is concerned? Do you believe, for example, that labor unions should be free of government control, and that the right to strike should be protected and guaranteed?"

A translation was made--he thought a moment, and his answer to these questions was "Yes." Obviously, he had to answer in this fashion because he was not in power at that time. After the answer was given I told him I was very glad to hear his reply because that was the kind of policy we had in the United States.

Then I added, "Labor unions are free in the United States and, of course, strikes are going on right now. Of course, you realize, Mr. Togliatti, that in the Soviet Union such is not the case because the labor unions there are completely dominated and controlled by the government and the right to strike is denied."

The translation was made and he looked at me in a not-too-friendly manner and said: "Well, I don't think that the Congressman and I understand each other. The reason why the right to strike has to be guaranteed in the United States or in any capitalist country is that there the labor policy is dominated by employers, reactionaries and capitalists. Therefore, the workers must have some protection against such exploiters. But in the Soviet Union we have no employers, reactionaries or capitalists and, hence, the right to strike need not be guaranteed in the USSR."

I said: "That is very interesting. Now let me ask you another question. In our conversation up to this point you have been extremely critical of the foreign policy of the United States. Certainly, you cannot contend that all of what you call 'aggressive intent, aggressive actions and imperialism' is on the side of the United States.

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Do you have any criticism whatever of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union on the ground that it is imperialistic? After all, you are an Italian, and sitting here in the middle you certainly cannot put all of the blame on our side when there are two great powers apparently involved in this conflict. In other words, is the policy of the Soviet Union imperialistic in any respect?"

Again the translation was made. I received the same rather unfriendly glance and then a very interesting answer. Said Mr. Togliatti, "Again the Congressman and I are not speaking or understanding quite the same language. The reason why the foreign policy of the United States is imperialistic is that it is dominated by employers, reactionaries and capitalists. In the Soviet Union we have no employers, reactionaries or capitalists. Therefore, it is impossible for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to be imperialistic. It is a people's policy, it is always right and is never subject to any criticism whatever."

I asked the same series of questions of Arthur Horner, the head of the miners' union in Britain and received the same answers cloaked in a British accent. I have asked the same series of questions of William Z. Foster, in a little different way, of course, because he happens to be an American citizen. Very pertinent for our purposes is the testimony of Foster before the Judiciary Committee in 1948 which was considering legislation to control the Communist Party in the United States. Senator Ferguson of Michigan questioned him at length as to whether members of the Communist Party of the United States would fight on the side of the United States in the event of an aggressive war begun by the Soviet Union. For approximately thirty minutes, Foster, in a very able display of mental footwork and gymnastics, side stepping, twisting, and turning, contended over and over again that the question was hypothetical because he said it was impossible for him to conceive of an aggressive war by a people's government, to wit, the Soviet Union. Therefore, in his estimation it was not necessary for him to determine whether or not he, or other members of the Communist Party would fight in such a war because it was impossible that such a war could occur. These examples are sufficient to show the global character of the Communist threat.

Accordingly, it seems to me that we made a basic mistake in failing to realize this fact. The Communist, wherever he exists, whether in Moscow, China, Korea or in the United States is essentially the same--owing his loyalty not to his own country, in the event that he is not a citizen of the Soviet Union or a satellite country, but to the power center, the Soviet Union, and to others who control the world Communist

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conspiracy. Yugoslavia, of course, is the present exception which proves the rule. Thus, I conclude that our mistaken evaluation of the global nature of the Communist strategy had much to do with the failure of our policy in China.

Compare, for example, the policy that we adopted in Greece with what we adopted in China. Though the terrain was much smaller and the complexity of the Grecian problem not at all as great, we could have applied to China some of the recognition of the Communist threat which motivated our actions in Greece in 1947. Over and over again we repeated the theme that the Chinese Nationalist Government was corrupt, that it was unstable and for those reasons that the support we had given was no good and no further help was justified. I was in Greece in 1947 and if there was any more corrupt or unstable government in the world than what Greece had in 1947, I would like to have seen it. It changed twice in two weeks while I was there and, yet, what did we do? We went in there and General Van Fleet did a magnificent job of training the Greeks so that they could defend themselves. As a result of our positive action, the Greeks met the Communist threat and met it effectively and at the present time, with our continued support, Greece is still on our side. Thus, as we look at the situation in Asia, it would seem that some of the same medicine possibly might have made the difference.

All of these, of course, are problems and mistakes which have been made in the past and the question is: Where do we go from here? As we analyze the problem of the immediate and distant future, may I say again that the only reason we discussed the past today is to make sure that we do not make those same mistakes tomorrow. As we determine where we go from here, I consider it proper that we look at some basic factors. The first basic one is: what do we want? Well, we want peace, not peace at any price, of course, but certainly peace at as high a price as we can pay without losing the honor of our nation. Secondly, the United States will never use war as an instrument of policy. Our Secretary of State underscored in a very effective manner this point before he went to Europe. However, the Kremlin, when confronted by a potential enemy, will use war as an instrument of policy, and so the key to peace is to see what actions or failures to act on our part will cause the Kremlin to act or fail to act at a critical time. Accordingly, it is appropriate that we analyze from all viewpoints the enemy with whom we are dealing--the man in the Kremlin, the man who is trained and brought up on the bibles which the Communists read and follow, viz., Marx, Lenin, Stalin. Without prying too deeply we are confronted with certain conclusions which are inescapable. First, the men in the Kremlin are realists. Hence, though they are bent on world revolution, though they will use war as an instrument of policy, they will not begin a world war until they are convinced they can win it. Second, they have a sense of history in that they are willing to wait not only through their own lifetimes but even longer than that, if it takes such time to reach the point where they can

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win the world conflict. Therefore, if we want peace, we must do several things. First, we must exert every effort to make sure that in the world the balance of power, from a military standpoint, is actually in our favor so that the Kremlin could not win a war if it began one. By the words, "in our favor," I do not mean quantity as much as I stress quality of arms and adequate training. Secondly, we must make the men in the Kremlin believe that the military balance, to which we have just referred, is in our favor because if they actually miscalculate by arriving at erroneous conclusions by reason of something we have done or failed to do, then, regardless of the power balance, war will come. Thus, I cannot overstress the importance of making sure that the military balance of power is actually on our side and to underscore our responsibility to make sure that we do nothing which will cause the men in the Kremlin to miscalculate our strength and begin a major world war, which, in a sense, no one will win. Thirdly, we must acknowledge that besides our military strength at home, we need allies abroad, because 150 million people obviously cannot stand up against 800 million people. Not only do we need allies but we need as many as we can get.

And so, the policies of the next few years, in large measure, will have to continue the policies which have developed during the past seven years, particularly with regard to Europe. If we keep the United States militarily strong at home, we must strive to get as many militarily strong allies as we can abroad.

But military strength alone is not enough. In this struggle for the world we are confronted with men who are very pragmatic about what they need to achieve their goals of conquest. Thus, they have developed new tactics of aggression with which you are familiar and which have proved themselves successful. Let's face the stark fact that by such tactics 600 million people have been won by the Soviets in seven years without the loss of a single Russian soldier in combat--at least none admittedly lost in combat. These new tactics of aggression developed by the Soviets do not contemplate the use of armed force involving the armies of the power center, itself--the Soviet Union. What are such techniques? Some of them, of course, are quite obvious.

a. The use of internal subversion, employing not only the traditional foreign agents but also agents who are nationals of the countries involved. Czechoslovakia is, perhaps, the most striking example of how a nation can be taken over through a coup d'etat in which the principals were Czechs and, yet, they owed their allegiance to a foreign power.

b. Next is the fomenting of revolution. This tactic used in various parts of the world, in Asia particularly, has been

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quite obviously employed in China. And again we note the instances in which the involuntary forces are made up of nationals of the countries involved and in which the forces of the USSR power center are not committed.

c. Extremely important is the great new weapon of economic, political, and psychological warfare.

Our answer, to some extent, is quite obvious. First, on the economic side, we must be as sound at home as we can possibly be-- that means balance. There are times, undoubtedly, when you may wonder why the Congress hesitates to approve appropriation requests for funds which you feel are needed for adequate military purposes or for foreign aid programs. I can assure you that this is not negativism on the part of the Congress but rather a sober attitude to be convinced of the necessity for the expenditures, because the greatest asset the free world has in the present struggle, and the importance of this point was emphasized in President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message, is a sound, free, productive, American economy. Thus the total program of the nation must be in balance, and I am sure that the policies recommended to the President by the National Security Council will always aim at achieving this result, namely, that we give as much support as we can to the development and maintenance of needed military strength for ourselves and the free world without destroying the basic economy which is our greatest asset and advantage in the battle for civilization in which we are engaged. This will demand of us that, while we maintain a sound economy at home in realistic fashion, we must shore up the economy of nations abroad so that they, themselves, may be militarily strong and, also, that they may develop a strong economy, because in such a climate, there is less likelihood that the Communist conspirator will be able to appeal to the masses of the people and sell his doctrines.

This last point compels me to inject a word of warning. I do not subscribe to the views of those who say that the answer to Communism, whether in the United States or abroad, is solely economic well being. Any of you who analyze this point will reach the same conclusion which is already expressed in the Bible that man does not live by bread alone. Economic strength is, of course, a definite factor entering into the present struggle. Certainly, where economic unrest prevails and hunger exists, you have a fertile field in which the Communist ideas can grow and prosper. But economic strength alone is not the complete answer, and I use again the classic example of Czechoslovakia. There was probably a no more advanced country in Europe at the time of the coup d'etat than that nation, and, yet, the Communist movement flourished and in a most effective manner.

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In addition to economic soundness, we must have internal security at home. I won't belabor that point because I believe it is in good hands at the present time. This is a most difficult problem, and I can imagine that some of you who have followed the work of some of us, as we have investigated subversive activities in the United States, are concerned about these investigations and the trend that they take in this country. I think, perhaps, that some concern is justified, because a very delicate balance must be maintained in this field between security on the one side and freedom on the other. This is not always easy to maintain.

I am sure that if you took a vote of the Congress of the United States--a secret vote, or perhaps, a public one--they would support a movement to put all the Communists in this country in one boat and ship them to the USSR, even though, of course, that might be technically impossible. That, however, gives you an idea of the temper of the Congress on this problem. This is somewhat symbolic of other easy solutions which are offered: for example, the outlawing of the Communist Party in the United States. This sounds laudable and easy but; unfortunately, as indicated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this is an unworkable solution. Therefore, we must be constantly on our guard that we do not resort to totalitarian police methods in dealing with the conspiracy in this country and, thus, adopt within our own borders the methods which we have criticized in our enemies abroad for dealing with dissidents in their countries. I leave with you the conviction that those of us who have been in the Congressional investigative field and others who are presently engaged in this activity have a realization of how constant care must be exerted not to kill the patient we are attempting to cure.

Finally, I believe we will all agree that the bolstering of our national defense in the development of political and psychological counterattack is essential. For example, I think that President Eisenhower's announcement that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be used to blockade the Chinese Communist coast from raids from Formosa, and his statement that a request would be made on the Congress for a resolution to repudiate secret agreements are worthwhile examples of taking the offensive in psychological warfare, besides the fact that, from other standpoints, these steps should have a great effect. Such steps as these mean only two things when they are interpreted to the world. One is that we back our friends and the other that we will not write off the captive peoples. So much for analyzing the Congressional mind--assuming that any Congressman or Senator has a mind. That, I admit, is a debatable point!

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Now, what is our new policy to be? First of all, I believe that the general outlines of that policy have been set forth in President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message and in the recent speech by Secretary of State, Dulles. I do think that a summary of that policy, as I see it, might be appropriate and of interest at this time. Basically, the new policy represents a change in attitude--a change in emphasis. I am sure that we are not going to see too many evidences of drastic moves which would indicate to the people of this country, or to the peoples of the world, that the policy is of a radically new type. The action regarding the Seventh Fleet, the pronouncement regarding secret agreements are good examples of this appreciation. In this analysis we inevitably grapple with the word "containment". Even though the policy concepts underlying "containment" may have served some useful purpose up to the present time, which I rather doubt, still, I believe that we have arrived at the point where the word "containment" means a static policy--a draw in the conflict in which we are engaged. In fact, it means victory for neither side. What we have failed to realize is that the alternative to "containment" is not all-out, total war but rather the winning of the cold war. As President Eisenhower indicated, only by winning the cold war can we avoid the hot war. To achieve this goal of tangible victory, some immediate objectives come to mind:

First. The most difficult goal of all is the winning of the war in Korea. Victory in Korea is of prime concern to our nation. I know that some peculiar arguments can be made, but always in quiet fashion -- never in the open, because you could never convince the American people of this -- contending that the continuance of the war in Korea is a good thing for the United States. Supporting this spurious position are statements to the effect that we should look at the casualty ratio in Korea--five to one in our favor. Now, this position is untenable because it is political dynamite which the people of the United States would never buy, and, furthermore, approaching it from just the standpoint of a layman, it would seem to me that all we have to do is realize that in the past two years or so of the Korean war, we have suffered 130 thousand casualties and the Soviet Union hasn't had any. Again, it is the old problem of keeping our eye on the main target, and winning the current war in Korea must be the first objective of such a policy.

Second. Our second objective, which is, of course, related to our past policy, is to allow no further solidification of Soviet holdings in satellite countries and no extension of their boundaries, because it is obvious that if they forge strength within their dynasty and bring further terrain under their command, they may calculate that they can begin a war--a World War--and win it.

Third. We must avoid trouble at home and keep under control the inevitable problems which we will have with the nations which we consider to be on our side. Without this approach, the strength which we develop will be sapped of its potency.

Finally, and this is the most important ingredient in what we mean by "dynamic" policy, is to roll back the enemy strength if we possibly can. Even though some consideration of this factor existed in past policy, I am convinced that we are going to see a stepping up of attitude and emphasis to reduce Soviet gains, to puncture the Communist conspiracy and to stir up just as much trouble as we possibly can in the satellite countries and in the Soviet Union proper.

This is a big order--a very big order. The objectives we have outlined certainly have been in the minds of our policy makers during the past two or three years. They are in our minds today, and we are hopeful that we will be able to translate these concepts into appropriate actions. Regardless of our thinking in wishful manner for easy answers, we must constantly admonish ourselves that in this field of foreign policy there are none.

The objectives for an affirmative foreign policy can be attained only by the support which policy makers must receive from you. I speak now as a member of the Administration and as a member of the National Security Council, which is the greatest consumer of your product, to emphasize that knowledge of the facts is essential if we are to make the right decisions. Essentially, that is why we have to have intelligence. Perhaps the best proof of this point is the rather obvious truth that with better intelligence support our nation might have avoided most of our present difficulties. Better intelligence might have put our leaders on notice as to the true character of the Communists, the men in the Kremlin, the men we were dealing with across the table at Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran. Better intelligence might have given us a greater appreciation of the overall global character of the Communist movement. For example, if we had better intelligence, we might not have made, what I think was, a fatal error in judgment as to the character of the Chinese Communist movement in the early days of its development. We would have known that the Chinese Communist was no different, essentially, than his counterpart in the satellite countries in eastern Europe and that, therefore, the choice in China was not between a Nationalist Government and something better but between the Nationalist Government and something far, far worse. This, therefore, is your job, to gather and analyze in impartial manner all the facts and to make the findings available to those who have to make the policy.

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I recognize that this is a tough job. I know that some of your assignments will be dangerous and, simultaneously, interesting. I realize, also, that many of you have already served well in difficult undertakings. In an organization of this type, which must be a kind of silent shock absorber, I can imagine that there are times when your tasks seem boring and maybe completely meaningless, because you may not be in a position to see the entire picture. Hence, when you are tempted to ask yourselves such questions as: "Why do we get this?" "Why do we have to spend precious time in such tasks as these?" I admonish you to have confidence in those who direct your activities, and without allowing your efforts to be neutralized, that you do the job which has been assigned to you, because, I say this advisedly, there is no job in our present government which, I think, is more important than the task which you ladies and gentlemen will be doing in the years ahead.

In my experiences as a Congressional investigator of Communist activities in the United States, I have been impressed by a number of things, but particularly, by the kind of people who have become Communists in our country. Though most of you are knowledgeable in this field, my own conclusions may interest you. What kind of men were Alger Hiss, John Apt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Victor Perlo and, I will add, incidentally, the atomic scientists and others who came before our committee and refused to answer questions on the grounds of incrimination? What kind of people were they? First of all, they were all born in the United States and, secondly, they were sensitive, intelligent, able people. Almost without exception, they were the graduates of the best colleges and universities of this country. Not one of them acted just for monetary gain but was motivated by fanatical belief and devotion in the cause in which he was working. Each believed so deeply that he was willing to do anything for the cause--a boring job, if need be. He was also willing to do a very dangerous job--one that would run the danger of a jail sentence and of holding himself and his family up to disgrace in his community and among his friends. Often have I thought, during the past three to four years, as I have seen these people parade before us--these young, intelligent, able people--of the need for people on our side as devoted to our cause as Communists are devoted to theirs.

When I was in Europe in 1947 and again in 1951, I had the opportunity to talk privately with three or four individuals who were members of this Agency. I saw in those individuals what is certainly the answer I have been looking for--the answer to the devotion which the Communists have on their side. I know that it takes a devoted and dedicated man or woman to do the job that you are doing. This may sound like flag waving to you, but most sincerely do I conclude on this note: The conflict in which we are engaged in the world is great and complex. It is military

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in character, economic in character, political in character. But, over all, it is a conflict for the minds and the hearts and the souls of men. Our enemies are dedicated to their cause. We need dedicated people on our side. General Smith, to you and to Mr. Dulles do I say, as a member of this Administration, and I know that I represent the views of the Commander-in-Chief, the President, we are very proud to have serving the United States a group of dedicated men and women--the people who are members of this Agency. Good luck and Godspeed!

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 2

4 March 1953

SUBJECT : Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense Schools and Colleges

REFERENCE : CIA Regulations [REDACTED]

25X1A

1. It is the policy of the Director of Central Intelligence that any individual in the Agency who meets the required qualifications shall have the opportunity to apply for training in the various Department of Defense schools and colleges.

2. Agency quotas for training in the various schools and colleges have been established, and selection of applicants to fill quotas is made by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Selection Boards acting under the chairmanship of the Director of Training.

3. Information with respect to the various schools and colleges, the qualifications required for training in each, and the procedure for application may be found in CIA Regulations [REDACTED]

25X1A

4. Suspense dates for the receipt of applications in the Office of Training are as follows:

1 April: National War College

5 April: Strategic Intelligence School
Counter Intelligence Corps School

10 April: Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Army War College
Naval War College
Air War College

24 April: Armed Forces Staff College
Intelligence Staff Officers Course,
Air Command and Staff School
Naval Intelligence School

5. Further information may be obtained from [REDACTED]
Room 1303 I Building, [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Distribution #5

Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

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25
JOB NO. BOX NO. FILE NO. DOC NO. 26188 CHANGE
IN CLASSIFICATION CLASS CHANGED TO: IS SECRET. JUST. 22
NEXT REV DATE 29 MAY 1954 11-19 REVIEWED
NO. PGS 2 CREATION DATE 043 COMP II OPII ORG CLASS S
REV CLASS C REV COORD. AUTH: HR 70-3

25X1

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 2

3 March 1953

SUBJECT : Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense Schools and Colleges

REFERENCE : CIA Regulations [REDACTED]

25X1A

1. It is the policy of the Director of Central Intelligence that any individual in the Agency who meets the required qualifications shall have the opportunity to apply for training ⁱⁿ at the various Department of Defense schools and colleges.

2. Agency quotas for training in the various schools and colleges have been established, and selection of applicants to fill quotas is made by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Selection Boards acting under the chairmanship of the Director of Training.

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24 April: Armed Forces Staff College
Intelligence Staff Officers Course, Air Command and Staff School
Naval Intelligence School

5. Further information may be obtained from [REDACTED]
Room 1303 I Building, [REDACTED]

25X1A

[REDACTED]
MATTHEW BAIRD

Director of Training

25X1A

Distribution #5 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Training Bulletin

6 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Training (General)
SUBJECT : The Remarks of William H. Jackson at
the Ninth Agency Orientation Course

1. After a thorough reading, it is the view of the Plans and Policy Staff that Mr. Jackson's remarks, while most interesting, do not contain sufficient intelligence information to merit publication as a Training Bulletin for general distribution within the Agency.

2. It is, therefore, recommended that Mr. Jackson's remarks not be the subject of a Training Bulletin as originally planned.

/s/
[Redacted]
Chief, Plans & Policy Staff

25X1A

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FLD NO. _____ DOC. NO. 21 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/DECLASS/CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C RET. JUST. 22
NEXT REV DATE 29 REV DATE 12/79 REVIEWER [Redacted] TYPE DOC. 02
NO. PGS 1 CREATION DATE _____ ORG COMP 11 OPI 11 ORG CLASS C
REV CLASS C REV COORD. _____ AUTH: HR 703

25X1

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

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Security Information

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING


TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 1

11 February 1953

The Director of Central Intelligence, at the 8th Orientation Course, on 21 November 1952, commented upon subjects of universal interest throughout the Agency. The questions to which he responded and his answers are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as appropriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control in their respective Offices.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

25X1A

Attachment: 1

Distribution No. 4

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FLD NO. _____ DOC. NO. 22 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/DECLASS/ CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C RET. JUST. 22
NEXT REV DATE 89 REV DATE 11-1-79 REVIEWER _____ TYPE DOC. 30
NO. PGS 25 CREATION DATE _____ ORG COMP 11 OPI 11 ORG CLASS S
REV CLASS S REV COORD. _____ AUTH: HR 70-3

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Security Information

COMMENTS

OF

GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH

AND HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED AT THE 8TH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

21 November 1952

* * * *

GENERAL SMITH: (Opening Remarks) I want to remind you that the service of national intelligence and of national security has become a permanent, honorable career. It is in effect a fourth service as compared with the three military services, and its operation will be continuous and accelerated in time of war, under its own command and under its own organization. Since the passage of the National Security Act, intelligence is able to offer you permanent, secure and honorable careers and it is to your credit and to our advantage that you have accepted intelligence careers earnestly and seriously. I do not think that many of you will ever feel that you have made a mistake.

QUESTION: Is the national intelligence which we are now making a good support for the national policy?

GENERAL SMITH: We think it is. We think that the product of national intelligence has been steadily increasing in quality and that it has now attained a standard of excellence which justifies its acceptance as the basis for national planning. A good deal remains to be desired. We have consistently been confronted with the impossibility of making certain estimates in the absence of military assumptions. Only recently the entire intelligence community was asked to participate in the preparation of an estimate of Soviet capabilities for defense against air attack. Obviously, it is quite impossible to estimate the capabilities of the Soviet Union to defend itself against an attack if there is no knowledge of our own capacity for attack. When a requisition for this type of estimate is made, and in the absence of definite assumptions as to the scope, caliber and materiel to be used in an attack, it is only possible for the intelligence community to prepare a sort of a bill of materials of Soviet assets and let it go at that. The time will come when those who are charged with formulating intelligence estimates will be provided at least with basic assumptions on which to prepare their counter-estimates.

QUESTION: To what extent is the intelligence product actually used by those who formulate national policy?

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Security Information

GENERAL SMITH: We have a good deal to learn in methods of using intelligence to get the best value out of it. This is a situation which will correct itself in time as the intelligence product becomes more and more reliable. As it now works out, we prepare certain intelligence estimates on the national or strategic level which are based on a schedule for production dependent largely on the problems which will confront the staff echelon which supports the National Security Council. When those estimates are prepared and are turned over to the members of the National Security Council and their subordinates on the staff, they become, or at least they should become, what in military parlance is called the G-2 annex on which operational plans are based, and they are more and more being used in that way. Regrettably, the demand for intelligence estimates exceeds our ability to supply them. Consequently, we are having a little difficulty getting estimates in a timely way so that the staff officers who do the work for the Security Council will have them well in advance of their own job, which is the preparation of draft policy papers. In some cases, we have been a little behind the policy papers, but more and more we are keeping up to date and a little bit ahead of the parade.

QUESTION: It has been said that the military commanders didn't have reliance or confidence in the intelligence people and, therefore, much was known to them which was not to the intelligence men, and that that had an effect on the estimates. Would you comment on this?

GENERAL SMITH: I don't think that reliance or confidence has anything to do with the problem. It is simply the acute realization of the necessity for security in connection with military plans and operations which has been driven home to the personnel involved in exercising command. By a long series of tragic events over a period of years, the inescapable conclusion has been arrived at that the more people who know about these things, the more insecure are plans and operations. Consequently, the tendency always is to hold on to information as tightly and closely as possible and not to give it out. It's the "need to know" theory raised to the nth power. Actually, we do disseminate information much too widely; that's inherent in our bureaucratic system. Everybody wants to know; a lot of people who want to know and who don't really need to know are able to establish their right to know regardless of what the intelligence chap or the operational chap feels about it. Where military or other knowledge is required for the production of an intelligence estimate, the solution, in my opinion, lies in providing the intelligence producer with a series of assumptions which need not reveal the plan, or which need not be entirely accurate, or which may even be fictitious, because it is possible with such assumptions to produce an intelligence estimate which the operational commander himself may scale down. I don't think that anything better will ever be produced until we set up on the highest level some machinery for coordinated G-2 and G-3 estimates; and whether that is possible or not, I don't know.

QUESTION: Do you feel that unanimity reduces the strength of many of the estimates?

GENERAL SMITH: We rarely have unanimity, and we don't strive for it. We don't make any effort to obtain it, so that itself is an academic question. As a matter of fact, the dissenting opinion is encouraged if it's a valid one; and if the dissenter is easily argued out of his position, then probably his dissent isn't worth very much.

QUESTION: Regarding the stability of the Agency, will the change in the Administration have any effect on the Agency?

GENERAL SMITH: Since this is a statutory Agency supported by a career service, there will be no change with changes in the Administration. The Director and his principal Deputies and Assistants are non-political appointees and, while the Director himself must undoubtedly be a man whom the Chief Executive is willing to accept, and to whom he will give a certain measure of confidence, it is unlikely that you will ever have a Director whose status will change with changes in the Administration.

QUESTION: What changes would take place as a consequence of a hot war?

GENERAL SMITH: There would be no change in wartime, except that, in theatres of active operations, our personnel under the senior representative present would automatically report to and carry out the orders of the senior military commander in the theatre of operations, just as they are now doing in Korea. In addition, our personnel would have missions targeted outside but based on a military theatre of operations. These missions would be transmitted to them from headquarters with the concurrence and knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they would be supported by the Theatre Commander concerned.

QUESTION: Are the Senior Representatives overseas your alter egos?

GENERAL SMITH: Yes. With relation to myself or to any future Director, they occupy the same position that the commander of a theatre of operations, in a military sense, would occupy with respect to the military heads in Washington.

QUESTION: If a "real" peace is achieved, what effect would this have upon the offices under DD/P?

GENERAL SMITH: Well, I'm afraid that the question is academic insofar as the lifetime of most of us is concerned, and while I would have to answer that I don't know exactly, I don't think that that is anything that you need to worry about in the immediately foreseeable future. Let's reserve that one for, let us say, the 28th or 38th or 58th Orientation Course.

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QUESTION: With regard to the official ceiling on T/O's, do you anticipate that there will be further cuts in the organization?

GENERAL SMITH: No. We'll have to increase a little bit for training purposes. It's a simple fact that while we have budgeted for a rather large personnel ceiling, we can't get qualified people to fill that personnel ceiling. They just simply don't exist. We've gone about the limit. Occasionally one may get from the outside very highly qualified men or women, tempt them in, twist their arms and get them to sign up on a career basis. But they are becoming fewer and fewer, so we must depend on the younger people that we are bringing up through the ranks. Of course these people are, in any technical service like our own, the heart and soul of a career organization. Unless every private carries the baton of a field marshal in his knapsack, he hasn't very much to look forward to. Unless every junior officer has the right to expect promotion through the grades and ultimately the opportunity to occupy the highest post in the career of his choice, there is very little to hold him in his job. So, my intention is to keep our numbers down, to be selective instead of expansive, and to look more and more to the juniors to fill the senior posts.

QUESTION: Is the policy of rotation of individuals in key spots in keeping with the career concept?

GENERAL SMITH: Well, since I've ordered the rotation policy, I'm obviously in favor of it. In the first place, one cannot conduct global operations, as we conduct them, exclusively and entirely controlled by a desk in Washington. In the second place, our people in the field believe, and unfortunately in some cases they've had grounds to feel, that the men who are telling them what to do have never been on the sharp end of the stick. There is a third and very impelling reason. An Agency of this kind, like a military agency, is extremely ill-advised if it keeps its best talent at home. It should get the best people that it can, get the most experienced people it has, the most reliable people that it has, out to the point of impact. Then, when you issue an order to a man in the field, knowing him, knowing his capability and his reliability, you have every assurance that the order will be properly carried out and that the duty will be well performed. Accordingly, it is desirable to get the people occupying key positions, who have demonstrated their fitness for trust and competence, as rapidly as possible to the critical places outside of the United States which are the key to our effective operations.

QUESTION: Is there enough working level cooperation between CIA Offices today, within the limits, of course, of security?

GENERAL SMITH: Yes, I think so. You have to try to arrive at a happy medium between the necessity of knowing and the actual need of knowing. The desire to provide cooperation exists, although the machinery, from time to time, has not been as effective as one would like. I hope to increase cooperation by the gradual transfer of qualified personnel from one Division of the

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Agency to another, to a greater extent than has heretofore obtained, so that each officer will have a broader perspective than that given him by work within one particular Division in which he may well specialize. But he should have one or two alternate specialties, particularly when he goes out into the field.

QUESTION: Does the fact that a CIA employee has reserve status hinder his career or help it in CIA?

GENERAL SMITH: In my opinion, reserve status is an asset because it increases the scope of the usefulness of a CIA officer. There are many jobs that we do in which past military training or military experience is an essential quality. There are also many jobs that we have to do where it might be desirable to have a person actually identified with the military service, in which case we can have him ordered to active duty and assigned to us.

QUESTION: Are you concerned about personnel turnover and are you taking steps to minimize it?

GENERAL SMITH: Very much so. Our personnel turnover is by comparison relatively small, but it's still much too large. That's one of the reasons why I brought an Inspector General down here and made him available to anybody in the Agency who had any complaint of any kind. As you know, you all have opportunity also for a direct appeal to myself or Mr. Dulles if you feel that you have been a victim of injustice. So there is no excuse for anybody going unheard if they have a complaint or a legitimate question to raise with regard to their official or personal lives within the Agency. I will not, however, tolerate anybody going outside the Agency. I had a case about six months ago. Since it was a special one, I have decided to ignore it. One of our employees wrote a letter to the President. Of course, he handed it to me. But we have an Inspector General for that.

QUESTION: Since we can not tolerate mediocrity in CIA, what does an employee do when he finds it on the job?

GENERAL SMITH: If he is an executive, who is responsible for eliminating mediocrity, he should promptly eliminate it. On the other hand, no one likes to be a talebearer, and no one likes a talebearer. In dealing with your subordinates, be completely cold-blooded in eliminating mediocrity. When you encounter it among your colleagues on the same level, just grit your teeth and hope that your immediate superior will be as quick to recognize it as you are.

QUESTION: Are we ever going to get our own building?

GENERAL SMITH: We have one authorized, but we are torn two ways. At the present time, the very fact that we are scattered and living and working in shacks, while it militates against working conditions, at the same time it

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Security Information

contributes indirectly to our security in that nobody knows just exactly where we are, or how many people work for us, or what they do. On the other hand, it poses security hazards because in our scattered condition it's pretty hard to guard us. We want a building badly, but on the other hand, as soon as we put one up it will be bigger than most people think and we will undoubtedly attract attention. The answer will probably be that we will use half measures and put up something of a permanent nature for certain of our operations and make "several bites of the cherry."

QUESTION: Shouldn't we be proud of the fact that there is a CIA in the United States coordinating intelligence and, therefore, do more to win a better understanding of what we do and why we do it on the part of the press and the American people?

GENERAL SMITH: There's a great deal to be said for that idea, but the United States needs one silent service and I think that it would be all to the good if we could so qualify. We can't, of course. Under our laws and under the rights of Congress, there are necessities for discussion. We could not, for instance, get the money that we need if we didn't tell a good deal about our operations; and as their scope increases and as their cost increases, the necessity increases for telling more people about it - in Congress, for example. So the only happy medium that we can draw is to say as little as possible consistent with the necessity for safeguarding our sources and our methods of operation. The American press generally, at least those who are deserving of consideration, who know something about the problems of securing and utilizing information because that's their business too, are basically respectful of an institution that talks as little as possible.

QUESTION: Are our relationships with Congress good?

GENERAL SMITH: Yes, although they are extremely limited, and that, of course, in itself is all to the good. In our actual dealings with Congress, our discussions have been limited to only two or three people on the appropriate committee in each of the two Houses, and they are fully alive to the necessity of security. During the time that I've been here, there has never been any, even the slightest, breach of security from those members of the two Houses with whom we have dealt. As a matter of fact, they are extremely reluctant to have it known that it is they who look into our little business because they fear, and quite justly, that there would be a demand from others to be permitted to know.

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Security Information

11 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Training Bulletin (General Smith's Comments to the 8th Orientation Course)

25X1A

1. [REDACTED], Regulations Control Staff of DD/A, advises that #4 distribution of the Bulletin, to Branch Chiefs with routing to all personnel with appropriate security clearance, will require approximately [REDACTED].

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25X9

2. [REDACTED], Training Aids Branch, after checking with the reproduction facilities at Alexandria, advises that the cost of producing this Bulletin of 7 pages in [REDACTED] will cost about \$50.00. On the basis of an estimated 4 Bulletins per year, the cost would amount to \$200.00.

3. If, as the Director of Training has suggested, the comments of the DDCI and the Vice President, at the 9th Orientation Course, be made the subjects of further Bulletins, the cost for this fiscal year would not exceed \$150.00.

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4. [REDACTED] Chief, Budget and Fiscal Division, advises that these costs can be slotted to the Training Aids Branch, OTR, and that funds are there available for this purpose. [REDACTED] Chief, Service and Supply Section, will write up a requisition for the production of the Bulletin, charging the cost to Training Aids Branch, 1503-10 (Support Staff). This requisition will request that the production and distribution of the Bulletin be expedited (72 hours).

25X1A

5. The Bulletin was cleared through [REDACTED] of DD/A. Two policy questions were involved:

a. Whether format as Training Notice required certification by a representative of the DCI, and centralized control under the DD/A.

b. Whether there should be centralized control of the use of reproduction facilities.

Red White was consulted and he recommended:

a. That the Bulletin did not properly fit into the regulatory system of the Agency and that, with a slight change of format, it could appropriately be issued under the D/TR's signature (without status as a Notice and without certification by representative of DCI).

b. That OTR then should arrange for reproduction, as required.

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6. The format of the Bulletin has been changed in line with Col. White's recommendations, approved by the Director of Training, and it is on the way.



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for Chief, Plans and Policy Staff

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Security Information

6 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

THROUGH : Deputy Director of Training (General)

SUBJECT : Training Bulletin - Volume I, No. 1

1. The attached document has been coordinated with [] of the Policy Staff, I&SO. As a result of this coordination, it was concluded that the document should be classified "Secret." An effort was made to determine if it was at all possible to hold it to "Confidential." In view of the General's comments on the hot war question and the discussion of our overseas activities, we both agreed that "Secret" was the lowest safe classification which should be applied to the General's remarks.

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2. The second point which was considered was that of distribution. Distribution No. 5 goes to all employees of the Agency regardless of their security clearance status. This means that people with provisional clearances would not only have access to the document, but under distribution No. 5 would be entrusted with its custody. We agreed, therefore, that distribution No. 4 was appropriate; distribution No. 4 goes to Branch Chiefs. A paragraph has been added to the main body of the Bulletin which places responsibility on the Branch Chiefs for circulation to their personnel cleared to receive Secret material, and which places on them responsibility for appropriate security control and retention of the document after circulation.

3. After you have signed the Notice, and in accordance with I&SO procedure in processing their Security Bulletin, the document is subject to review and approval of the DD/A as an Agency issuance.

4. Upon approval by the DD/A, OTR must then arrange through reproduction facilities in Alexandria for the printing, collation, and distribution. The most economical way of reproduction is a photographic one in which the type script is photographed and multilith prints are made from the photograph negative. This is the procedure employed by I&SO for the Security Bulletin.

5. After you have signed the document, this staff will hand-process the Bulletin through the DD/A and to the reproduction []

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[]
Chief, Plans and Policy Staff

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

NOTICE

NO. T-1-53

5 February 1953

SUBJECT: Training Bulletin - Volume I, No. 1

The Director of Central Intelligence, at the 8th Orientation Course, on 21 November 1952, commented upon subjects of universal interest throughout the Agency. The questions to which he responded and his answers are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

are requested to

Branch Chiefs ~~shall~~ ^{*are requested to*} circulate this document, as appropriate, and ~~request~~ ^{*request*} its return for retention and security control in their respective Offices.

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution No. 4

1. no erasures or strikeovers - letter perfect copy
2. New typewriter ribbon
3. Clean all pages in typewriter
4. Security classification typed, not stamped

SECRET

Remarks of General Walter B. Smith

and his answers to questions submitted

at the 8th Agency Orientation Course, 21 November 1952

* * * *

GENERAL SMITH: Opening Remarks - I want to remind you that the service of national intelligence and of national security has become a permanent, honorable career. It is in effect a fourth service as compared with the three military services, and its operation will be continuous and accelerated in time of war, under its own command and under its own organization. Since the passage of the National Security Act, intelligence is able to offer you permanent, secure and honorable careers and it is to your credit and to our advantage that you have accepted intelligence careers earnestly and seriously. I do not think that many of you will ever feel that you have made a mistake.

25X1B

QUESTION: Is the national intelligence which we are now making a good support for the national policy?

QUESTION: To what extent is the intelligence product actually used by those who formulate national policy?

GENERAL SMITH: We have a good deal to learn in methods of using intelligence to get the best value out of it. This is a situation which will correct itself in time as the intelligence product becomes more and more reliable. As it now works out, we prepare certain intelligence estimates on the national or strategic level which are based on a schedule for production dependent largely on the problems which will confront

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the ^{staff} echelon which supports the ^{Security Information} National Security Council. When those estimates are prepared and are turned over to the members of the National Security Council and their subordinates on the staff, they become, or at least they should become, what in military parlance is called the G-2 annex on which operational plans are based, and they are more and more being used in that way. [Regretably, the demand for intelligence estimates exceeds our ability to supply them. Consequently, we are having a little difficulty getting estimates in a timely way so that the staff officers who do the work for the Security Council will have them well in advance of their own job, which is the preparation of a draft policy papers. In some cases, we have been a little behind the policy papers, but more and more are we keeping up to date and a little bit ahead of the parade.]

QUESTION: It has been said that the military commanders didn't have reliance or confidence in the intelligence people and, therefore, much was known to them which was not to the intelligence men, and that that had an effect on the estimates. Would you comment on this?

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GENERAL SMITH: I don't think that reliance or confidence has anything to do with the problem. It is simply the acute realization of the necessity for security in connection with military plans and operations which has been driven home to the personnel involved in exercising command. By a long series of tragic events over a period of years, the inescapable conclusion has been arrived at that the more people who know about these things, the more insecure are plans and operations. Consequently, the tendency always is to hold on to information as tightly and closely as possible and not to give it out. It's the "need to know" theory raised to the nth power. Actually, we do disseminate information much too widely; that's inherent in our bureaucratic system. Everybody wants to know; a lot of the people who want to know and who don't really need to know are able to establish their right to know regardless of what the intelligence chap or the operational chap feels about it. Where military or other knowledge is required for the production of an intelligence estimate, the solution, in my opinion, lies in providing the intelligence producer with a series of assumptions which need not reveal the plan, or which need not be entirely accurate, or which may even be fictitious, because it is possible with such assumptions to produce an intelligence estimate which the operational commander himself may scale down. I don't think that anything better will ever be produced until we set up on the highest level some machinery for coordinated G-2 and G-3 estimates; and whether that is possible or not, I don't know.

QUESTION: Do you feel that unanimity reduces the strength of many of the estimates?

GENERAL SMITH: We rarely have unanimity, and we don't strive for it. We don't make any effort to obtain it, so that itself is an academic question.

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As a matter of fact, the dissenting opinion is encouraged if it's a valid one; and if the dissenter is easily argued out of his position, then probably his dissent isn't worth very much.

QUESTION: Regarding the stability of the Agency, will the change in the Administration have any effect on the Agency?

GENERAL SMITH: Since this is a statutory Agency supported by a career service, there will be no change with changes in the Administration. The Director and his principal Deputies and Assistants are non-political appointees and, while the Director himself must undoubtedly be a man whom the Chief Executive is willing to accept, and to whom he will give a certain measure of confidence, it is unlikely that you will ever have a Director whose status will change with changes in the Administration.

QUESTION: What changes would take place as a consequence of a hot war?

GENERAL SMITH: There would be no change in wartime, except that, in theatres of active operations, our personnel under the senior representative present would automatically report to and carry out the orders of the senior military commander in the theatre of operations, just as they are now doing in Korea. In addition, our personnel would have missions targeted outside but based on a military theatre of operations. These missions would be transmitted to them from headquarters with the concurrence and knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they would be supported by the Theatre Commander concerned.

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QUESTION: If a "real" peace is achieved, what effect would this have upon the offices under DD/P?

GENERAL SMITH: Well, I'm afraid that the question is academic insofar as the lifetime of most of us is concerned, and while I would have to answer that I don't know exactly, I don't think that that is anything that you need to worry about in the immediately foreseeable future. Let's reserve that one for, let us say, the 28th or 38th or 58th Orientation Course.

QUESTION: With regard to the official ceiling on T/O's, do you anticipate that there will be further cuts in the organization?

GENERAL SMITH: No. We'll have to increase a little bit for training purposes. It's a simple fact that while we have budgeted for a rather large personnel ceiling, we can't get the qualified people to fill that personnel ceiling.

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They just simply don't exist. We've gone about the limit. Occasionally one may get from the outside very highly qualified men or women, tempt them in, twist their arms and get them to sign up on a career basis. But they are becoming fewer and fewer, so we must depend on the younger people that we are bringing up through the ranks. Of course these people are, in any technical service like our own, the heart and soul of a career organization. Unless every private carries the baton of a field marshall in his knapsack, he hasn't very much to look forward to. Unless every junior officer has the right to expect promotion through the grades and ultimately the opportunity to occupy the highest post in the career of his choice, there is very little to hold him in his job. So, my intention is to keep our numbers down, to be selective instead of expansive, and to look more and more to the juniors to fill the senior posts.

QUESTION: Is the policy of rotation of individuals in key spots in keeping with the career concept?

GENERAL SMITH: Well, since I've ordered the rotation policy, I'm obviously in favor of it. In the first place, one cannot conduct global operations, as we conduct them, exclusively and entirely controlled by a desk in Washington. In the second place, our people in the field believe, and unfortunately in some cases they've had grounds to feel, that the men who are telling them what to do have never been on the sharp end of the stick. There is a third and very impelling reason. An Agency of this kind, like a military agency, is extremely ill-advised if it keeps its best talent at home. It should get the best people that it can, get the most experienced people it has, the most reliable people that it has, out to the point of impact. Then, when you issue an order to a man in the field, knowing him, knowing his capability and his reliability, you have every assurance that the order will be properly carried out and that the duty will be well performed. Accordingly, it is desirable to get the people occupying key positions, who have demonstrated their fitness for trust and competence, as rapidly as possible to the critical places outside of the United States which are the key to our effective operations.

cut

QUESTION: Is there enough working level cooperation between CIA Offices today, within the limits, of course, of security?

GENERAL SMITH: Yes, I think so. You have to try to arrive at a happy medium between the necessity of knowing and the actual need of knowing. The desire to provide cooperation exists, although the machinery, from time to time, has not been as effective as one would like. I hope to increase cooperation by the gradual transfer of qualified personnel from one Division of the Agency to another, to a greater extent than has heretofore obtained, so that each officer will have a broader perspective than that given him by work within one particular Division in which he may well specialize. But he should have one or two alternate specialities, particularly when he goes out into the field.

cut

QUESTION: Does the fact that a CIA employee has reserve status hinder his career or help it in CIA?

GENERAL SMITH: In my opinion, reserve status is an asset because it increases the scope of the usefulness of a CIA officer. There are many jobs that we do in which past military training or military experience is an essential quality. There are also many jobs that we have to do where it might be desirable to have a person actually identified with the military service, in which case we can have him ordered to active duty and assigned to us.

QUESTION: Are you concerned about personnel turnover and are you taking steps to minimize it?

GENERAL SMITH: Very much so. Our personnel turnover is by comparison relatively small, but it's still much too large. That's one of the reasons why I brought an Inspector General down here and made him available to anybody in the Agency who had any complaint of any kind. As you know, you all have opportunity also for a direct appeal to myself or Mr. Dulles if you feel that you have been a victim of injustice. So there is no excuse for anybody going unheard if they have a complaint or a legitimate question to raise with regard to their official or personal lives within the Agency. I will not, however, tolerate anybody going outside the Agency. I had a case about six months ago. Since it was a special one, I have decided to ignore it. One of our employees wrote a letter to the President. Of course, he handed it to me. But we have an Inspector General for that.

QUESTION: Since we can not tolerate mediocrity in CIA, what does an employee do when he finds it on the job?

GENERAL SMITH: If he is an executive, who is responsible for eliminating mediocrity, he should promptly eliminate it. On the other hand, no one likes to be a talebearer, and no one likes a talebearer. In dealing with your subordinates, be completely cold-blooded in eliminating mediocrity. When you encounter it among your colleagues on the same level, just grit your teeth and hope that your immediate superior will be as quick to recognize it as you are.

QUESTION: Are we ever going to get our own building?

GENERAL SMITH: We have one authorized, but we are torn two ways. At the present time, the very fact that we are scattered and living and working in shacks, while it militates against working conditions, at the same time it contributes indirectly to our security in that nobody knows just exactly where we are, or how many people work for us, or what they do. On the other hand, it poses security hazards because in our scattered condition it's pretty hard to guard us. We want a building badly, but

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on the other hand, as soon as we put one up it will be bigger than most people think and we will undoubtedly attract attention. The answer will probably be that we will use half measures and put up something of a permanent nature for certain of our operations and make "several bites of the cherry."

QUESTION: Shouldn't we be proud of the fact that there is a CIA in the United States coordinating intelligence and, therefore, do more to win a better understanding of what we do and why we do it on the part of the press and the American people?

cut
7
GENERAL SMITH: There's a great deal to be said for that idea, but the United States needs one silent service and I think that it would be all to the good if we could so qualify. We can't, of course. Under our laws and under the rights of Congress, there are necessities for discussion. We could not, for instance, get the money that we need if we didn't tell a good deal about our operations; and as their scope increases and as their cost increases, the necessity increases for telling more people about it - in Congress, for example. So the only happy medium that we can draw is to say as little as possible consistent with the necessity for safeguarding our sources and our methods of operation. The American press generally, at least those who are deserving of consideration, who know something about the problems of securing and utilizing information because that's their business too, are basically respectful of an institution that talks as little as possible.

QUESTION: Are our relationships with Congress good?

cut
GENERAL SMITH: Yes, although they are extremely limited, and that, of course, in itself is all to the good. In our actual dealings with Congress, our discussions have been limited to only two or three people on the appropriate committee in each of the two Houses, and they are fully alive to the necessity of security. During the time that I've been here, there has never been any, even the slightest, breach of security from those members of the two Houses with whom we have dealt. As a matter of fact, they are extremely reluctant to have it known that it is they who look into our little business because they fear, and quite justly, that there would be a demand from others to be permitted to know.

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Remarks of General Walter B. Smith

and his answers to questions submitted

at the 8th Agency Orientation Course, 21 November 1952

General Smith: [I have found that there are always a number of questions which our people would like to ask, not only in connection with the over-all business of the Agency, but in connection with their personal careers. Please have no hesitation in asking ~~anything~~ ^{any question} which may occur to you. If I cannot myself answer ~~your questions from the platform~~, I will see that you get them answered by someone who is possibly more competent and more familiar with the details than I. I want to remind you that the service of national intelligence and of national security has become a permanent, honorable career. [It is in effect a fourth service ~~as compared~~ ^{along} with the three military services, and its operation will be continuous and accelerated in time of war, under its own command and under its own organization. Since the passage of the National Security Act, intelligence is able to offer you permanent, secure and honorable careers and it is to your credit and to our advantage that you have accepted ~~that career~~ earnestly and seriously. I do not think that many of you will ever feel that you have made a mistake.

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(5) Question: ~~Regarding the stability of the Agency, Will the change in the Administration have any effect on the Agency? and what would happen to us in time of hot-war?~~

General Smith: Since ~~this~~ ^{the} is a statutory Agency supported by a career service, there will ~~be~~ ^{be no} change with changes in the Administration. The Director and his principal Deputies and Assistants are non-political appointees and, while the Director himself must undoubtedly be a man whom the Chief Executive is willing to accept, and to whom he will give a certain measure of confidence, it is unlikely that ~~you the~~ ^{will ever have a Director whose} status will change with changes in the Administration. ~~As a statutory organization established to service the National Government, there is no possibility of change that I can anticipate over the long view; no is there, any in wartime, except that, in theatres of active operations, that is where shooting is going on our personnel under the senior representative present~~

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would automatically report to and carry out the orders of the senior military commander in the theatre of operations, just as they are now doing in Korea. ~~These the military requirement of winning the campaign or winning the war is paramount and everything else is subordinate to that. However, our personnel in an active theatre of operations would have other responsibilities. They would have missions targeted outside but based on a military theatre of operations. Those missions would be transmitted to them from headquarters with the concurrence and knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they would be supported by the Theatre Commander concerned.~~ In addition, our personnel

* * *

7 Question: Are the Senior Representatives overseas your alter egos?

General Smith: Yes. With relation to myself or to any future Director, they occupy the same position that the commander of a theatre of operations, in a military sense, would occupy with respect to the military heads in Washington.

* * *

10 Question: ~~What do you think about the~~ ^{is the} policy of rotation of individuals in key spots, in keeping with the career concept?

General Smith: Well, since I've ordered ~~it~~ ^{rotation} and pressed it, I'm obviously in favor of it. ~~I would like to amplify that a little bit.~~ In the first place, one cannot conduct global operations, ~~as we conduct them,~~ exclusively and entirely controlled by a desk in Washington. In the second place, our people in the field believe, and unfortunately in some cases they ~~had~~ ^{are} had grounds to feel, that the men who are telling them what to do have never been on the sharp end of the stick. There is a third and very impelling reason. An Agency of this kind, like a military agency, is extremely ill-advised if it keeps its best talent at home. It should get the best people that it can, ~~get the~~ most experienced people that it has, ~~the most reliable people that it has~~ out to the point of impact. ~~Then~~ ^{the rotation} when you issue an order to a man in the field, knowing him, knowing his capability and his reliability, you have every assurance that ~~it~~ ^{it} will be properly carried out, ~~and that the duty will be well performed.~~ Accordingly, it is desirable to get the people we have here occupying key positions, who have demonstrated their fitness for trust and competence, as rapidly as possible to the critical places outside of the United States which are the key to our effective operations.

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11
Question: ~~Do you feel that there is~~ enough working level cooperation between CIA Offices today, within the limits ~~of security~~, of security?

General Smith: Yes, I think so. You have to try to arrive at a happy medium between the necessity of knowing and the actual need of knowing, particularly with regard to our sensitive Offices. ~~At least~~ The intention of the policy and the desire to provide that cooperation exists, although the machinery, from time to time, has not been as effective as one would like. ~~I hope to increase this by~~ gradual transfer of qualified personnel from one Division of the Agency to another, to a greater extent than has heretofore obtained, so that each officer ~~each employee~~ will have a broader perspective than that given him by work within one particular Division in which he may well specialize. But he should have one or two alternate specialties, particularly when he goes out into the field.

* * *

17
Question: ~~Many CIA people have reserve status.~~ Does the fact that a CIA employee ~~is a member of an Army reserve~~ hinder his career ~~as help~~ in CIA? ~~to reserve status~~

General Smith: ~~Why to a certain extent I should think it would help it, because~~ There are many jobs that we do in which military training or ~~past~~ military experience is an essential quality. Besides, there are many jobs that we have to do where it might be desirable to have ~~a person actually~~ identified with the military service, in which case we can have them ordered to active duty and assigned to us, ~~and reimburse the military department concerned.~~ So, ~~in my opinion,~~ Reserve status is an asset because it increases the scope of the usefulness of a CIA officer.

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23
Question: Are you concerned about personnel turnover and are you taking steps to minimize it?

General Smith: Very much so. Our personnel turnover is by comparison relatively small, but it's still much too large. That's one of the reasons why I brought an Inspector General down here and made him available to anybody in the Agency who had any complaint of any kind. As you know, you all have opportunity also for a direct appeal to myself or Mr. Duales if you feel that you have been a victim of injustice. So there is no excuse for anybody

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going unheard if they have a complaint or a legitimate question to raise with regard to their official or personal lives within the Agency. I will not, however, tolerate anybody going outside the Agency. I had a case about six months ago. Since it was a special one, I have decided to ignore it. One of our employees wrote a letter to the President - of course he handed it to me. But we have an Inspector General for that, ~~and you can all come to someone.~~

* * *

(14) Question: Since we can not tolerate mediocrity in CIA, what does an employee do when he finds it on the job?

General Smith: If he is an executive, who is responsible for eliminating mediocrity, he should promptly eliminate it. On the other hand, no one likes to be a talebearer, and no one likes a talebearer. In dealing with your subordinates, be completely cold-blooded in eliminating mediocrity. Where you encounter it among your colleagues on the same level, just grit your teeth and hope that your immediate superior will be as quick to recognize it as you are.

* * *

(19) Question: With regard to the official ceiling on T/O's, do you anticipate that there will be further cuts in the organization?

General Smith: No, ~~I don't~~. We ^{will} have to increase a little bit for training purposes. It's a simple fact that while we have a rather large personnel ceiling budgeted for, we can't get the qualified people to fill that personnel ceiling. They just simply don't exist. We've gone about the limit. Occasionally one may get from the outside very highly qualified men or women, tempt them in, twist their arms and get them to sign up on a career basis. But ~~these~~ are becoming fewer and fewer, so we must depend on the younger people that we are bringing up through the ranks. Of course ~~that is~~, in any technical service like our own, the heart and soul of a career organization. Unless every private carries the baton of a field marshall in his knapsack, he hasn't very much to look forward to. Unless every junior officer has the right to expect promotion through the grades and ultimately the opportunity to occupy the highest post in the career of his choice, there is very little to hold him in his job. So, my intention is to keep our numbers down, to be selective instead of expansive, and to look more and more to the juniors to fill the senior posts.

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(1)
Question: Is the national intelligence which we are now making a good support for the National policy?

General Smith: We think it is. We think that the product of national intelligence has been steadily increasing in quality and that now it has attained a standard of excellence which justifies its acceptance as the basis for national planning.

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(2) *Pa*
is constantly coming up and that is to what extent is the intelligence product actually used by those who formulate national policy. We have a good deal to learn in methods of using intelligence to get the best value out of it. This is a situation which will correct itself in time as the intelligence product becomes more and more reliable. As it now works out, we prepare certain intelligence estimates on the national or strategic level which are based on a schedule for their production dependent largely on the problems which will confront the senior staff. That, as you know, is the staff echelon which supports the National Security Council, and on this staff the Central Intelligence Agency has representation. When those estimates are prepared and are turned over to the members of the National Security Council and their subordinates on the staff, they become, or at least they should become, what, in military parlance, is called the G-2 annex on which operational plans are based, and they are more and more being used in that way. Regrettably, the demand for intelligence estimates exceeds our ability to supply them. Consequently, we are having a little difficulty getting them in in a timely way so that the staff officers who do the work for the Security Council echelon will have them well in advance of their own job, which is the preparation of a draft policy paper. In some cases, we have been a little behind the policy papers, but more and more are we keeping up to date and a little bit ahead of the parade.

for the National Security Council

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115
Question: Are we ever going to get our own building?

General Smith: ~~We have one authorized, as you know, but~~ and we are torn two ways. At the present time, the very fact that we are scattered and living and working in shacks, while it militates against working conditions, ~~at the same time,~~ contributes indirectly to our security in that nobody knows just exactly where we are, or how many people work for us, or what they do. On the other hand, it poses security hazards because in our scattered condition it's pretty hard to guard us. We want a building badly, but on the other hand, as soon as we put one up it will be bigger than most people think and we will undoubtedly attract attention. The answer will probably be that we will use half measures and put up something of a permanent nature for certain of our operations and make "several bites of the cherry."

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8
Question: If a "real" peace is achieved, what effect would this have upon the offices under DD/P?

General Smith: Well, I'm afraid that the question is academic ~~in itself~~ insofar as the lifetime of most of us is concerned, and while I would have to answer that I don't know exactly, I don't think that that is anything that you need to worry about in the immediately foreseeable future. Let's reserve that one for, let us say, the 28th or 38th or 58th Orientation Course.

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14
Question: Do you feel that unanimity reduces the strength of many of the estimates?

General Smith: We rarely have unanimity, and we don't strive for it. We don't make any effort to obtain it, so that itself is an academic question. As a matter of fact, the dissenting opinion is encouraged if it's a valid one; and if the dissenter is easily argued out of his position, then probably his dissent isn't worth very much.

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Question: It has been said that the military commanders didn't have reliance or confidence in the intelligence people and, therefore, much was known to them which was not to the intelligence men, and that that had an effect on the estimates. Would you comment on this?

General Smith: I don't think that reliance or confidence has anything to do with the problem. It is simply the acute realization of the necessity for security in connection with military plans and operations which has been driven home to the personnel involved in exercising command. By a long series of tragic events over a period of years, the inescapable conclusion has been arrived at that the more people who know about these things, the more insecure are plans and operations. Consequently, the tendency always is to hold on to information as tightly and closely as possible and not to give it out. It's the "need to know" theory raised to the nth power. Actually, we do disseminate information much too widely; that's inherent in our bureaucratic system. Everybody wants to know; a lot of the people who want to know and who don't really need to know are able to establish their right to know regardless of what the intelligence chap or the operational chap feels about it. Where military or other knowledge is required for the production of an intelligence estimate, the solution, in my opinion, lies in providing the intelligence producer with a series of assumptions which need not reveal the plan, or which need not be entirely accurate, or which may even be fictitious, because it is possible with such assumptions to produce an intelligence estimate which the operational commander himself may scale down. I don't think that anything better will ever be produced until we set up on the highest level some machinery for coordinated G-2 and G-3 estimates; and whether that is possible or not, I don't know.

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16
Question: Shouldn't we be proud of the fact that there is a CIA in the United States coordinating intelligence and, therefore, do more to win a better understanding of what we do and why we do it on the part of the press and the American people?

General Smith: Well, that's a question that has plagued us for a long time. There's a great deal to be said for that idea, but the United States needs one silent service and I think that it would be all to the good if we could so qualify. We can't, of course. Under our laws and under the rights of Congress, there

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there are necessities for discussion. We could not, for instance, get the money that we need if we didn't tell a good deal about our operations; and as their scope increases and as their cost increases, the necessity increases for telling more people about it--in Congress, for example. So the only happy medium that we can draw is to say as little as possible consistent with the necessity for safeguarding our sources and our methods of operation. The American press generally, at least those who are deserving of consideration, who know something about the problems of securing and utilizing information because that's their business too, are basically respectful of an institution which talks as little as possible.

* * *

 Question: Are our relationships with Congress good?

General Smith: Yes, although they are extremely limited, and that, of course, in itself is all to the good. In our actual dealing with Congress, our discussions have been limited to only two or three people on the appropriate committee in each of the two Houses, and those with whom we deal are fully alive to the necessity of security. During the time that I've been here, there has never been any--even the slightest--breach of security from those members of the two Houses with whom we have dealt. As a matter of fact, they are extremely reluctant to have it known that it is they who look into our little business because they fear, and quite justly, that there would be a demand from others also to be permitted to know.

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

4 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT: Proposed Release of Vice President Nixon's Remarks

REFERENCES: a. Memorandum from DD/P to DCI dtd 25 February 53;
Subject: "Proposed Release of Vice President Nixon's Remarks, to the field. (Att. 1)
b. Text of Speech by the Honorable Richard Nixon at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course

1. The attachments listed above came to me from the Publications Office of the DD/P for publication as an Agency dissemination. Since I was of the opinion that an issuance such as this has no place in the regulatory system (Regulations, Notices and Handbooks) of the Agency, the matter was referred to [] and Colonel White for determination as to the form and manner in which the desired dissemination could be arranged.

2. The Assistant DD/A has instructed me to advise that Training has been designated as the most appropriate office for the preparation of this material for both headquarters and field dissemination. He also advised that [] concurs with this designation.

3. For your information, [] has expressed the view to me that proper field distribution would appear to be that given the most widely distributed "News Letter". This apparently is all Chiefs of field activities--both of DD/P and DD/I. Further, the Publications Staff of the DD/P can no doubt assist you in any matters of sterilization of the field distribution and in effecting the actual distribution.

[]
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director (Admin.)

Enclosures - 1
References a and b

SA/DDA:EDE:mes (/ March 1953)
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2

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Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
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25 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Release of Vice President Nixon's Remarks, to the field.

1. You requested me to look over the attached report of Vice President Nixon's statements at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course, and to provide to you my opinion as to the desirability of sending copies of this report to our field stations as an item of interest and general information. I have read the report and it is my conclusion that it would be desirable to forward copies of it to our field stations. It might be pointed out in a brief introductory paragraph that Mr. Nixon throughout most of his speech was purporting to give a picture of what he considers to be certain congressional points of view. Mr. Nixon made this statement several times during the course of his remarks, but I consider it desirable to emphasize this point since otherwise the field might draw the conclusion that the remarks represent current "national policy", which is not necessarily the case in all respects.

2. The references to the whys and wherefores of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences (pages 5 and 6) and certain statements at the top of page 7 as to what caused the Communist take-over of China, are of course controversial subjects. But since, as indicated above, Mr. Nixon puts these points forward as representative of congressional opinion, I can see no objection to their being included in what goes forward to the field. Moreover, I don't think it would be wise for us to attempt to revise Mr. Nixon's statements in any way or to provide any balancing commentary, even with respect to the most controversial points. There is, in my opinion, much to be said for the point of view expressed by Mr. Nixon on these points, even though one does not have to accept his rationale completely.

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FRANK G. WISNER
 Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment

Transcript of subject remarks.

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Noted and approved for dissemination to the field by DCI
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53-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 3

6 March 1953

SUBJECT: Address of the Vice President of the United States,
The Honorable Richard Nixon

1. The Vice President, the Honorable Richard Nixon, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course, on 10 February 1953, spoke on the current world situation.

2. The Vice President pointed out that he spoke on this subject from a Congressional point of view, and as representative of Congressional opinion. His address should not, therefore, be interpreted in its entirety as representing current national policy.

3. Some of the subjects about which the Vice President spoke are, of course, controversial, but it is believed that his speech and his point of view will be of universal interest throughout the Agency.

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution #__

JOB NO. _____ BOX NO. _____ FLD NO. _____ DOC. NO. 31 NO CHANGE
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

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NO.

DATE

27 MARCH 1953

| TO— | ROOM NO. | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS |
|-----|--------------|----------|-----------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | | |
| | 227 ADMIN | | 4/3/53 | | <p><u>Please return to</u> <u>me at 1309 Eye</u></p> <p><u>Bldg -</u> <u>2D</u></p> <p>1-2 Thank you. Returned it as soon as I could.</p> <p><u>file</u> <u>TR Bulletin</u></p> |
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THE HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON - 27

AT THE - 6

NINTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE - 32

10 February 1953-16

When Mr. Dulles invited me to talk before this group, I had very grave doubts as to what I might be able to contribute to this program. That you are all experts or potential experts in a very specialized field was clear to me when I read the contents of the printed program showing both the coverage of subject matter and the biographic sketches of the participants. I, therefore, know that I would be out of my depth were I to attempt to compete with intelligence experts in talking to you. Thus, it appeared that my most appropriate contribution to this training course should come from a recognition of your interest in gathering and analyzing facts which are then used as the basis for forming National Intelligence Estimates for the National Security Council of which I am a statutory member. Further, realizing that whatever is done in the formulation of foreign policy must in the final analysis receive the support and approval of the Congress, I felt I would attempt something which is rather unusual--namely, analyze the current situation with which we are confronted in the world as seen through the eyes of an average U. S. Congressman or Senator. This I can do because I have been an average Congressman and Senator. This I would like to do because much misunderstanding exists in the Executive Departments and Agencies regarding the

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Congress, both House and Senate, much of which is attributable to a tendency to be overly fearful of what the Congressman or Senator is going to think or do and, hence, what must be done to make him act in "proper fashion."

I came to the House in 1947 just at the beginning of the period when we were developing the programs which you are working with and under today. That was the year of CIA's creation in the National Security Act of 1947. Naturally, what I say will be colored to a great extent by my own background and experiences. However, in working up my thoughts today I have attempted to make them representative of the thoughts of most of the Senators and Congressmen, both Republican and Democrats--probably more Republicans--who believe that some changes in the direction and attitudes of our foreign, military and security policies need to be made.

First, I believe it is appropriate to start with an analysis of our foreign policy as inherited from the past administration. The first question we have to ask ourselves is whether this policy ought to be continued as is--intact--or modified to some degree. Fairness demands that we pose the query as to whether or not that policy has been successful. To answer this question we must go back at least to the end of World War II--the most costly war in the history of the world. That was the time when the people of the United States had great hopes for the future, with our complete military superiority, based justifiably on the possession of the best Army, Navy and Air Force plus the monopoly of the atomic bomb.

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In scanning the peoples of the world we felt that all were on our side with the exception of possibly 180 million to 200 million in the USSR and the satellites. Such was the situation at the end of World War II.

Since that time the Congress has appropriated approximately 100 billion dollars for military purposes and about 33 to 35 billion for foreign aid, most of which has gone to Europe.

We also developed certain plans and programs--the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, and others which were designed to stop the march of aggressive Communism throughout the world and to roll back that tide. But as we analyze the results of that policy today and after all, people in political life think usually in terms of results and not in terms of causes and excuses, no matter how good those excuses may be, I believe that most of us get somewhat of a shock in finding that we have lost our military supremacy--though not completely, certainly to a great degree. For example, we are stronger in strategic air power but we are definitely weaker in tactical air. Even though we are more powerful on the sea, I think even good Navy men, and I happen to be one, will admit that we are probably weaker under the sea. We no longer have a monopoly on the atomic bomb although, of course, we derive consolation from our conviction that we have many more and better ones than our enemy.

As far as peoples in the world are concerned, and that, of course, is the most dramatic part of this analysis, we find that we have lost 600 million people to Communist control, for various reasons, some of them probably pretty good.

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Now those are the facts--the facts which concern the average U. S. Congressman, the average U. S. Senator, and accordingly the average American. Since this policy seems to have failed in some instances, the question arises as to how this did happen.

~~At~~ At this point I reject two extremes that probably you will find today in the Congress of the United States and through our country. One extreme contends that the only reason this happened is because the people that made the policy intended it that way. This morning I do not intend to go into any detail on the question of disloyalty in the Government. But without minimizing the importance of this problem, I think any reasonable person rejects the idea that the failures we have had in foreign policy since World War II have to any considerable extent been caused because those who made the policies deliberately intended that they fail.

At the other extreme is the fatalistic view of those who say that the results were inevitable because of the cleverness and aggressiveness of imperialistic Russian Communism. Proponents of this view conclude that the chicanery and subversive methods of the Soviets in their use of means that we would never adopt brought results which gave them their great successes and gains and that nothing we could or would have done would have changed the results.

I repeat that both of these extreme viewpoints must be rejected because I think that there is another ground which represents better the thinking of the great majority of the members of the House and the Senate and which I believe is representative of the American viewpoint. Frankly, it doesn't make a great deal of difference why it happened, except, per-

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haps, from the academic standpoint we may avoid the errors of tomorrow by examining the mistakes of yesterday. Today it doesn't make a great deal of difference to stable, current, national security whether those who made the policies intended them to fail or whether the failures were due to bad judgment. The important fact of the moment is that we are confronted with current errors in policy and recognizing the mistakes we must develop new policies that will not contain in them the seeds of error which caused the failures of our present policies.

At this point I believe some general conclusions can be drawn. In the first place I think the great basic error which has caused our present difficulties is that we misjudged the character of the world Communist conspiracy. It was, perhaps, quite easy to do that. All of us who served in World War II welcomed the participation of the Russians in that war. We recognized the great contribution that they made and we were happy in the realization that the assistance of Russia cut down the contributions and sacrifices that would have to be made by American men and American women. But as a result of this and because of very clever propaganda in the United States by persons whom we have since learned to recognize as actually serving the conspiracy of international Communism, an idea grew up even in high places in the United States that the Communist movement, the Communists, themselves, the power center of the Soviet Union, were all segments of a great peace-loving democracy and that, you could, therefore, trust the men in the Kremlin and believe what they said at the conference table. Yalta and Potsdam were primarily the results of that mistaken concept. Though some of those who attended the conferences

Directly of course, a very good example of the way the Communists work - but it may be that the Communists are not so stupid as they are often portrayed to be.

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had serious doubts about the sincerity of Soviet expressions, we know that these doubts were not ventilated in the open and ~~were~~ removed. If they were made known at all, it was not until after the conferences took place. Thus, we must reach the conclusion that one of the basic reasons for the difficulties that exist today goes back to the concessions that were made at these conferences and that such concessions were ^{granted} because of a fundamental error in judging the character of the men in the Kremlin who run the Communist conspiracy.

Even after we began to recognize the fact that the men in the Kremlin could not be trusted at the conference table, we note a second fundamental error which, of course, is related to the first, viz., that we failed to realize that the Soviets were engaged in a conspiracy--a revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the free nations. Even when we did realize this fact, we failed to appreciate fully the global character of that conspiracy. There was a theory, which, incidentally, is still prevalent in some places and can be sustained by fairly effective argument, holding that what we are confronted with in the world today is not World Communism but simply Russian imperialism which has taken the form of Communism. Hence, as we look over the past seven years, we find that in too many places there were people who said Communism was a danger within Russia. Some people of this kind would go even further and say that Communism was dangerous in Germany and possibly in Greece, in Turkey, in France, in Italy, but that Communism in Asia, and specifically Communism in China and in the United States was a different kind altogether. Such oversimplification, I remind you, is an effort to give you the average

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thinking of those in the national legislature which is representative of the country at large. The result of that line of thinking is quite obvious because it was the basis for what happened in China and, of course, what happened in China caused what happened in Korea. From my own experience I give you an example which I think points up the falsity of that approach and which, at the same time, proves the point that Communism is a global conspiracy, as President Eisenhower said in his State-of-the-Union message.

~~Sup~~ I was in Europe in 1947 with the Herter Committee. Allen Dulles was one of our advisers, without pay as I recall, and he did an excellent job. I am sure he will agree with me when I make the observation that if more members of the House and Senate could go on such trips, we would experience less difficulty in getting programs through the House and the Senate which are needed for the security of the country. The Herter Committee, as you recall, was making studies as to the needs of the various countries of Europe for Marshall Plan funds. Our recommendations to the House were in a large part accepted and resulted in the adoption of the ECA program in the House and, of course, its counterpart, ⁱⁿ the Senate. On that European trip some of us made it a point not only to talk to the heads of the governments which were anti-Communist in the countries which we visited, but whenever and wherever we could we got an audience or an interview with the Communist leaders. This was of particular interest to me because I wanted to see what made them tick.

I remember on one occasion a very interesting conversation I had with Togliatti, the leader of the Communist party in Italy. One segment

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I remember quite vividly. I informed him that I was a member of the Labor Committee of the United States House of Representatives and that, consequently, I was interested in his thinking on labor problems. I said, "Mr. Togliatti: In the event that the Communists take over in Italy (the Italian elections were coming up within a few months) what kind of a program would you favor as far as labor is concerned? Do you believe, for example, that labor unions should be free of government control, and that the right to strike should be protected and guaranteed?"

A translation was made--he thought a moment, and his answer to these questions was "Yes." Obviously, he had to answer in this fashion because he was not in power at that time. After the answer was given I told him I was very glad to hear his reply because that was the kind of policy we had in the United States.

Then I added, "Labor unions are free in the United States and, of course, strikes are going on right now. Of course, you realize, Mr. Togliatti, that in the Soviet Union such is not the case because the labor unions there are completely dominated and controlled by the government and the right to strike is denied."

The translation was made and he looked at me in a not-too-friendly manner and said: "Well, I don't think that the Congressman and I understand each other. The reason why the right to strike has to be guaranteed in the United States or in any capitalist country is that there the labor policy is dominated by employers, reactionaries and capitalists. Therefore, the workers must have some protection against such exploiters.

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But in the Soviet Union we have no employers, reactionaries or capitalists and, hence, the right to strike need not be guaranteed in the USSR."

I said: "That is very interesting. Now let me ask you another question. In our conversation up to this point you have been extremely critical of the foreign policy of the United States. Certainly, you cannot contend that all of what you call 'aggressive intent, aggressive actions and imperialism' is on the side of the United States. Do you have any criticism whatever of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union on the ground that it is imperialistic? After all, you are an Italian, and sitting here in the middle you certainly cannot put all of the blame on our side when there are two great powers apparently involved in this conflict. In other words, is the policy of the Soviet Union imperialistic in any respect?"

Again the translation was made. I received the same rather unfriendly glance and then a very interesting answer. Said Mr. Togliatti, "Again the Congressman and I are not speaking or understanding quite the same language. The reason why the foreign policy of the United States is imperialistic is that it is dominated by employers, reactionaries and capitalists. In the Soviet Union we have no employers, reactionaries or capitalists. Therefore, it is impossible for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to be imperialistic. It is a people's policy, it is always right and is never subject to any criticism whatever."

I asked the same series of questions of Arthur Horner, the head of the miners' union in Britain and received the same answers cloaked in a British accent. I have asked the same series of questions of William

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Z. Foster, in a little different way, of course, because he happens to be an American citizen. Very pertinent for our purposes is the testimony of Foster before the Judiciary Committee in 1948 which was considering legislation to control the Communist Party in the United States. Senator Ferguson of Michigan questioned him at length as to whether members of the Communist Party of the United States would fight on the side of the United States in the event of an aggressive war begun by the Soviet Union. For approximately thirty minutes, Foster, in a very able display of mental footwork and gymnastics, side stepping, twisting, and turning, contended over and over again that the question was hypothetical because he said it was impossible for him to conceive of an aggressive war by a people's government, to wit, the Soviet Union. Therefore, in his estimation it was not necessary for him to determine whether or not he, or other members of the Communist Party would fight in such a war because it was impossible that such a war could occur. These examples are sufficient to show the global character of the Communist threat.

Accordingly, it seems to me that we made a basic mistake in failing to realize this fact. The Communist, wherever he exists, whether in Moscow, China, Korea or in the United States is essentially the same--owing his loyalty not to his own country, in the event that he is not a citizen of the Soviet Union or a satellite country, but to the power center, the Soviet Union, and to others who control the world Communist conspiracy. Yugoslavia, of course, is the present exception which proves the rule. Thus, I conclude that our mistaken evaluation of the global nature of the Communist strategy had much to do with the failure of our policy in China.

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Compare, for example, the policy that we adopted in Greece with what we adopted in China. Though the terrain was much smaller and the complexity of the Grecian problem not at all as great, we could have applied to China some of the recognition of the Communist threat which motivated our actions in Greece in 1947. Over and over again we repeated the theme that the Chinese Nationalist Government was corrupt, that it was unstable and for those reasons that the support we had given was no good and no further help was justified. I was in Greece in 1947 and if there was any more corrupt or unstable government in the world than what Greece had in 1947, I would like to have seen it. It changed twice in two weeks while I was there and, yet, what did we do? We went in there and General Van Fleet did a magnificent job of training the Greeks so that they could defend themselves. As a result of our positive action, the Greeks met the Communist threat and met it effectively and at the present time, with our continued support, Greece is still on our side. Thus, as we look at the situation in Asia, it would seem that some of the same medicine possibly might have made the difference.

All of these, of course, are problems and mistakes which have been made in the past and the question is: Where do we go from here? As we analyze the problem of the immediate and distant future, may I say again that the only reason we discussed the past today is to make sure that we do not make those same mistakes tomorrow. As we determine where we go from here, I consider it proper that we look at some basic factors. The first basic one is: What do we want? Well, we want peace, not peace at any price, of course, but certainly peace at as high a price as we can pay without losing the honor of our nation. Secondly, the

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United States will never use war as an instrument of policy. Our Secretary of State underscored in a very effective manner this point before he went to Europe. However, the Kremlin, when confronted by a potential enemy, will use war as an instrument of policy, and so the key to peace is to see what actions or failures to act on our part will cause the Kremlin to act or fail to act at a critical time. Accordingly, it is appropriate that we analyze from all viewpoints the enemy with whom we are dealing--the man in the Kremlin, the man who is trained and brought up on the bibles which the Communists read and follow, viz., Marx, Lenin, Stalin. Without prying too deeply we are confronted with certain conclusions which are inescapable. First, the men in the Kremlin are realists. Hence, though they are bent on world revolution, though they will use war as an instrument of policy, they will not begin a world war until they are convinced they can win it. Second, they have a sense of history in that they are willing to wait not only through their own lifetimes but even longer than that, if it takes such time to reach the point where they can win the world conflict. Therefore, if we want peace, we must do several things. First, we must exert every effort to make sure that in the world the balance of power, from a military standpoint, is actually in our favor so that the Kremlin could not win a war if it began one. By the words, "in our favor," I do not mean quantity as much as I stress quality of arms and adequate training. Secondly, we must make the men in the Kremlin believe that the military balance, to which we have just referred, is in our favor because if they actually miscalculate by arriving at erroneous conclusions by reason of something we have done or failed to do, then, regardless of the power balance, war will come. Thus, I cannot overstress the importance of making sure that the

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military balance of power is actually on our side and to underscore our responsibility to make sure that we do nothing which will cause the men in the Kremlin to miscalculate our strength and begin a major world war, which, in a sense, no one will win. Thirdly, we must acknowledge that besides our military strength at home, we need allies abroad, because 150 million people obviously cannot stand up against 800 million people. Not only do we need allies but we need as many as we can get.

And so, the policies of the next few years, in large measure, will have to continue the policies which have developed during the past seven years, particularly with regard to Europe. If we keep the United States militarily strong at home, we must strive to get as many militarily strong allies as we can abroad.

But military strength alone is not enough. In this struggle for the world we are confronted with men who are very pragmatic about what they need to achieve their goals of conquest. Thus, they have developed new tactics of aggression with which you are familiar and which have proved themselves successful. Let's face the stark fact that by such tactics 600 million people have been won by the Soviets in seven years without the loss of a single Russian soldier in combat--at least none admittedly lost in combat. These new tactics of aggression developed by the Soviets do not contemplate the use of armed force involving the armies of the power center, itself--the Soviet Union. What are such techniques? Some of them, of course, are quite obvious.

a. The use of internal subversion, employing not only the traditional foreign agents but also agents who are nationals of the countries involved. Czechoslovakia is, perhaps, the most

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striking example of how a nation can be taken over through a coup d'etat in which the principals were Czechs and, yet, they owed their allegiance to a foreign power.

b. Next is the fomenting of revolution. This tactic used in various parts of the world, in Asia particularly, has been quite obviously employed in China. And again we note the instances in which the involuntary forces are made up of nationalisms of the countries involved and in which the forces of the USSR power center are not committed.

c. Extremely important is the great new weapon of economic, political, and psychological warfare.

Our answer, to some extent, is quite obvious. First, on the economic side, we must be as sound at home as we can possibly be—that means balance. There are times, undoubtedly, when you may wonder why the Congress hesitates to approve appropriation requests for funds which you feel are needed for adequate military purposes or for foreign aid programs. I can assure you that this is not negativism on the part of the Congress but rather a sober attitude to be convinced of the necessity for the expenditures, because the greatest asset the free world has in the present struggle, and the importance of this point was emphasized in President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message, is a sound, free, productive, American economy. Thus the total program of the nation must be in balance, and I am sure that the policies recommended to the President by the National Security Council will always aim at achieving this result, namely, that we give as much support as we can to the development and maintenance of ^{needed} ~~needed~~

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military strength for ourselves and the free world without destroying the basic economy which is our greatest asset and advantage in the battle for civilization in which we are engaged. This will demand of us that, while we maintain a sound economy at home in realistic fashion, we must shore up the economy of nations abroad so that they, themselves, may be militarily strong and, also, that they may develop a strong economy, because in such a climate, there is less likelihood that the Communist conspirator will be able to appeal to the masses of the people and sell his doctrines.

This last point compels me to inject a word of warning. I do not subscribe to the views of those who say that the answer to Communism, whether in the United States or abroad, is solely economic well being. Any of you who analyze this point will reach the same conclusion which is already expressed in the Bible that man does not live by bread alone. Economic strength is, of course, a definite factor entering into the present struggle. Certainly, where economic unrest prevails and hunger exists, you have a fertile field in which the Communist ideas can grow and prosper. But economic strength alone is not the complete answer, and I use again the classic example of Czechoslovakia. There was probably a no more advanced country in Europe at the time of the coup d'etat than that nation, and, yet, the Communist movement flourished and in a most effective manner.

Walt In addition to economic soundness, we must have internal security at home. I won't belabor that point because I believe it is in good hands at the present time. This is a most difficult problem, and I can imagine that some of you who have followed the work of some of us, as we have investigated subversive activities in the United States, are concerned about these

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investigations and the trend that they take in this country. I think, perhaps, that some concern is justified, because a very delicate balance must be maintained in this field between security on the one side and freedom on the other. This is not always easy to maintain.

I am sure that if you took a vote of the Congress of the United States --a secret vote, or perhaps, a public one--they would support a movement to put all the Communists in this country in one boat and ship them to the USSR, even though, of course, that might be technically impossible. That, however, gives you an idea of the temper of the Congress on this problem. This is somewhat symbolic of other easy solutions which are offered: for example, the outlawing of the Communist Party in the United States. This sounds laudable and easy but, unfortunately, as indicated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this is an unworkable solution. Therefore, we must be constantly on our guard that we do not resort to totalitarian police methods in dealing with the conspiracy in this country and, thus, adopt within our own borders the methods which we have criticized in our enemies abroad for dealing with dissidents in their countries. I leave with you the conviction that those of us who have been in the Congressional investigative field and others who are presently engaged in this activity have a realization of how constant care must be exerted not to kill the patient we are attempting to cure.

Finally, I believe we will all agree that the bolstering of our national defense in the development of political and psychological counterattack is essential. For example, I think that President Eisenhower's announcement that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be used to blockade the Chinese Communist coast from raids from Formosa, and his statement that

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a request would be made on the Congress for a resolution to repudiate secret agreements are worthwhile examples of taking the offensive in psychological warfare, besides the fact that, from other standpoints, these steps should have a great effect. Such steps as these mean only two things when they are interpreted to the world. One is that we back our friends and the other that we will not write off the captive peoples. So much for analyzing the Congressional mind--assuming that any Congressman or Senator has a mind.

I admit,
That is a debatable point!

Now, what is our new policy to be? First of all, I believe that the general outlines of that policy have been set forth in President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union Message and in the recent speech by Secretary of State, Dulles. I do think that a summary of that policy, as I see it, might be appropriate and of interest at this time. Basically, the new policy represents a change in attitude--a change in emphasis. I am sure that we are not going to see too many evidences of drastic moves which would indicate to the people of this country, or to the peoples of the world, that the policy is of a radically new type. The action regarding the Seventh Fleet, the pronouncement regarding secret agreements are good examples of this appreciation. In this analysis we inevitably grapple with the word "containment." Even though the policy concepts underlying "containment" may have served some useful purpose up to the present time, which I rather doubt, still, I believe that we have arrived at the point where the word "containment" means a static policy--a draw in the conflict in which we are engaged. In fact, it means victory for neither side. What we have

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failed to realize is that the alternative to "containment" is not all-out, total war but rather the winning of the cold war. As President Eisenhower indicated, only by winning the cold war can we avoid the hot war. To achieve this goal of tangible victory, some immediate objectives come to mind:

First. The most difficult goal of all is the winning of the war in Korea. Victory in Korea is of prime concern to our nation. I know that some peculiar arguments can be made, but always in quiet fashion --never in the open, because you could never convince the American people of this--contending that the continuance of the war in Korea is a good thing for the United States. Supporting this spurious position are statements to the effect that we should look at the casualty ratio in Korea--five to one in our favor. Now, this position is untenable because it is political dynamite which the people of the United States would never buy, and, furthermore, approaching it from just the standpoint of a layman, it would seem to me that all we have to do is realize that in the past two years or so of the Korean war, we have suffered 130 thousand casualties and the Soviet Union hasn't had any. Again, it is the old problem of keeping our eye on the main target, and winning the current war in Korea must be the first objective of such a policy.

Second. Our second objective, which is, of course, related to our past policy, is to allow no further solidification of Soviet holdings in satellite countries and no extension of their boundaries, because it is obvious that if they forge strength within their dynasty and bring further terrain under their command, they may calculate that they can begin a war--a World War--and win it.

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Third. We must avoid trouble at home and keep under control the inevitable problems which we will have with the Nations which we consider to be on our side. Without this approach, the strength which we develop will be sapped of its potency.

Finally, and this is the most important ingredient in what we mean by "dynamic" policy, is to roll back the enemy strength if we possibly can. Even though some consideration of this factor existed in past policy, I am convinced that we are going to see a stepping up of attitude and emphasis to reduce Soviet gains, to puncture the Communist conspiracy and to stir up just as much trouble as we possible can in the satellite countries and in the Soviet Union proper.

This is a big order--a very big order. The objectives we have outlined certainly have been in the minds of our policy makers during the past two or three years. They are in our minds today, and we are hopeful that we will be able to translate these concepts into appropriate actions. Regardless of our thinking in wishful manner for easy answers, we must constantly admonish ourselves that in this field of foreign policy there are none.

The objectives for an affirmative foreign policy can be attained only by the support which policy makers must receive from you. I speak now as a member of the Administration and as a member of the National Security Council, which is the greatest consumer of your product, to emphasize that knowledge of the facts is essential if we are to make the right decisions. Essentially, that is why we have to have intelligence. Perhaps the best proof of this point is the rather obvious truth that with better intelligence support our nation might have avoided most of our present difficulties.

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Better intelligence might have put our leaders on notice as to the true character of the Communists, the men in the Kremlin, the men we were dealing with across the table at Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran. Better intelligence might have given us a greater appreciation of the overall global character of the Communist movement. For example, if we had better intelligence, we might not have made, what I think was, a fatal error in judgment as to the character of the Chinese Communist movement in the early days of its development. We would have known that the Chinese Communist was no different, essentially, than his counterpart in the satellite countries in eastern Europe and that, therefore, the choice in China was not between a Nationalist Government and something better but between the Nationalist Government and something far, far worse. This, therefore, is your job, to gather and analyze in impartial manner all the facts and to make the findings available to those who have to make the policy.

Start I recognize that this is a tough job. I know that some of your assignments will be dangerous and, simultaneously, interesting. I realize, also, that many of you have already served well in difficult undertakings. In an organization of this type, which must be a kind of silent shock absorber, I can imagine that there are times when your tasks seem boring and maybe completely meaningless, because you may not be in a position to see the entire picture. Hence, when you are tempted to ask yourselves such questions as: "Why do we get this?" "Why do we have to spend precious time in such tasks as these?" I admonish you to have confidence in those who direct your activities, and without allowing your efforts to be neutralized, that you do the job which has been assigned to you, because, I say this advisedly, there

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is no job in our present government which, I think, is more important than the task which you ladies and gentlemen will be doing in the years ahead.

In my experiences as a Congressional investigator of Communist activities in the United States, I have been impressed by a number of things, but, particularly, by the kind of people who have become Communists in our country. Though most of you are knowledgeable in this field, my own conclusions may interest you. What kind of men were Alger Hiss, John Apt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Victor Perlo and, I will add, incidentally, the atomic scientists and others who came before our committee and refused to answer questions on the grounds of incrimination? What kind of people were they? First of all, they were all born in the United States and, secondly, they were sensitive, intelligent, able people. Almost without exception, they were the graduates of the best colleges and universities of this country. Not one of them acted just for monetary gain but was motivated by fanatical belief and devotion in the cause in which he was working. Each believed so deeply that he was willing to do anything for the cause--a boring job, if need be. He was also willing to do a very dangerous job--one that would run the danger of a jail sentence and of holding himself and his family up to disgrace in his community and among his friends. Often have I thought, during the past three to four years, as I have seen these people parade before us--these young, intelligent, able people--of the need for people on our side as devoted to our cause as Communists are devoted to theirs.

When I was in Europe in 1947 and again in 1951, I had the opportunity to talk privately with three or four individuals who were members of this Agency. I saw in those individuals what is certainly the answer I have been

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looking for--the answer to the devotion which the Communists have on their side. I know that it takes a devoted and dedicated man or woman to do the job that you are doing. This may sound like flag waving to you, but most sincerely do I conclude on this note: The conflict in which we are engaged in the world is great and complex. It is military in character, economic in character, political in character. But, over all, it is a conflict for the minds and the hearts and the souls of men. Our enemies are dedicated to their cause. We need dedicated people on our side. General Smith, to you and to Mr. Dulles do I say, as a member of this Administration, and I know that I represent the views of the Commander-in-Chief, the President, we are very proud to have serving the United States a group of dedicated men and women--the people who are members of this Agency. Good luck and Godspeed!

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